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Abstract 
 
 
 
 This work is a study of the ethical thought of Johann Gottfried Herder.  I examine 
the development of his ethics from 1765 through 1791.  I contend that the earliest texts 
express a set of ideas that Herder modified and developed throughout the rest of his 
work.  These are a perfectionist conception of the end of human life, a belief in the 
centrality of history for ethics, a form of naturalism, and a commitment to the idea that 
every individual ought to blend their characteristic powers into a harmonious whole.    
 The study considers a set of texts in chronological order.  I begin with an 
examination of the ideals espoused by Herder in two texts from the 1760s, “Wie die 
Philosophie zum Besten des Volks Allgemeiner und Nützlicher Werden Kann” and 
Journal meiner Reise im Jahr 1769.  I then look at an exchange of letters between Herder 
and Moses Mendelssohn concerning the highest good, or vocation of man.  I then look at 
how the ideas sketched in these earlier works were filled out in Abhandlung über den 
Ursprung der Sprache (1772), Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der 
Menschheit (1774), Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele (1774-8), 
and Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-91). 
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Introduction 
 
 
I 
 
 T. Churchill, in the translator’s preface to the 1800 English language translation 
of Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, writes of his 
experience translating Herder: 
…many moments of bodily pain and mental anxiety has it sweetly beguiled; and 
while it has made my breast glow with the fervor of virtuous sentiment, I have 
almost felt myself the inhabitant of another world. May others feel from the 
perusal what I have done from the performance; and then no one, I hope, will lay 
down the book, without being able to say, that he is a happier and better man.1 
   
This is not the only reference to the effect of reading Herder that strikes such a tone.  
Herder receives a significant mention in one of the greatest novels of the nineteenth-
century, Tolstoy’s War and Peace.  In a central moment of the novel, Pierre Bezukhov 
counsels the despondent Prince Andrei Bolkhonski: 
“You say you can’t see the kingdom of the good and the true on earth.  I didn’t 
see it either; and it can’t be seen if you look at our life as the end of everything.  
On earth, I mean this earth” (Pierre pointed to the fields), “there is no truth – but 
in the universe, in the whole universe, there is the kingdom of the true, and we are 
now children of the earth, but eternally – children of the whole universe.  Don’t I 
feel in my soul that I make up a part of that huge, harmonious whole?  Don’t I feel 
that, among the countless number of beings in which the divinity – the higher 
power – whatever you like – is manifest, I make up one link, one step from lower 
beings to higher?  If I see, see clearly, this ladder that leads from plant to man, 
then why should I suppose that this ladder, the lower end of which I do not see, is 
lost in the plants?  Why should I suppose that this ladder stops with me and does 
not lead further and further to higher beings?  I feel not only that I cannot 
                                                
1 Translator’s preface to Johann Gottfried Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man, trans. 
T. Churchill (London: Luke Hansard, 1800), p. iv. 
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disappear, as nothing disappears in the world, but that I will always be and have 
always been.  I feel that, besides me, above me, spirits live, and that in this world 
there is truth.” 
“Yes, that’s Herder’s teaching,” said Prince Andrei, “but that, dear heart, 
does not convince me; life and death are what convince me.”2 
 
 For the present moment, I wish to set aside the issue of the accuracy of these 
portrayals.3  What I want to draw attention to is that in both passages we can see that 
Herder was regarded as a thinker who had something to offer us in our ethical reflections, 
even for our improvement.  This facet of his thought is foregrounded, and both writers 
suggest that Herder is a philosopher to be read for moral edification.4 
 This stands in stark contrast to the majority of Herder scholarship, which has not 
frequently made his ethical thought an object of detailed study.  Admittedly, there are 
frequent passing references to Herder’s ethical views by scholars.  However, these are 
almost always interjected as a background consideration in the midst of an account of his 
philosophy of history, language, social theory, or aesthetics.5  This is understandable, as 
                                                
2 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Knopf, 2007), 
p. 389.  It is worth noting that Pierre achieves this transformation, in part, through an involvement in 
freemasonry, and that Herder was also a freemason from early in his adulthood.  Tolstoy may have been 
aware of this. 
3 The passage from Tolstoy comes closest to offering an actual interpretation of Herder, and I think that 
there are elements of it that are correct, but others that are wrong or misleading.  Where I think it seems to 
go wrong, in brief, is that it intonates that the meaning of a human life is something transcendent and has 
to do with the existence of spirits or “higher beings”.  As I will try to show in the present work, I think that 
Herder’s account of the highest good does not at all rely on such notions.   
4 Throughout the rest of this text, I do not distinguish between the ‘ethical’, as an account of how one 
should live, and the ‘moral’, as concerned with duties and obligations.  I admit the fruitfulness that such a 
distinction can have, as has been argued in Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), chapter 10.  I believe nonetheless that imposing a 
distinction of this kind onto Herder, or forcing an inquiry into his works to conform to such a distinction, 
would be arduous and distortive.   
5 The most noteworthy exceptions to this are Benjamin D. Crowe, "Herder’s Moral Philosophy: 
Perfectionism, Sentimentalism, and Theism," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, no. 6 
(2012); Heiko Joosten, Selbst, Substanz und Subjekt: Die ethische und politische Relevanz der personalen 
Identität bei Descartes, Herder und Hegel (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2005); Sonia Sikka, 
Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).   
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Herder never published a text that presents a moral or ethical theory in the traditional 
form.6  Nonetheless, Herder’s works are filled with rich and intriguing discussions of 
virtue, happiness, the relationship between history and morality, and the aim of human 
lives.  With the increasing philosophical attention being paid to Herder, it would be 
unfortunate for these issues to be left in the margins.   
 The present study, I hope, will contribute to filling in this gap in the scholarship.  
It will not necessarily undermine or contradict the interpretations of Herder’s other views 
that have been developed by others.  Rather, I believe that much of what is presented in 
the present work complements the best scholarship, even if that work has focused on 
other aspects of his thought.  
 
II 
 
The present study aims to offer an account of the central ideas of Herder’s ethical 
thought.  I believe that there are four fundamental ideas of Herder’s ethics that run 
through the works that will be considered.  These ideas are developed in different ways 
over the course of Herder’s career, and are drawn together into a coherent whole in his 
later works.  The four central notions are a perfectionist account of the telos of human 
life, an insistence on the centrality of history for understanding human activity, a 
commitment to a form of naturalism, and a defense of the importance of a harmoniously 
                                                                                                                                                          
Works devoted to systematic issues in moral philosophy that draw on Herder are rare, but the 
important exception are Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1992); The Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
6 In fact, there is a general challenge for finding a text that offers new readers a way entry into Herder’s 
thought as a whole.  There is no central text that serves for him as as the Treatise of Human Nature does 
for Hume or the Ethics for Spinoza.  For more on this, see Michael Morton, Herder and the Poetics of 
Thought (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), pp. 1-4. 
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developed individuality.  My reasons for attributing these ideas to Herder will emerge 
most fully in the following chapters.  However, it will be useful to say something briefly 
about each of them so that the reader has a set of guiding threads for working through the 
chapters that follow. 
 Herder adheres to a form of perfectionism.  As a general form of ethical theory, 
perfectionism is the view that the aim or end of human life is for an agent to make herself 
as perfect as possible through the development of her powers.7  In modern German 
philosophy, perfectionism is most closely associated with Leibnizian-Wolffian 
rationalism.  Herder has often been regarded as one of the fiercest critics of that school, 
and been cast by some scholars as an enemy of everything that it stands for.8  I think that 
such a characterization of Herder’s relation to German rationalism is inaccurate.  In the 
present study, I hope to show that with regard to his ethical thought Herder draws as 
much from the German rationalists as he rejects.  Herder accepts the idea that the highest 
good, or what in the time was called the vocation of man, is the perfecting and 
developing of one’s powers.  Herder transforms this idea in important ways, to be sure, 
and those transformations are of momentous importance.  However, he still remains a 
perfectionist at root. 
 A second central idea that we will see defended by Herder is the importance of 
history.  Herder argues that it is essential to understand a society or person’s historical 
situation in order to make fitting judgments about perfection and happiness.  This 
                                                
7 Variations of perfectionism have been advanced by recent philosophers, especially those attempting to 
articulate a contemporary Aristotelianism.  For a thorough recent defense of a perfectionism, see Thomas 
Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
8 This characterization of Herder’s relationship to the Leibniz-Wolff school is defended in different ways in 
Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder (London: Pimlico, 2000); John 
Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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provides an important counterpoint to Herder’s perfectionism.  Perfections and 
excellences cannot, on his view, be understood in abstraction from the conditions of lived 
human experience.  He contends that in order to know what should count as a perfection 
or virtue, as opposed to a fault or vice, one must understand the context in which a 
person lives.  Herder’s conception of history is broader than the contemporary sense of 
the term.  The general set of factors – historical, cultural, and biological – that shape the 
context in which human beings live are all folded by Herder into the concept of history.  
In brief, this aspect of Herder’s ethics is a belief that that to know what kinds of talents or 
abilities an individual (or society) can or should develop, one must understand the history 
that shapes the context of that individual (or society). 
 A third idea integral to Herder’s ethics is a form of naturalism.  According to 
Herder, human beings are a part of nature and must be understood as natural beings.  
There are unique qualities that human beings possess vis-à-vis other organisms, but 
human beings are nonetheless embodied natural beings who must be understood 
according to the natural laws that shape them.  There are ambiguities and vagaries 
involved in the concept of naturalism as the term is used by philosophers.9  In saying that 
Herder’s views are naturalistic, I intend two things.  First, he does not appeal to 
supernatural explanations to account for human life, including those aspects of our life 
that fall within the domain of the ethical.  Second, Herder grounds his account of human 
beings, our practices, and values not only in ordinary observation, but he strives to make 
his account accord with the latest scientific developments of his age.  It is important to 
                                                
9 For a valuable account of the wide and confusing variety of senses that are given to this term, see Owen 
Flanagan, "Varieties of Naturalism," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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emphasize these aspects of Herder’s views because there has been a strand of 
commentary on Herder that has cast him as a counter-Enlightenment figure with a 
penchant for irrationality and mysticism.10  The general trend of recent Herder 
scholarship has not corroborated such an interpretation, but has instead emphasized both 
Herder’s continuity with the Enlightenment and his engagement with the natural 
sciences.11  Nonetheless, counter-Enlightenment interpretations of Herder still have an 
afterlife in the works of those who have not engaged with Herder directly, but have 
instead picked up snippets about him through either the work of Isaiah Berlin or the 
passing remarks of Kantians.12  This is unfortunate, and I hope that the present study 
can serve as an additional corrective to such tendencies. 
                                                
10 See, for example, Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder; Alexanger Gillies, 
Herder (Oxford: Blackwell, 1945); Frank McEachran, The Life and Philosophy of Johann Gottfried 
Herder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939); Rudolf Unger, Herder, Novalis und Kleist: Studien über 
die Entwicklung des Todesproblems in Denken und Dichten vom Sturm und Drang zur Romantik 
(Frankfurt: Moritz Diesterweg, 1922); Benno von Wiese, Herder: Grundzüge seines Weltbildes (Leipzig: 
Bibliographisches Institut, 1939). 
 Berlin’s account of Herder’s relationship to science and the Enlightenment is more complicated 
than the other thinkers listed here.  However, his description of Herder as a counter-Enlightenment figure 
has been immensely influential. 
11 An especially important criticism of the counter-Enlightenment interpretation of Herder is Emil Adler, 
Herder und die deutsche Aufklärung (Vienna: Europa, 1968).  For recent work that emphasizes Herder’s 
naturalism or his continuity with the Enlightenment, see Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Robert E. Norton, Herder's Aesthetics and the 
European Enlightenment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Wolfgang Pross, "Herder und die 
Anthropologie der Aufklärung," in Johann Gottfried Herder, Werke, ed. Wolfgang Pross (München: 
Hanser, 1987); Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology; "Epigenesis: Concept and 
Metaphor in J.G. Herder's Ideen," in Vom Selbstdenken: Aufklärung und Aufklärungskritik in Johann 
Gottfried Herders Ideen zur Philosophieder Geschichte der Menschheit, ed. Regine Otto and John 
Zammito (Heidelberg: Synchron Wissenschaftsverlag, 2001). 
 For a valuable, though not uncontestable, survey of the trends and shifts in Herder scholarship, see 
John Zammito, Karl Menges, and Ernest A. Menze, "Johann Gottfried Herder Revisited: The Revolution 
in Scholarship in the Last Quarter Century," Journal of the History of Ideas 71, no. 4 (2010). 
12 An example of the kind of passing remark that I have in mind can be seen in Allen Wood’s uncharitable 
and misleading account of Herder’s interpretation of Genesis in Allen Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 226-33.  Wood’s more recent work on Herder is 
more accurate and doesn’t suffer from these faults.  See "Herder and Kant on History: Their 
Enlightenment Faith," in Metaphysics and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew 
Adams, ed. L. Jorgensen and S. Newlands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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 A fourth component of Herder’s ethics is something that I will call the principle of 
harmonious development.  This is a complex notion, one underlying what is often 
referred to as the ethics of individuality.  The principle of harmonious development is the 
notion that each person ought to strive to make herself a unique individual whose talents 
and powers are blended into a harmonious whole.  It often is expressed by a claim that 
human beings ought to make themselves and their lives into works of art.  The idea is 
commonly associated with the German Romantics, Friedrich Schiller, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, and Friedrich Nietzsche.   The present study will show that this principle is 
developed by Herder over the course of his life, as well as how he unites this idea with 
those mentioned above. 
 
III 
 
The present study proceeds chronologically.  By approaching the material in this 
way, I hope to make some beginning moves towards tracing the development of Herder’s 
ethical views.  Seeing a philosopher’s views as static and fixed is a danger to the historian.  
As human beings facing different predicaments over time, and whose thought struggles 
towards greater adequacy, philosophers’ ideas are always developing.  Herder was himself 
keenly aware of this, and I have attempted in the present study to depict the movement of 
his views in their liveliness and development.  I do not pretend that the story I have 
                                                                                                                                                          
 Robert Norton has spent a great deal of energy attacking the counter-Enlightenment interpretation 
of Herder.  See Robert E. Norton, "The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment," Journal of the History of 
Ideas 68 (2007); "Isaiah Berlin's 'Expressionism,' or: 'Ha! Du bist das Blökende!'," Journal of the History of 
Ideas 69 (2008).  I am sympathetic with the general direction of Norton’s interpretation, though his attacks 
on Isaiah Berlin are often unnecessarily vituperative, and sometimes inaccurate and unfair. 
8 
 
presented is complete, but I do think that the general arc of Herder’s thought that it 
presents is accurate.   
I confine my attention to works authored between 1765 and 1791.  I begin with 
some of Herder’s earliest works and end with a consideration of one of his greatest 
mature pieces, the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, the final 
installment of which was published in 1791.  I am not able to consider all of the works 
authored by Herder within this frame of time.  Herder was a prolific author.  A discussion 
of all of his published and significant unpublished works would be a mammoth 
enterprise.  In order to avoid producing such a monstrosity, I have elected to focus on a 
set of works that are both well-known and contain significant discussions of ethical issues.  
Attention to more texts from the period covered in the present study would fill in more 
detail, but I do not believe that it would undermine my account of Herder’s ideas and 
their development.   
Herder lived until 1803 and the last twelve years of his life were incredibly 
productive.   It was during those years that he engaged in his battle against Kant’s critical 
philosophy (in the Metakritik and Kalligone), and wrote the extensive and rich Briefe zu 
Beförderung der Humanität.  Herder’s collections of essays, Zerstreute Blätter are also 
significant, and have been seriously neglected in the scholarship.  The present study does 
not take account of these later works, unfortunately.  The developments that take place 
during those years deserve to be studied, and I hope to take them up in a future project.   
In addition to developing a chronological story, I also aim to offer a contextual 
account of Herder’s views.  In unpacking the ethical ideas in each of his texts, I work to 
show how Herder’s arguments fit into a dialogical context, and how his arguments were 
9 
 
directed against the other views in that context.  Most significant, I believe, is the dispute 
that Herder engaged in with Moses Mendelssohn in 1769, discussed in the second 
chapter.  I believe that the ethical views contained in the later works, considered in 
chapters three through six, are best understood against the background of this earlier 
dispute.   Not only the topics that Herder addresses and the views that he develops, but 
even his vocabulary, should be considered in that light. 
My aim is first and foremost to characterize Herder’s views accurately.  While I 
engage in some criticism and assessment of the adequacy of Herder’s theories and 
arguments, my primary end is interpretive.  A further work, or set of works, that makes 
criticism and evaluation central would be of great worth.  However, at the present time 
Herder’s ethical thought has hardly been explored.   Before engaging in the critical task, 
it is thus imperative to successfully develop an accurate interpretation of Herder’s ethics. 
The method that I have chosen is not that of translating Herder’s arguments into 
the language and methods of contemporary analytic (or even Continental) philosophy.    
I do not take such an approach for two primary reasons.  First, to force an historical 
thinker’s views into a different mold tends to distort the meaning of their claims.  If ideas 
and meanings were ahistorical platonic essences capable of receiving a plenitude of 
different realizations, then such historical work would not always run the risk of 
distortion.  However, such a view about meaning is philosophically dubious.  Work in the 
history of philosophy ought to be grounded in a recognition of the ways that the 
meanings of texts are shaped by their contexts.13  This is not to deny that reconstructive 
studies are at times valuable.  But in order for them to be worthwhile engagements with 
                                                
13 I thus agree with most of  the argument in Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History 
of Ideas," History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969). 
10 
 
the past, an accurate understanding of the past is an indispensable prerequisite.  Such an 
understanding requires attention to context and history. 
Further, I am simply not convinced that contemporary philosophy is an 
improvement on the past in any straightforward sense.  The kind of Whig history that 
treats the thinkers of the past as valuable only because they affirm our sense of superiority 
is something that I find to be both distasteful and unjustified.  I do not believe the 
obverse of the Whig claim, however, in holding that we are the last products of a cultural 
decline and need to go back to the mythologized ideal way of being of our ancestors.14  
Instead, I think that that each age has both advantages and disadvantages.  We do better 
in thinking of history as a series of ebbs and flows, growths and declines, rather than a 
straight line upwards or downwards.  This is, I am sure, a part of why I was initially 
attracted to Herder.  His account of history, especially in Auch eine Philosophie der 
Geschichte, rejects both the idealization and demonization of the past. 
 
IV 
 
The present work, as noted above, proceeds chronologically.  I will here 
enumerate the contents of each chapter in brief, in order to orient the reader to the rest of 
the work.  While the chapters are connected and there is a general development from 
beginning to end, I also believe that each can be read fruitfully on its own.     
                                                
14 Something like this idea can be seen in many of the works of Leo Strauss.  See, for example Leo Strauss, 
What is Political Philosophy? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Natural Right and History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).  
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In the first two chapters, I begin by looking at several works that Herder composed 
in the 1760s.  These all belong to what can be designated his early period.  None of the 
texts that I examine in the first two chapters were published by Herder in his lifetime.15  
Herder was an advanced thinker even at that time, but these works wear their youthful 
character on their sleeve.  Despite this, they offer valuable insight into the direction that 
his thought was taking.   
In chapter 1, I draw out and explicate some of the ethical ideas contained in two 
of Herder’s works from the 1760s.  These are an important sketch of 1765, “Wie die 
Philosophie zum Besten des Volks Allgemeiner und Nützlicher Werden Kann”, and a 
travel journal, standardly referred to as Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769.  Both of 
these works are concerned with education or Bildung, an issue especially important to 
Herder at that time because part of his occupation involved managing a school in Riga.  
In these texts, Herder offers a sketch, both of his educational ideals and his conception of 
philosophy.  As such, they allow us to see how the young Herder conceived of the aims of 
his philosophical work and the goals of a proper education.  These goals and aims have 
an important ethical dimension, and the account of them that I offer focuses on that.  
Both texts reject one-sided emphases on human rationality, emphasizing instead the 
importance of human emotions, passions, and sensibility.  The travel journal also argues 
that the development of a harmonious individuality is the goal of a complete education. 
                                                
15 Herder did publish several important larger works during this period.  The first is the three collections of 
fragments, Über die neuere deutsche Literatur. Eine Beilage zu den Briefen, die neueste Literatur 
betreffend, included in DKV 1.  The second major work is the Kritische Wälder, included in Johann 
Gottfried Herder, Kritische Wälder: Erstes bis Drittes Wäldchen; Viertes Wäldchen; Paralipomena, 2 vols. 
(Berlin: Aufbau, 1990).  Herder published the first three volumes of the Kritische Wälder, but the fourth 
was published only posthumously.  These works primarily deal with issues in aesthetics, though I make 
reference to them when they contain material relevant to Herder’s ethical thought. 
12 
 
In chapter 2, I examine an exchange of letters between Herder and Moses 
Mendelssohn concerning the Bestimmung des Menschen, or vocation of man.  This 
exchange took place in 1769, and provides what may be the most important material for 
understanding the ethics of the young Herder.  Herder’s contribution to this dispute 
allows us to see some of the ethical ideas that he was working out at the time.  The letters 
show that he rejects the rationalist version of perfectionism as both too narrow in its 
understanding of perfection and as grounded in a wrong conception of the human soul.  
But, these letters also also make it apparent that Herder adheres to a species of 
perfectionism himself.  I discuss the intellectual context of the controversy, including 
Johann Joachim Spalding’s initiation of the controversy with his text, Die Bestimmung 
des Menschen.  I look at the arguments made by Thomas Abbt and Mendelssohn about 
the issue, as that exchange set the scene for Herder’s own intervention.  This is followed 
by an examination of Herder’s letters to Mendelssohn concerning this crucial ethical 
issue.   
In the following chapters, I turn to an examination of several of Herder’s more 
developed works.  Each of these was prepared for publication, and they contain fuller 
expositions of his ideas than his earliest texts. Chapter 3 focuses on the Abhandlung über 
den Ursprung der Sprache, a work that is as important for understanding Herder’s 
philosophical anthropology and the development of his ethical views, as it is for 
understanding his philosophy of language.  I attempt to show that the text contains a 
development of the perfectionist ethics presented in Herder’s letters to Mendelssohn.  
Herder’s account of language also involves an argument for conceiving of human beings 
as thoroughly social and dependent on others.  As social beings, always immersed in a 
13 
 
culture, human beings refine and perfect their skills over time – over the course of 
individual lives and from one generation to the next. 
The argument of the Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache leads to a 
consideration of the importance of history for Herder, the central theme of Auch eine 
Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit, taken up in chapter 4.  In my 
reading of this text, I focus on Herder’s argument that ethical life emerges from the needs 
and desires of each historical age.  According to Herder, this means that the ethical 
practices of any age must be understood genealogically.  The text as a whole offers a 
genealogy of modern European morality, and should be read in this way.  It thus presents 
a way of doing philosophical work on ethics that resembles what Friedrich Nietzsche later 
developed in Genealogie zur Moral, but with some important differences that I discuss. 
Chapter 5 turns to Herder’s Vom Erkennen und Empfinden.  Scholarship on this 
text has focused on what it shows about his general philosophy of mind, but I focus on 
the aspects of it that bear directly on his ethics.  This text contains an account not only of 
Herder’s moral psychology and theory of motivation, but his views about freedom, the 
nature of the emotions, and the place of love in human life.  It also lays out in greater 
detail the principle of harmonious development.   
The final chapter examines one argument from Herder’s magnum opus, the Ideen 
zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.  I emphasize the way that Herder’s 
account of the social nature of humanity is connected with his naturalism – his emphasis 
on both accurate scientific accounts of humanity, and his refusal to appeal to miraculous 
forms of explanation.  This draws together some of the work discussed in the earlier 
chapters on Herder’s perfectionism and the social character of man, but reveals how 
14 
 
these are blended with his naturalism in this mature work.  I also contend that Herder’s 
account of the possibility of history rests on his ethical ideas.  While my account of the 
Ideen is not comprehensive (a full commentary or analysis of that work would have to 
itself be grand in size), I believe that it serves well as a capstone to an account of Herder’s 
thought up through 1791.   
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Chapter 1: Herder’s Early Ideals 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Herder’s early texts are a trove of philosophical experiments.  While often 
fragmentary and undeveloped, they are fascinating attempts to give form to the chaotic 
and conflicting forces at work in his mind.  Goethe, in his autobiography, recalled that in 
his first weeks of acquaintance with Herder in Strasbourg, “As to the abundance that 
these few weeks that we lived together contained, I can well say that everything that 
Herder gradually carried out was depicted in a germinal form.”1  This personal 
reminiscence appears all the more apt as one reads through Herder’s early sketches and 
fragments.   
To understand the direction of Herder’s ethical thought, it will be useful to begin 
with an account the ethics contained in his early works.  These early texts contain 
expressions of ideals more than complete arguments, but they are not less valuable for 
that reason.  Two of the texts that are most revealing of Herder’s early ideals are the short 
sketch of 1775, “Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks Allgemeiner und Nützlicher 
Werden Kann”, and the Journal meiner Reise im Jahr 1769.  In what follows, I will 
attempt to offer an exposition of some of the major ethical themes that occupied Herder 
during the earliest part of his career in order to understand how Herder conceived of the 
problems at this period in time.  These texts will be used both to give focus to the 
                                                
1 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Aus meinem Leben: Wahrheit und Dichtung (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1866), 
p. 494. 
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interpretation of Herder’s later texts, and also to lay the ground for an inquiry into the 
continuities, ruptures, and developments in Herder’s thought over time. 
 
 
I – “Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks Allgemeiner und Nützlicher Werden 
Kann” 
 
  
Herder’s sketch, “Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks Allgemeiner und 
Nützlicher Werden Kann” was prompted by an essay contest held by the Bern Patriotic 
Society.  The question posed by the society was: “How can the truths of philosophy 
become more universal and useful for the people?“2  Herder drafted, but neither 
submitted nor completed his entry to the contest.  The text is markedly incomplete and, 
in many places, extremely unclear.  Despite this, the draft is a valuable document for 
understanding the young Herder.  The text contains intriguing, if rough, sketches of 
views that Herder will develop throughout the course of his intellectual career.3     
                                                
2 This text has received a great deal of attention in recent scholarship.  See  Frederick C. Beiser, 
Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 
196-7.; Michael N. Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 13-5.; Kristin Gjesdal, "'A Not Yet Invented Logic': Herder on 
Bildung, Anthropology, and the Future of Philosophy," in Die Bildung der Moderne, ed. Michael Dreyer 
and Michael Forster (Tübingen: Francke, 2013).; John Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of 
Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 172-7. 
3 Michael Forster includes this text under a section entitled “General Philosophical Program” in his 
translation of Herder’s Philosophical Writings, trans. Michael Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).  While I believe that much can be learned from this text, I am not confident that it represents 
anything as solid as a program to which Herder adheres in his mature works.  
 Others have claimed that Herder’s advocacy of philosophy becoming anthropology in this text 
should be read as a “programmatic call” which guides his entire intellectual output.  John Zammito, Karl 
Menges, and Ernest A. Menze, "Johann Gottfried Herder Revisited: The Revolution in Scholarship in the 
Last Quarter Century," Journal of the History of Ideas 71, no. 4 (2010): p. 664.  
 More cautiously, Rudolf Haym claims that the essay is the program of Herder’s activity – both 
intellectual and practical – during his time in Riga (from 1765-9).  He does not claim that it is a more 
extensive program which should be used as a guide to Herder’s later work.  Rudolf Haym, Herder: Nach 
seinem Leben und seinen Werken, 2 vols. (Berlin: Rudolf Gaertner, 1877-85), I, p. 95. 
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 The essay is driven by Herder’s attempt to resolve a dispute concerning the value 
and usefulness of philosophy.  In attempting to negotiate this dispute, Herder offers 
reflections on the nature and value of philosophy, and an account of its proper aims.4  He 
categorizes the critics of philosophy into four groups: mathematicians, physicists, 
theologians and statesmen.  Philosophy has at different times attempted to adapt itself to 
the manner of thinking of each of these various critics.  Because philosophy has adapted 
itself to their demands in various ways, the four forms of criticism have also become four 
tendencies of philosophy.5   
Most important for understanding Herder’s ethical thought is his account of the 
shortcomings of German rationalism, as exemplified in the works of Christian Wolff and 
Alexander Baumgarten.  Though his critical remarks on this intellectual movement are 
central, they should not be exaggerated.  Herder does not express an out-and-out 
rejection of the ideas of these thinkers.  This can be observed from Herder’s later 
adherence to certain Leibnizian doctrines, as well as his own defense of a species of moral 
perfectionism, as I intend to show in the subsequent chapters. 
One of Herder’s criticisms of rationalism concerns philosophical form.  He accuses 
the rationalist tradition of being too imitative of mathematics, through an overemphasis 
on rigorous demonstrations and the use of principles, as opposed to experience and 
intuition.6  Wolff, for example, authored his works in a mathematical or geometric form, 
                                                
4 A valuable discussion of the text as an account of the proper aims of philosophy is Gjesdal, "'A Not Yet 
Invented Logic': Herder on Bildung, Anthropology, and the Future of Philosophy."   
5 DKV 1: 105-110. 
6 DKV 1: 106. 
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much like Spinoza.7  Alexander Baumgarten likewise models his philosophical works on 
mathematics.  Even Baumgarten’s work in aesthetics proceeds in the form of 
demonstrations from axiomatic first principles.8   
According to Herder, presenting philosophy in this way is not merely distasteful or 
tedious, but morally deleterious.  He contends that works composed in this manner are 
powerless to help people actually improve themselves because they are abstract and do 
not address the emotional and sensible character of the agent.9  To be morally 
upbuilding, a work would need to speak to the passions as well as to the intellect.  
Human action is driven not by principles but by the moving power of sensation or 
emotion.  Principles and demonstrations, according to Herder, are not merely different 
from the true sources of moral action, but are even opposed to them.  For this reason, the 
excessive emphasis on abstract principles by philosophy can make people morally 
worse.10  This highlights an important aspect of Herder’s conception of the aim of moral 
philosophy.  It should not be pursued merely to increase our understanding or 
knowledge, but it ought also to attempt to improve our character.11  A philosophy that 
                                                
7 See, for example, Christian Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, zu 
Beförderung ihrer Glückseligkeit (Frankfurt and Lepzig1733). 
8 Alexander Baumgarten, Ästhetik, trans. Dagmar Mirbach, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2009).  For a 
discussion of Baumgarten’s mathematical method, see Frederick C. Beiser, Diotima's Children: German 
Aesthetic Rationalism From Leibniz to Lessing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.124  
9 DKV 1: 115ff.   
10 “So bald Empfindungen Grundsatz wird, so bald hört er auf Empfindung zu sein – ich denke, ich 
betrachte ich ergreife moralische Pflicht: - mein Gesichtspunkt ist ganz anders, ich verlerne sein Gegenteil, 
zu handeln, ihn anzuwenden – Jede Fertigkeit ist der andern entgegengesetzt.”  DKV 1: 116.  See also 
Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition, pp. 14-5. 
11 Hence, Herder would reject the manner in which much early twentieth-century philosophy was also 
pursued; he would have more in common with G.E.M. Anscombe and Iris Murdoch than, say, J.L. Mackie 
and his sharp distinction between first-order and second-order moral views.  See G.E.M. Anscombe, 
"Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958); Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good 
(New York: Shocken Books, 1970); J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 
1977). 
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was actually productive of moral improvement, by contrast, would aid people in 
developing their sentiments, which are the source of our motivation and understanding.   
Herder also finds fault with another component of rationalist ethical theory.  The 
ethical theory advanced by all of the German rationalists is a form of perfectionism.12  
Wolff presents a representative version of this position in his ethical works.  Wolff holds 
that the highest good, the fundamental aim, of a human life is to perfect oneself and 
others.13  However, the central form of perfection that matters, according to Wolff is the 
perfection of the higher human faculties, especially our reason.  Accordingly, this theory 
treats rationality and the development of human rational capacities as being of the highest 
value, and makes acting according to principles the basis of its theory of moral action.14  
It further connects makes development of philosophical reason through logical study a 
central and indispensable part of the ethical imperative to perfect oneself.   
Herder contends that this ethical theory utilizes an abstract ideal of perfection that 
should be rejected: 
If there existed a logic which was arrayed in the ideal perfections 
[Idealvollkommenheiten] of our idol, which banished errors, etc., should it for the 
use of the people become more universal?  As long as one makes judgments about 
the perfection or imperfection of an ideal science of thought, without showing this 
goddess in the clothing of humanity: for that time much will be identified 
[erkennt] as good, which in its application [Anwendung] shows itself to be bare 
[Blöße].  Indeed, philosophical thinking is a perfection.  But if it is for human 
beings such as we are, whose watchword is spoken by nature: “live, procreate, and 
die”; and if thinking philosophically would be for citizens, for whom the state’s 
watchword is: “act!” is a question that is very relevant for our problem.15 
                                                
12 This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
13 Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, zu Beförderung ihrer 
Glückseligkeit, sections 12 and 44. 
14 Ibid., section 24. 
15 DKV 1: 112-3.  My translation of this passage was considerably aided by consulting that of Forster. 
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Herder’s move here is not to reject the idea that human beings ought to aim to perfect 
themselves, or even that philosophical thinking in particular is a perfection.  Rather, he 
attacks the specific account of perfection contained in the rationalist tradition, the 
perfection of the so-called ‘higher’ faculties of the soul, as empty and useless.  The 
Wolffian ideal is so far removed from human life that, though is appears to be true in the 
abstract, the attempt to apply it to human life reveals the ideal to be without clothes.16  
This “Idealvollkommenheit” is, hence, an idol that prevents us from pursuing the 
genuine article – a more human form of perfection. 
On two counts, then, moral philosophy in the key of mathematics is flawed: first, it 
is mistaken about moral psychology because it assumes that people act according to 
principle and that bad actions are the result of bad principles.  Because of this, it fails to 
address the sentiments.  Those who imbibe its works and ideas are likely to have their 
own sentimental nature weakened, thus becoming morally worse.  Second, the ideal it 
prescribes for moral development is empty or, worse, harmful because it prevents people 
from recognizing the plurality of more attainable forms of perfection that might be 
pursued.  
The critique of these aspects of the form and content of rationalist ethics is the 
negative side of Herder’s position.  Herder’s own positive views can be roughly pieced 
together as the inverse of these positions.  To begin with, he can be understood to hold 
that the spurs to action are not purely rational principles, but must involve some other 
                                                
16 This is the most important modification of Forster’s translation that I have attempted to make – to retain 
the contrast between ‘Tracht’ and ‘Blöße’ which figures in the passage. 
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source of motivation.  This on its own is a very thin idea, and Herder does little in this 
essay to flesh it out.  Herder suggests that the “healthy understanding” is capable of this, 
but the concept of a healthy understanding is not adequately explained.  Herder does 
frequently invoke sentiments in his sketch, and he seems to oppose them to reason.  We 
might then think of Herder’s position as crudely Humean, committed to binary 
distinction between beliefs and desires, and the view that it is desires rather than 
cognition that leads people to act as they do.  Michael Forster seems to endorse such a 
reading of this text when he characterizes Herder’s view as a form of noncognitivism.17  
There is no evidence contrary to this in this text, and Herder’s claim that principles and 
sentiments/feeling are opposed to one another would seem to bolster such an 
interpretation of this text.18  If Herder’s account here is a form of noncognitivism this 
extreme, this placing of reason and sentiment into radical opposition with one another 
would make his account philosophically problematic.  Such views run into the problem of 
accounting for the means by which cognizing certain features of the world can motivate 
one to act.  Further, the emotions themselves seem to require cognition of the object of 
one’s feeling to be the emotion that it is. Being angry is distinguished from sadness 
because the former emotion involved the belief that a wrong has been done, even though 
both involve the notion that a harm has occurred.19    
                                                
17 Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition, p. 15. 
18 DKV 1: 116. 
19 On this issue generally, see Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), especially chapter 1; Ronald De Sousa, The Rationality 
of Emotion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Jerome Neu, A Tear is an Intellectual 
Thing: The Meanings of Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  The locus classicii of this 
account of anger are the works of Aristotle and Seneca.  For Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book II, chapter 2, 
included in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984). Seneca’s On Anger is included in Moral and Political Essays, trans. John M. Cooper and J.F. 
Procopé (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).   
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Even if Herder adheres to this conception of the relationship between emotion and 
reason in this sketch, it is not his final position.  In his later work, Herder will develop a 
more complex moral psychology - one which does not calve reason and emotion in just 
this way.  Especially in Vom Erkennen und Empfinden, Herder will attempt to develop a 
more nuanced view in which sentiments and reason are not “opposed to one another.”   
Instead, he will argue that these aspects of the human being originate in a common 
source, and are capable of being harmoniously integrated with one another.20   
This change in Herder’s view is one reason why I think it is not entirely correct to 
see this essay as a general “program” guiding all of Herder’s philosophical work.  Rather, 
it is one of Herder’s first attempts to come to terms with a set of issues and, as such, is 
rougher and more simplistic than the accounts found in Herder’s later texts.  
Philosophically, Herder’s work in the 1770s is more original and compelling.  This early 
account, with its binary picture of reason and sentiment, seems to offer a standard 
version of sentimentalist moral psychology, such as one finds in Francis Hutcheson or 
David Hume.21  Herder’s later work offers a much more nuanced and sophisticated 
account of the relationship between sentiment and reason. 
An additional concern that Herder raises about the wrong form of philosophy is 
that it cultivates a dangerous and unnatural kind of curiosity.  This is an issue that arises 
                                                
20 To see just how different Herder’s view becomes, consider the following passage from the 1775 draft of 
Vom Erkennen und Empfinden: “Empfindung, Reiz, Leidenschaft ist der Vernunft so wenig entgegen, daß 
ja die wahre, einzige Vernunft und Tugend allein aus und mit aller wahren Empfindung, Reiz, Leidenschaft 
handelt.”  SWS 8: 310.   
21 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (London: J. Darby, 
1725); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), Book III.  Herder 
was probably more directly influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose first discourse argued reason and 
the advancement of the sciences posed a danger to virtue, whereas natural sentiments offered a direct routs 
to goodness.  Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, included in The Discourses and Other Early Political 
writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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for most of the historical forms of philosophy, and not only that of the German 
rationalists.  The praise of curiosity by philosophers can be seen in Aristotle’s claim that 
philosophy begins in wonder.22  This fondness for curiosity was especially prominent 
among philosophers in Herder’s own time.  During the high period of the enlightenment, 
the acquisition (and propagation) of any kind of knowledge was thought by many to be 
intrinsically, even superlatively, valuable.23  Herder dissents from this epistemic 
optimism.   
He acknowledges that there is a healthy and natural form of curiosity, but he also 
avers that there is an adventitious drive for knowledge inimical to our well-being.  Herder 
describes the former as “a drive composed of self-preservation and protection.”24  It is a 
disposition to gather information about the world that assists the human being in living 
safely and happily.  The artificial form of curiosity, by contrast, is not confined to matters 
that contribute to the self-preservation or well-being of the agent, but is “insatiable” and 
“infinite”.  It tends to make human beings discontent and unhappy because under its 
influence one forms ideals and aims that cannot possibly be satisfied within context of a 
human life.25   
Herder’s description of the natural and healthy form of curiosity is very similar to 
Rousseau’s account of amour de soi meme, and the account of the artificial form of 
                                                
22 Metaphysics, 982b12.   
23 Most characteristic of this outlook is that of the philosophes, which drove the encyclopedia project.  See, 
for example,  
24 DKV 1: 119.  Just after this, Herder describes the kind of curiosity found in the lives of the Hottentots as 
“tot für jede feinere Neubegierde.”  This is contrasted with the insatiable curiosity of the Europeans, which 
drives them to both explore and exploit the earth.  This passage seems to foreshadow Herder’s later dispute 
with Kant concerning the value of the kind of life lived by the Tahitians. 
25 DKV 1: 119. 
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curiosity is likewise similar to Rousseau’s characterization of amour propre.26   It is 
known that Herder was heavily influenced by Rousseau, especially in his youth.  As such, 
Herder may have been influenced directly by Rousseau’s own conclusions about curiosity 
and vanity.  If so, he might follow Rousseau in asserting that the source of the artificial 
and harmful form of curiosity is an excessive concern with how one appears before others 
(what Rousseau calls amour propre).  This form of self-love, which finds its satisfaction 
through outdoing others, according to Rousseau makes possible, and stimulates, the vice 
of vanity, which was an especially salient problem in modern societies.27  This gives us 
reason to think that Herder considered there to be a connection between curiosity and 
viciousness.  Consequently, the purpose of a philosophy that improves human life will not 
be to encourage inquiry and curiosity as such.  Rather, it will be grounded in the needs 
and concerns of human life and will only facilitate our desire for knowledge within a 
limited domain.  
To be properly useful, “our philosophy must descend from the stars to human 
beings.”28  Herder pleas here for what Haym has called a “menschliche Philosophie.”29  
This call for philosophy to descend from the stars is a deliberate echo of Cicero’s 
characterization of Socrates as the first thinker who drew philosophy away from a study of 
that which is in the heavens and instead made human life, happiness, and virtue its 
                                                
26 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality, included in The 
Discourses and Other Early Political writings.  Herder’s debt to Rousseau is also noted by Ulrich Gaier in 
his commentary on “Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks”, DKV 1: 977.  Rousseau’s account was 
influenced by Montaigne, a thinker also admired by Herder. 
27 Rudolf Haym shows that was a concern of  Herder’s, stimulated by his engagement with the civic life of 
Riga, which was dominated by commercial concerns.  See Haym, Herder: Nach seinem Leben und seinen 
Werken, I, p. 95.   
28 DKV 1: 122.   
29 Haym, Herder: Nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken, I, p. 94.  This characterization of Herder’s 
philosophy is followed by a number of others.  See, for example, Emil Adler, Herder und die deutsche 
Aufklärung (Vienna: Europa, 1968), pp. 72-6.  
  
25 
 
central focus.30   The ideal of philosophy depicted by Herder is not that of a recondite or 
purely theoretical discipline, but rather a form of thought that is capable of improving 
human life.  It ought to be beneficial to all human beings, and not only intellectuals.  
This human philosophy requires a revaluation of activities and forms of living that have 
often been regarded by intellectuals as lowly or inferior.31  Herder’s rejection of a 
conception of human life that privileges the activities of intellectuals will be dear to him 
for the remainder of his life.  Philosophy must take account of how a wider range of 
human activities are good and conducive to happiness, and not focus exclusively on the 
sharpening of the abstract intellect.     
Herder suggests that this human philosophy ought to follow a very different 
method than the rationalists.  He states, “In physics, the Cartesian hypotheses were 
followed by a Newton.  In philosophy, may the mathematical aeons be followed by the 
physical ones.”32  Herder does not mean by this that he wants philosophy to be reduced 
to experimental physics.  He is not an untimely logical positivist.  Rather, he means that 
philosophy ought to be grounded in a close acquaintance with object examined, the 
human being, and not to force humanity into a priori models that are not themselves 
                                                
30 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, V.4.  This characterization fits well with the depiction of Socrates in 
Apology, 19b-c and 30a-b. 
Beiser claims that Herder’s ideal goes back to the humanism of the Renaissance at The German 
Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 102.  This is true, but it has a more 
ancient origin.   
There is also a similar description of Socrates by Montaigne in “Of Physiognomy”.  Included in 
Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Works, trans. Donald Frame (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). 
31 Herder specifically calls for the philosopher to “gehe auf das Land, und lerne die Weise der Ackerleute.”  
DKV 1: 127. 
32 DKV 1: 107. 
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derived from a close attention to experience.33  It ought to be grounded in the facts, and 
not the product of fanciful speculation. 
 The subject-matter of a reformed philosophy ought to be the human being: “If 
philosophy is to become useful for human beings, then let it make the human being its 
center.”34  Herder states the general point alternately as: “what new fruitful 
developments must not occur here, if our whole philosophy becomes anthropology.”35  
Herder is not arguing that philosophy should be absorbed by a competing academic 
discipline.36  No discipline with that name existed at the time.  Herder intends rather that 
philosophy should be grounded in, and proceed from, the study (logos) of the human 
being (Anthropos).  It would aim to develop a sound view of what human beings are 
actually like, and make human concerns its central topic.  It considers human beings as 
they are, based on observation; and not as abstruse systems of metaphysics presume them 
to be.   As Herder develops his ideas in later texts, we will see that this includes attending 
                                                
33 Herder is clearly hearkening back to Newton’s own rejection of the use of hypotheses.  Consider, for 
example, the following from the Principia, “Those who take the foundation of their speculations from 
hypotheses, even if they then proceed most rigorously according to mechanical laws, are merely putting 
together a romance, elegant perhaps and charming, but nevertheless a romance.”  Isaac Newton, 
Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 43. 
34 DKV 1: 125.  Forster’s translation. 
35 DKV 1: 134.  Forster’s translation. 
36 Zammito sometimes writes as if this is the case.  See, for example, Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the 
Birth of Anthropology, pp. 3 and 176.  For a more accurate account of what Herder means by 
anthropology, see Hans Dietrich Irmscher, "Weitstrahlsinniges" Denken. Studien zu Johann Gottfried 
Herder (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2010), p. 41.  Zammito’s interpretation of the text is 
criticized in detail in Gjesdal, "'A Not Yet Invented Logic': Herder on Bildung, Anthropology, and the 
Future of Philosophy."  
 Herder did have an important impact on the development of the discipline we now call 
anthropology, but the story of his influence is much more complicated than his use of the word.  See 
Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition, chapter 6. 
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to human beings as embodied, linguistic creatures whose manner of living and thinking is 
shaped by history.37 
Improving human beings and human life would be the primary goal of this 
philosophy.  Herder thinks that this should be carried out by providing moral and 
political education (Bildung).38  According to Herder, moral Bildung must be adapted to 
the circumstances and lives of those who are being taught.  The words used to instruct 
should not be “torn from their context”, for such words cannot be understood correctly 
by those who are being taught.  He mentions two specific misuses of terms.  The first is 
the use of the language of the Bible in moral education.  The concepts contained in the 
Bible belong to the “Morgenland”, and while suited to their time, are not fitting for the 
eighteenth-century.39  The second misuse is the employment of Greek and Roman terms 
of approval and criticism.40  Such ages were different from the modern one, in that they 
were ages of vigor and strength.  In the modern world, people lack the vitality for even 
the errors of that age, and hence should not aim to develop the same traits.  The qualities 
of character that were virtues in those contexts cannot simply be imitated by persons 
living in modern societies.41  Doing such would produce only an unconvincing and flat 
simulacrum of the classical virtues.  Instead, it is crucial that one attends to people as 
                                                
37 The later chapters of the present work will aim to show this.  On the soul-body relation in particular, see 
Nigel DeSouza, "The Soul-Body Relationship and the Foundations of Morality: Herder contra 
Mendelssohn," Herder Yearbook 21 (2014): pp. 149-54. 
38 DKV 1: 127-30.  I discuss only the sections on moral Bildung here, as the very short section on political 
Bildung is inchoate to the point of being nearly incoherent. 
39 DKV 1: 127. 
40 DKV 1: 129. 
41 Herder makes a similar claim in his early works on aesthetics and language, where he argues that modern 
Germans should not imitate the works of ancient Latin and Greek authors because their language and 
social conditions are very different.  See, for example, “Von der Ode”, DKV 1: 85-8 and Über die neuere 
deutsche Literatur. Erste Sammlung von Fragemenen, DKV 1: 222-32. 
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they are, and draw on the strengths and virtues that people in one’s own age are most 
disposed to.42  
There are two ideas here that are developed more thoroughly in later texts.  The 
first is a point about the meaning of terms.  Herder is holist about meaning who also 
thinks that the meaning of a term is determined by its use.  The use is itself shaped by the 
context in which a speaker intends to use a term in a particular way.   Hence, to know 
fully what a word means one must understand the context in which a term is used, and 
the purposes for which it is used.43  To tear a word from its context is to thus deprive it 
of the background against which it can have meaning.  If ethical terms are deprived of the 
context that makes them meaningful, then they will not be any longer capable of offering 
moral guidance or contributing to moral improvement.    
A second important idea is that human perfections and virtues are anchored in 
their historical period.  Each age is suited for the cultivation of some virtues and not 
others.  The Romans lived in a society where the martial virtues, such as courage, were 
well-suited.  This is not the case for citizens of modern European societies.  Likewise, 
different virtues are needed by those who live in different ages.  This issue is not pursued 
in detail in the sketch, but it will be a central theme in Herder’s 1774 Auch eine 
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.   
                                                
42 “O lasset uns die Moral aus dem Herzen des Menschen nicht aus fremden Zeiten lernen, um nützlich zu 
werden…”  DKV 1: 129. 
43 There is a similarity here to Wittgenstein.  For further discussion of Herder’s philosophy of language in 
general, and his theory of meaning in particular, see Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the 
German Tradition, chapter 2.  
 There is also a richly illuminating discussion of this issue in Sonia Sikka, Herder on Humanity and 
Cultural Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), chapter 5.  See especially her 
fascinating account of the difficulty of translating a poem containing the Hindi word, ‘dhūp’, on pp. 171-2. 
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 These points in “Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks Allgemeiner und 
Nützlicher Werden Kann” can serve as a useful initial orientation to some of Herder’s 
basic ideas about ethics and moral philosophy.  Its value lies not in offering us a full 
picture of Herder’s views, but in the image it provides of the aspirations that led him to 
work out his more refined and nuanced positions in later texts.  Another early text, 
written four years after the short sketch, will fill out these aspirations in a bit more detail. 
 
 
II – Journal Meiner Reise im Jahr 1769 
 
  
 
In June of 1769, feeling weary of his obligations as a teacher and minister in Riga, 
Herder embarked on a voyage that would take him across northern Europe, and into 
France.  Herder left for the journey full of angst and yearning for a new perspective on his 
life and the world.  The travels were both stimulating and chastening.  Chastening, in 
that the French intellectuals he had admired struck him as arrogant and shallow when he 
chanced to meet them in person.  This left Herder with a bitter taste for the approach to 
philosophy taken by the philosophes.  The journey was also stimulating, in that during his 
travels Herder began to formulate some of his major ideals in the form of a travel journal.  
Rudolf Haym describes this text as “the most meaningful, illuminating document for the 
inner history of the Herderian spirit.”44  The journal offers a vivid and fascinating portrait 
of a great mind in ferment, striving to develop a mass of ideas into an articulable form.  
The tone of the journal is fitting of the Sturm und Drang years, which it prefigures. 
                                                
44 Haym, Herder: Nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken, I, p. 317. 
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 There are a number of important issues discussed in the journal that are of interest 
for understanding Herder’s ethics.  Three of these are especially important, and the 
following account will focus on them.  In the journal, Herder develops a set of ideas 
about education and development which are relevant to his conception of moral character 
and the methods which should be employed by moral philosophy.  A second set of issues 
concerns the relationship between history and ethics.  Finally, Herder depicts the moral 
ideals which ought to be the goal of moral philosophy and of an individual’s own 
Bildung.   
 The initial publication of Herder’s travel journal presented it as a work on 
education.45  While the journal addresses a wide range of issues, the concept of education 
plays a central role in the journal.  Most concretely, in the journal Herder expresses his 
intention to reform the educational system in Riga, upon his return.46  He lays out an 
extremely detailed account of the structure that the schooling in Riga ought to take.  
These include such specific and practical matters as the subjects to be taught, the order 
in which they are to be taught, and the duration of the school day.  Of importance for 
understanding Herder’s ethics are the general ideals that guide his account of the proper 
format of educational institutions.  The interest in education, or Bildung, brings the 
Journal meiner Reise into close connection with the 1775 sketch discussed above.   
In the Journal, he contends that education should address the whole character of 
the person.  In a child this can only be achieved by making the education exciting and 
enjoyable. 47  The teacher should not compel or force the student to memorize formulas, 
                                                
45 See Rainer Wisbert’s commentary at DKV 9/2: 889.  The first publication included only a portion of the 
work, and appeared posthumously in 1810 with the title Ideal einer Schule.   
46 DKV 9/2: 35-40. 
47 DKV 9/2: 51. 
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but should rather stimulate the child’s intellectual powers by giving the student an 
opportunity to experience strong sensible impressions in her own way.48  Education 
should focus on providing the student with deep and emotionally laden impressions, 
rather than conveying facts in a dry and formulaic manner.  Such Empfindungen, he 
claims, will serve the child in his future development and refinement.   
The fundamental idea is that instruction of the young ought to be based on 
experience and nature, rather than on abstract principles: “Philosopher of nature!  That 
should be your standpoint with the youth whom you instruct!“49  Being inattentive to the 
nature of the students being formed by the process of education yields a one-sided and 
inadequate form of education – one that does not produce well-rounded human beings 
capable of living full lives.  Working contrary to nature and attempting to force human 
beings into artificial molds that correspond to the teacher’s favored set of abstract 
principles will be damaging to the student.50 
Nature is, on this account, the ground of the norms that we should draw on to 
assess human activities in general, and education or the facilitation of human 
development in particular.51  Understanding which kinds of development are beneficial 
for the individual and society will, consequently, require a careful study of the natural 
world.  This is why ethics requires knowledge of the mind and human nature.52  
Scientific inquiry is thus an important prerequisite for, and part of, the instruction of the 
young.  In the Journal, this call for an empirically grounded form of education (that 
includes the formation of ethical and moral character) remains just that – a plea or 
                                                
48 DKV 9/2: 119-20. 
49 DKV 9/2: 16. 
50 DKV 9/2: 77. 
51 “Wer kann wider die Natur der Dinge?”  DKV 9/2: 77.   
52 DKV 9/2: 50. 
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expression of hope.  This cri de coeur, however, shows us that Herder’s later attempt to 
provide a scientifically grounded account of the human being as a historical creature, an 
account which is also intended to improve humanity, is not simply the patching together 
of two entirely distinct interests.53  Rather, from early on Herder was of the view that any 
account of human development, individual or social, had to take its start from an 
accurate account of nature.    
The Journal meiner Reise is also important for the insight it offers into Herder’s 
early interest in history, and how that interest is related to his ethical views.  Herder’s 
reputation, for many, derives primarily from his work in the philosophy of history.  
Friedrich Meinecke, for example, places Herder in a position of central importance in the 
development of historicism.  According to Meinecke, Herder was the first to offer a full 
account of the historicist concept of individuality, which is the notion that each historical 
age has its own unique characteristics, and that historical understanding must attempt to 
grasp each age in its individuality.54  Meinecke’s account of Herder is grounded in a 
reading of Herder’s Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte of 1774, but the 1769 travel 
journal contains the kernel of this idea.  While this concept is of undeniable importance 
for Herder’s historical theory, it also has an important ethical hue. 
 In the Journal, Herder contends that each class of society, and each form of life, 
has its own characteristic ethics, or “Sitten”. 55  The term ‘Sitten’ has a significant 
pedigree in the history of German philosophy, most famously in Hegel’s distinction 
                                                
53 This approach is most obviously apparent in the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte. 
54 Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1965), pp. 165, 
369, 402-3, and 545. 
55 “Jeder Stand, jede Lebensart hat ihre eignen Sitten.”  DKV 9/2: 27. 
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between Moralität and Sittlichkeit.56  Herder, in his journal, does not make the post-
Kantian distinction between these two concepts, which should not be imputed to him.  
But we should still not see his use of the term as restricted to a narrow range of issues 
concerning obligation and punishment, as might be the case if we see it as fitting with 
later uses of ‘morality’.  Herder’s use of ‘Sitten’ should be understood to refer inclusively 
to the practices and outlook of a people or class – their complete form of life.  Herder’s 
examples in the passage make this clear.  He credits Hume with depicting many forms of 
character in his historical and political essays, and sees this as an example of the 
recognition that different classes have different ethics.57  Herder also notes that the 
sailors on the ship he is travelling on have their own characteristic Sitten, as can be seen 
in their combination of superstition, rashness, ways of cooperating and quarrelling with 
others, and a valuation of the heroic.58   
In saying that each class and form of life has its own ethics, the point is not merely 
the triviality that there are differences between the ways different individuals conduct 
themselves.  Rather, Herder’s contention is the broader, and theoretically richer claim, 
that different ways of life conduce to happiness in different ways and that individuals find 
their own forms of happiness and well-being in one or other of these possible ways of 
living.  Thus, on the one hand individuals have the ethical and moral possibilities open to 
them that they do because of the culture or class which determines their possible ways of 
                                                
56 It is a fundamental distinction in Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in 
zwanzig Bänden, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
1971), volume 7.   
57 Herder’s reference is primarily to Hume’s History of England, though he also seems to have in mind his 
essays.  Relevant here would be especially, “Of National Characters”.  Included in Essays Moral, Political, 
and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987). 
58 DKV 9/2: 27. 
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living.  On the other hand, each of these ways of living makes it possible to be ethically 
good in unique and distinctive ways.   
We can think of this idea as having two complementary sides.  The first is a claim 
about the determining character of social groups for individual identity.  The second is a 
claim about ethical pluralism – that there are distinct and different kinds of ‚’Sitten’ for 
different forms of life.  Individuals are thus formed by the social groups to which they 
belong.59  These groups constitute the identities of individuals, and structure their 
possibilities of development and happiness.60   
Because societies shape individuals in this way, the study of history is of 
paramount ethical significance.  Such study, when done properly, should offer an account 
of the different kinds of moral practices and views that human beings have adopted, and 
how the historical conditions have shaped the practices and values of these societies.  
Herder argues that such a study of history is important in order to enable one to better 
understand how to enhance the happiness and well-being of persons in one’s own age: 
The human soul, in itself and in its appearance on this earth, its sensual tools and 
standards [Gewichte] and hopes and pleasures and duties, everything which can 
make human beings happy here, will be my fundamental perspective.   Everything 
else will be set aside, as long as I collect materials for this purpose.  And to learn to 
know, awaken, direct, and use every impulse [Triebfeder] which lies in the human 
heart, from the frightful and wonderful to the quietly meditative and gently 
stunning [Sanftbetäubenden] – For this purpose I desire to collect data from the 
history of all ages.  Each should supply to me the image of its own ethics [Sitten], 
customs [Gebräuche], virtues, vices, and happinesses, as I wish to lead all of this 
                                                
59 Recent philosophical work has also emphasized this aspect of social groups, and I am here in part 
influenced by the language of that work.  See, especially, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
60 This is the aspect of Herder’s thought that has been described by Isaiah Berlin as ‘pluralism’ in Isaiah 
Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder (London: Pimlico, 2000), pp. 176, 
231-9. 
 Sonia Sikka argues that his position is better described as a form of ‘relativism’ at Sikka, Herder on 
Humanity and Cultural Difference, pp. 33-43.  However, she also aptly notes that getting entangled in 
disputes about which label to apply to Herder is unhelpful, and likely to lead to anachronistic impositions 
of later views onto Herder. 
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back to our time and learn how to justly use these.  The human species has in all 
of its ages, only in one way or another, happiness to the highest degree [zur 
Summe].61 
 
This passage makes it clear that Herder’s interest in history was from this early period 
motivated by practical and ethical concerns.  He expresses a desire to understand the 
different ways of living and acting that have been conducive to the happiness of human 
beings, with the final intent of learning how to apply what has been learned for the 
improvement and benefit of his own age.  A guiding assumption here – one that will be 
critical later, especially in 1774 – is Herder’s belief that “The human species has in all of 
its ages, only in one way or another, happiness to the highest degree“62  This provides a 
reason for aiming to understand each age on its own terms, and to recognize a variety of 
different ways of living as valuable.  Herder’s claim further entails that in coming to 
understand how one should live as an individual human being, one must attend to the 
character of one’s own historical age in order to understand how it has shaped one’s own 
individual needs and possibilities.   
The Journal thus makes historical inquiry one of the highest tasks of the 
philosopher.  Herder does not think that just any engagement with history will serve these 
ethical ends, however.  One must bring history to life in such a way that one becomes 
aware of one’s own historical position as the product of historical development, and also 
as opening onto a further set of future possibilities.63  Any form of thinking about ethics 
that ignores the constitutive and enabling power of a society’s history suffers from a form 
of agnosia, and will not be able to contribute to the further development of one’s own age 
                                                
61 DKV 9/1: 30. 
62 Herder makes a notably similar assertion in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte: “jede Nation hat 
ihrem Mittelpunkt der Glückseligkeit in sich, wie jede Kugel ihren Schwerpunkt!”  DKV 4: 39. 
63 DKV 9/2: 123. 
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in an optimal way.  Further, the individual will not have an accurate estimation of their 
own possibilities.  
Because of the way history shapes each individual’s possibilities, every human life 
has a determinate horizon, which gives it a general structure and direction.64  In order to 
be most effective in one’s own time and place, it thus becomes imperative to understand 
how one’s own society came to be, as this history is what reveals the possibilities and 
limitations of each age.65  Herder advocates what has been called a genetic method for 
the investigation of human phenomena.66  This method was first developed for the study 
of aesthetic objects and genres.67  Herder’s travel journal shows that he also explicitly 
defends this historical method as necessary for understanding moral outlooks and 
practices.  This is because it is necessary for self-knowledge of both individuals and 
societies.  This reflective awareness is a requirement for understanding how to best 
improve one’s own age, for knowing what will contribute to happiness and virtue of those 
living in a particular society.  This provides one impetus for pursuing a genealogy of the 
way of life of one’s own society, a project that he will pursue in detail in Auch eine 
Philosophie der Geschichte. 
                                                
64 Herder uses the language of a horizon later in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, DKV 4: 39.  This 
term is also used by Gadamer in his account of the way that an individual’s interpretive possibilities are 
shaped by their historical situation.  See Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1998), pp. 302-7.  Gadamer credits 
Husserl and Nietzsche with this notion, surprisingly given his own engagement earlier with Herder, and 
Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte in particular, in his earlier texts Volk und Geschichte im Denken 
Herders (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1942); "Herder und die geschichtliche Welt," in Gesammelte Werke 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1967). 
65 The young Herder notes that this is crucial for his own activity as a minister, as he chastens himself to 
“werde ein Prediger der Tugend deines Zeitalters!”  DKV 9/2: 30. 
66 DKV 9/2: 123.  The notion that everything in the human world has a history, or has emerged as the 
product of a series of changes, is fundamental to his thought.  His views on this issue were stimulated in 
great part by his encounter with Kant’s early work, Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels.  
See, Adler, Herder und die deutsche Aufklärung, pp. 56-9; Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition, p. 
105. 
67 “Von der Ode”, DKV 1: 57-100; “Versuch einer Geschichte der lyrischen Dichtkunst”, SWS 32: 85-
140; the Fragmente cover this in many places, but see especially DKV 1: 190-4.  
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Herder also contends that the study of distant ages and cultures is beneficial for 
reasons other than providing a genealogy of one’s own form of life.  Knowledge of 
historically and geographically distant cultures is valuable because it provides one with 
both models of behavior, and stimuli for the development of one’s own virtues.  In the 
Journal, he expressing a longing for a history more emotionally vivifying and factually 
comprehensive than that produced by Iselin in the latter’s Geschichte der Menschheit.68  
Such a history would collect accounts of the social, moral, and aesthetic practices of a 
variety of ages, and present them to the reader in a way that allows them to see the good 
in each of the ages, and how one’s own could be made better through a selective 
appropriation of the good qualities of others.69   
Just as the virtues and characteristics that are appropriate for one historical age 
may not be the same as that of another, Herder contends that there are different traits 
that fitting for distinct stages of each individual life.  In the Journal, he makes this 
conception of stages central to his account of the individual’s life: “The human soul has 
its life-stages, just as the body does.”70   In youth, there are passions and curiosity that 
drive a person to develop and act in a way appropriate for youth.  Different passions and 
dispositions come to the fore in the other stages of life.71  This might appear to be merely 
an armchair empirical generalization about the ways in which persons of different ages 
tend to behave.  That Herder’s account is normative, however, is clear from his claim 
that in the present age persons are frequently turned into “monsters” due to a poorly 
                                                
68 Isaak Iselin, Über die Geschichte der Menschheit (Zürich: Orell, Gessner, und Comp, 1768). 
69 “Das sind Fragmente über die Moral und Religion aller Völker, Sitten und Zeiten, für unser Zeit…”  
DKV 9/2: 31. 
70 DKV 9/2: 113.   
71 DKV 9/2: 113-5.  Herder notes that Aristotle, Horace, and Hagedorn have each depicted the differences 
in human character typical of the different stages of life.  For Aristotle, he has in mind Rhetoric, Bk. II, Ch. 
10-2. 
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structured education that transforms children into codgers, and the elderly into 
juveniles.72  Herder clearly condemns such education on the grounds that it is a harmful 
and unhealthy way to live out one’s life.  It makes persons unhappy and ill-suited to act in 
the ways that are appropriate.  This conception of the stages of life is thus intended to 
ground norms about the proper ways of being for each stage. 
There are two key ideas here.  First, education is crucial because it shapes the 
character of the young in a way that will affect them for the rest of their life.73  To form a 
happy and virtuous person, one must thus attend to the dispositions that a person is wont 
to have at their age and to take those into consideration.  On that basis, traits and powers 
conducive to well-being should be cultivated.  Second, each human life has a structure 
and a well-lived life proceeds through each stage in the appropriate way.74  The 
imposition of the standards appropriate to one age upon a different age must be avoided.  
When this happens, it creates unhappiness and prevents people from developing their 
powers and talents in a healthy and lasting way.75 
This may sound like Herder is laying down a uniform schema of development for 
all human beings, in which each human being is supposed to develop through the same 
                                                
72 “…junge Greise, greise Jünglinge.”  DKV 9/2: 116. 
73 “So ist Erziehung Unterricht, Lebensart: hier eine Stimme der Wahrheit und Menschheit is Wohltat: sie 
schafft der Genuß der ganzen Lebenszeit: sie ist unschätzbar.”  DKV 9/2: 116. 
74 “Jeder Mensch muß sie durchgehen: denn sie entwickeln sich aus einander: man kann nie das folgende 
genießen, wenn man nicht das vorhergehende genossen hat: das erste enthält immer die Data zum Zweiten: 
sie gehen in Geometrischer, nicht Arithmetischer Progression fort: in ihre ganze Folge genießt man das 
Leben, und wird auf honette Weise Alt.” DKV 9/2: 115. 
75 Here, Herder is spinning a Rousseauean motif, familiar to any reader of Emile – it is inappropriate to 
force a child to act and think as an adult, and education should be tailored to the frame of mind natural for 
a child of that age.  Hence, one should consider the qualities of character to be not simply good or 
appropriate as such, but good or appropriate for a specific stage of life.  Consider, for example, “Childhood 
has its ways of seeing, thinking, and feeling which are proper to it.  Nothing is less sensible than to want to 
substitute ours for theirs, and I would like as little to insist that  a ten-year-old be five feet tall as that he 
possess judgment.”  Emile : or, On education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 90.   
A discussion of how Herder was influenced by these ideas of Rousseau’s, see Hans Wolff, "Der 
junge Herder und die Entwicklungsidee Rousseaus," Proceedings of the Modern Language Association 57 
(1942). 
  
39 
 
stages.  There is some truth to this interpretation, though it might appear to be in tension 
with some of the other things that Herder says about uniqueness and individuality.  
However, that which he depicts as common to all persons is a very general schema of 
development which leaves room for a great deal of variety in detail.  It does not require 
every person to live in an identical way, but rather only acknowledges the very basic 
natural fact that human beings are born as dependent infants, and mature over time into 
adults capable of self-determination and reflective thought.  Each of these stages has a set 
of virtues, and some of these virtues are distinct from the virtues appropriate for the other 
stages of life. 
The account of individual development presented so far means that there are a set 
of virtues and vices which are appropriate for each stage of human life.  Such virtues and 
vices are also historically shaped, and must be understood as fitting to only some 
historical ages.  This interpretation of the text, though, might seem suspicious if we 
consider one of the most striking passages of the journal: 
All morality is a record of fine abstract concepts.  All virtues and vices, the result of 
close attention to narrow situations, narrow cases [Fälle]!  Centuries, societies, 
covenants, religions have contributed to this!  What childish soul can hear and learn 
all of that which is contained in the word, and decipher it!  What philosopher has 
deciphered this!  What living philosopher, even if they had deciphered this, would be 
able to do this in a lively way, in order to be able to apply it!76 
 
One might read this as expressing simply an anti-theoretical sentiment that rejects all 
forms of moral philosophy as mere abstractions or useless fantasies.  What has been said 
thus far about there being virtues and vices appropriate to each age, because of the life-
                                                
76 DKV 9/2: 123.  The first sentence cannot be translated in a way that retains some of the suggestive 
connections between adjectives contained in the German.  It reads: “Die ganze Moral ist ein Register feiner 
Abstrakter Begriffe: alle Tugenden und Laster das Resultat vieler feiner Bemerkungen feiner Situationen, 
feiner Fälle!”  See also DKV 9/2: 117. 
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stages that each individual must grow through, might seem to run afoul of this restriction.  
However, if we attend to the whole of the passage, it seems that it should be read instead 
as a critique in the sense that we are more familiar with from Kant – an attempt to 
delimit the proper domain and procedures of a faculty or activity.  It is true that moral 
philosophy runs a danger of being merely a repository of historically accumulated ideas, 
sentiments, and conventions - if it were not able to offer an account of the origins of such 
sentiments. But if one were able to offer such an account of the origins of the ideas in 
question, then one might be able to do something more fruitful.  Such a form of ethical 
thought would then avoid the charge of merely treating the prejudices of one’s own age as 
eternal truths.  They would be seen instead as living responses to a particular 
predicament.   
A mere account of the history of our ethical life is not all that Herder thinks one 
should aim for.  He also suggestst that the origin of these ideas and sentiments must be 
developed in a living way in order for them to be‚put into use.  Nothing is said about how 
this would be done, or what the difference between a living and a dead or mechanical 
account would be.  It may be that a lively account would simply be more emotional and 
full of feeling, filled with the kind of writing characteristic of the Sturm und Drang.  It 
could also be that the work would present a totality of material as developing in an 
organic way.  In either case, Herder’s later historical works seem to be attempts to 
present history in both of these ways – Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte with its 
charisma and pathos, and the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit with 
its attempt to present a complete account of humanity as a part of the natural world.  
Herder may not have a clear idea about the proper execution of the inquiry into virtue 
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and morality at this early stage, as he dreams about it in the Journal.  Regardless, we need 
not conclude that Herder is a complete skeptic about the possibility of moral philosophy, 
though we can say that he is dubious about some forms of moral philosophy, and how 
they fail to attend to to the history of ethical practices as they should.  
There remains a question about the proper aim of philosophical inquiry into ethics 
and social life.  Two such aims can be discerned in the Journal: the cultivation of a 
harmoniously developed unique individual, and the production of self-determining 
persons capable of independent thought. 
It is in this text that we find one of the earliest formulations of what can be called 
the principle of harmonious develpment.  This is the notion that each individual ought to 
strive to perfect themself not only by developing one’s characteristic powers to their 
maximum, but that each individual‘s character ought to be a harmonious and well-
proportioned whole.77  In Journal meiner Reise, Herder describes this as the goal of an 
ideal education: “The powers of the soul [Seelenkräfte] in a child of youth will be evenly 
brought together [ausgebessert], and extended in proportion.“78  This idea is not filled 
out in great detail here, but there are two important elements that deserve to be noted, as 
they will be explored in later works.  The first is that education and human development 
consists not in the acquisition of information, but rather in the improvement of one’s 
powers or Kräfte.79  The second is that a person’s various powers should be developed 
such that a person’s various powers are in harmony with one another, where each power 
complements and balances the others.  This development, as it involves drawing out the 
                                                
77 I discuss this at greater length in chapter 5. 
78 DKV 9/2: 51. 
79 This idea is developed in more detail in Herder’s letters to Mendelssohn, which are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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innate dispositions of each individual, and bringing them into a complex unity, would 
result in the production of a unique way of being for that person.  This means that it is 
important and valuable for each person not only to develop their talents to a high degree, 
but to strive to become a unique individual.   
One might think that this emphasis on individuality is to be contrasted with an 
ethics that focuses on the social character of human life and our connections with others.  
To encourage the individual to be her unique self might involve the recommendation to 
cast aside, or even rebel against, all social conventions as hindrances to the individual’s 
pursuit of uniqueness.80   In Herder’s case, this is not so.  Herder was certainly aware of 
possible stultifying effects of social norms on the growth of an individual, if the norms are 
the wrong kind. But even in his Sturm und Drang years, his position was balanced by a 
recognition of the positive contributions that an individual’s culture makes to personal 
development.  In a striking passage about what is required to be an individual, he writes: 
“The human being is as much a social animal, as he is a human being.  The setting of the 
sun is to the planets just as natural, as society is to bring forth [fortzueilen] his powers.  
But only if the society does not completely kill our particularity [Eigenheit].”81  As is 
evident, Herder thinks that it is possible for an individual to have their individuality 
“killed“ by social coercion or excessive conformity.  Yet an individual can also develop 
themself in a richer way by drawing on the resources provided by their social context.   
This social context provides the individual with concepts that would be unavailable in 
isolation.82  To be capable of achieving the goal of becoming a fully developed and 
                                                
80 In the nineteenth-century, Max Stirner offers an argument for this kind of ethic of individuality.  See Der 
Einzige und sein Eigentum (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1979). 
81 DKV 9/2: 119. 
82 DKV 9/2: 119. 
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harmonious personality,  the individual needs the conceptual resources provided by a 
human community.   
In addition to his commitment to the principle of harmonious development, 
Herder holds that another goal of development is that the student become someone who 
“knows how to be his own master.“83  This characteristic enlightenment sentiment -  
likely inspired by that prophet of autonomy, Rousseau  - is important for Herder.  To live 
as one ought, one should act from one’s own nature and not live slavishly according to 
the dictates of others.  The student is not to remain in thrall to his teachers, but to be 
assisted in becoming a self-determining agent capable of independent thought.84 
Herder’s defense of egalitarianism and his critique of illegitimate forms of power 
and domination can also be seen as outgrowths of this principle.85  If each person should 
be educated in such a way that they can become their own master, then it follows that no 
one should be the master of others.  Herder’s advocacy of a form of autonomy is latent, 
rather than fully developed here, but his later criticism of Kant - that a human being who 
needs a master is an animal - has its roots here in his conception of a healthy form of 
development tending towards individual freedom and independence.86   
It is important to emphasize this side of Herder’s thought, as some interpreters 
have contended that Herder believes that the individual should be completely 
                                                
83 DKV 9/2: 50. 
84 Gjesdal also sees a defense of independent thinking as the central aim of “Wie die Philosophie zum 
Besten des Volks Allgemeiner und Nützlicher Werden Kann.”  See "'A Not Yet Invented Logic': Herder on 
Bildung, Anthropology, and the Future of Philosophy," pp. 62-6. 
85 For a detailed discussion of Herder’s views on equality and unjust forms of power, see Sikka, Herder on 
Humanity and Cultural Difference, pp. 18-25. 
86 See Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, DKV 6: 369.   
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subordinated to, or absorbed in, their culture.87  Such a contention is belied by a careful 
reading of any of Herder’s texts.  It is even more implausible when we see that from this 
early stage in Herder’s development, the cultivation of independent thought and self-
determination were central goals.  Herder will never adopt the Kantian conception of 
autonomy as the ability to act independently of the laws of nature,88 but he does work to 
develop and defend a more naturalized form of autonomy.   
 
III  
 
 
 These early and incomplete works of Herder’s are inchoate and undeveloped.  
Even if one is generous in one‘s conception of an argument, a reader will be unlikely to 
find arguments that are either complete or compelling.  These texts have their value 
primarily for what they reveal about the projects that Herder began to pursue as a young 
thinker, and for the basic ideas that he was beginning to formulate.  
 In the following chapters, we will find many of these ideas being developed and 
explored.  These will include the notion that what makes for a good or happy life is 
historically constituted, that the aim of an individual’s self-development is to become a 
harmonious whole, and that any ethical reflection on human life should be grounded in a 
conception of human nature that is realistic and scientifically informed.   
 There is one idea of great importance for Herder’s ethical thought that is 
developed in this same time period in a more thorough way – that human beings ought to 
                                                
87 Frank McEachran, The Life and Philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1939), p. 65; Robert Reinhold Ergang, Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism (New 
York: Octagon Books, 1966), p. 111; Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 95-7. 
88 See Kant, Grundlagen der Metaphysik der Sitten, Dritter Abschnitt.  In Band IV of Immanuel Kant, 
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Wilhelm Dilthey et al., 29 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). 
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work throughout their lives to perfect themselves by developing their powers.  In an 
exchange of letters with Moses Mendelssohn that took place in the same time period (the 
late 1760s), Herder offers a more detailed articulation of how he conceives this 
perfectionist idea.  This encounter with Mendelssohn will be the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2: The Vocation of Man Controversy 
 
 
I 
     
 In 1769, Johann Gottfried Herder wrote two important letters to Moses 
Mendelssohn concerning the latter’s recently published Platonic dialogue, 
Phädon.  These letters offer important insight into Herder’s ethical thought, as in 
them Herder presents his early views about such important ethical issues as 
pleasure, perfection, and the highest good.  They also show that Herder was 
sympathetic to many of the major ideas of the German rationalist tradition and 
not, as some scholars have been wont to claim, a diehard enemy of the 
enlightenment.1   
Herder’s letters to Mendelssohn are part of an important historical event in 
the history of German philosophy – the controversy over Die Bestimmung des 
Menschen.  The controversy’s center of gravity was a short book published by 
Johann Joachim Spalding in 1748 entitled Die Bestimmung des Menschen, or The 
                                                 
1 This conception of Herder was prominent in the first half of the twentieth century.  See, for example, 
Rudolf Unger, Herder, Novalis Und Kleist: Studien Über Die Entwicklung Des Todesproblems in Denken 
Und Dichten Vom Sturm Und Drang Zur Romantik (Frankfurt: Moritz Diesterweg, 1922); Alexanger 
Gillies, Herder (Oxford: Blackwell, 1945); Frank McEachran, The Life and Philosophy of Johann Gottfried 
Herder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939).  The “counter-enlightenment” reading of Herder received 
its most influential presentation in Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder 
(London: Pimlico, 2000)..   
No contemporary Herder scholar maintains this view, at least to my knowledge.  This is due, 
largely, to Emil Adler, Herder Und Die Deutsche Aufklärung (Vienna: Europa, 1968).    Sadly, however, 
Herder is still commonly referred to as a member of the “counter-enlightenment” by writers who have not 
studied his works directly.  In perhaps the most bizarre instance of this, Philipp Bobbitt compares Herder’s 
ideas to those of Osama bin Laden.  See the discussion in Robert E. Norton, "The Myth of the Counter-
Enlightenment," Journal of the History of Ideas 68 (2007). 
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Vocation of Man.2  While little known today, the book was one of the most widely 
discussed in the German-speaking world of the eighteenth century, and played an 
important role in shaping discussions in ethics and the philosophy of religion.  
According to Stefan Lorenz: 
Without exaggeration, one can say that Johann Joachim Spalding’s Die 
Bestimmung des Menschen was one of the most read books in Germany in 
the 18th Century.  Its first edition of 26 pages appeared in 1748, it was 
constantly enlarged by various supplements, up until its thirteenth edition 
in 1794, as well as having received translations into French and Latin.3   
 
One of the most important public exchanges inspired by Spalding’s text took place 
between Moses Mendelssohn and Thomas Abbt in pages of the major literary 
organ of the Berlin Aufklärung: the Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend.   
The controversy over Die Bestimmung des Menschen had a decisive 
influence on the young Johann Gottfried Herder, who carefully read Spalding’s 
book, as well as the works of Mendelssohn and Abbt.  His own intervention in the 
dispute is one of the most important moments in Herder’s intellectual 
development.  Herder’s thought was indelibly marked by these events, and he 
                                                 
2 The German word Bestimmung is impossible to translate precisely into English.  Potential translations are 
‘destiny’, ‘vocation’ and ‘determination’ – words that are hardly synonymous in contemporary English.  
The challenge for the present discussion is that the Bestimmung of a thing can be understood either as how 
it has already been determined to be (its present determination or its nature), or as what it ought to be (what 
it is determined to be in the future or what it ought to become), much like Aristotle’s acorn which will or 
ought to become a tree in the future because at the present moment it has the nature of an acorn as its 
potentiality.   
I generally translate the noun Bestimmung as ‘vocation’, though I will occasionally opt for 
‘determination’ when the context makes that valence of the German term seem more appropriate to 
emphasize.  I will almost always translate the verb bestimmen as ‘to determine’.   Whenever the term is 
translated, I will leave the original German in parentheses in order to alert readers that it is this crucial term 
that is being used. 
3 Stefan Lorenz, "Thomas Abbt Und Moses Mendelssohn in Ihrer Debatte Über Johann Joachim Spaldings 
Bestimmung Des Menschen," in Moses Mendelssohn Und Die Krise Seiner Wirksamkeit, ed. Michael 
Albrecht, Eva J. Engel, and Norbert Hinske (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1994), p. 124. 
The various additions brought the length of the thirteenth edition up to 244 pages.  The seventh 
edition of 1763, the appearance of which was the basis of the discussion between Abbt and Mendelssohn, is 
132 pages long. 
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worked throughout his philosophical career to give adequate expression to the 
position that he began to work out in his letters to Mendelssohn.   
In this chapter, I will try to bring out the issues at stake in the controversy 
over Die Bestimmung des Menschen and to interpret Herder’s early ethical views 
in light of them.  I will begin with an overview of Spalding’s text, and Herder’s 
reaction to it. I will then turn to Abbt and Mendelssohn, offering a brief account 
of each of their positions in turn.  I will then examine Herder’s letters to 
Mendelssohn, with the intent of highlighting what is distinctive in Herder’s 
position vis-à-vis the other figures involved in the discussion of the vocation of 
man.  I will then offer an account of the issues that remain unresolved in Herder’s 
letters.  The unresolved problems in Herder’s position, I will argue, are taken up 
by Herder in his later works where he attempts to address the problems either 
directly or obliquely.     
 
II 
 
Spalding’s Die Bestimmung des Menschen is concerned with providing an 
answer to the questions found in Persius’ Satires and cited on the opening page: 
“Whence come you? Whither are you going?”4  Each of these questions sets a task 
that Spalding takes up.  The question “Whence come you?” is understood as 
meaning roughly “What is your [i.e. human] nature?”  Spalding interprets 
“Whither are you going?” such that it is equivalent to Socrates’ basic ethical 
                                                 
4 “Quid samus? et quidnam victuri gignimur?” Persius, Satires, III, 67. The English translation in the 
paragraph is my translation of Spalding’s translation of the Latin.   
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question, “How should one live?”5  Spalding intends thus to offer both an account 
of human nature and of the proper ends of a human life.6   
Spalding’s text follows a narrator reflecting on the purpose of his existence.  
The path taken by the narrator is supposed to serve as a guide to all who read the 
text themselves, in the same way that readers of Descartes’ Meditations are 
supposed to be led from reposing faith in their senses to a belief in the superior 
power of their reason.  The issues Spalding addresses are ethical and religious, 
rather than epistemological, but the conclusion is in many ways similar to 
Descartes’.  Spalding seeks to persuade his reader that the best kind of life will not 
be one lived under the guidance of, or for the satisfaction of, either bodily or 
intellectual pleasures.  Rather, it will be a life devoted to improving and perfecting 
the immaterial soul. 
 Spalding begins by considering the value and importance of pleasure (first 
bodily pleasure,7 then intellectual pleasure8), then virtue,9 followed by religion10.   
All forms of pleasure, and even virtuous activity, are found incomplete and 
incapable of allowing a human being to be satisfied and content.  The highest 
                                                 
5 Plato, Republic 352d.  
6 Some helpful general discussions of Spalding’s text are Clemens Schwaiger, "Zur Frage Nach Den 
Quellen Von Spaldings Bestimmung Des Menshen.  Ein Ungelöstes Rätsel Der Aufklärungsforschung," 
Aufklärung 11, no. 1 (1999); Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study (University 
AL: University of Alabama Press, 1973), pp. 131-2; John Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of 
Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 165-7; Manfred Kuehn, "Reason as a 
Species Characteristic," in Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide, 
ed. Amelie Rorty and James Schmidt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Reinhard Brandt, 
Die Bestimmung Des Menschen Bei Kant (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2007), pp. 61-77; Michael Printy, "The 
Determination of Man: Johann Joachim Spalding and the Protestant Enlightenment," Journal of the History 
of Ideas 74, no. 2 (2013). 
7 Die Bestimmung des Menschen, pp. 39-43.  Citations are to the modern edition, Johann Joachim Spalding, 
Die Bestimmung Des Menschen,Die Erstausgabe Von 1748 Und Die Letzte Aufklage Von 1794 (Waltrop: 
Hartmut Spenner, 1997).  
8 Ibid., pp-44-8. 
9 Ibid., pp. 49-67.  
10 Ibid., pp. 68-79. 
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good of a human life can be found only in the perfecting of one’s rational, spiritual 
and moral nature.  This process of perfecting oneself can only be completed in an 
afterlife in which one’s real self, or pure soul, has an eternity to continue the task 
of self-perfection without being hindered by a physical body. The narrator 
concludes by contending that immortality is a necessary condition for the 
fulfillment of the vocation of man.11   
Spalding’s method of defending this view involves offering an account of 
the character of human beings,  of their desires and ways of thinking, which he 
believes will lead one to conclude that human beings must have been designed (or 
bestimmt) for immortality.  Spalding is a faithful member of the Lebnizian-
Wolffian perfectionist school of thought, and his argument is based on the idea 
that human beings are endowed with a set of powers and abilities which they are 
determined [bestimmt] to perfect.  Spalding claims: 
I sense abilities [Fähigkeiten] in me, which are capable of an infinite 
development [Wachstums].  Should my capacity to recognize and love the 
true and the good then cease when it either has merely begun to be 
developed, or even if it has become skillful through practice, prevented 
from a swifter ascent to a greater perfection?  That would be too much 
futility in the designs [Veranstaltungen] of an infinite wisdom.12 
 
Given that human beings have capacities that can be developed more completely 
than would be possible if the present life were the only one, the wisest way for the 
world to be constituted would be for human beings to be given the opportunity to 
develop these capacities to a complete perfection in an afterlife.  That the world 
would not be organized in a wise and excellent way is thought to be either 
                                                 
11 Ibid., pp. 80-9. 
12 Ibid., p. 82. 
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impossible or wildly implausible by Spalding.  This is because he believes that if 
we think carefully about how nature is organized, we will see that the world is 
well-ordered and that this will compel us to belief in divine providence.13     
Spalding’s argument reveals the dual influences of Shaftesbury and Wolff.14  
Spalding’s case for the belief in God, or divine providence, on the basis of the 
apparently harmonious order of nature is remarkably similar to an argument 
contained in Shaftesbury’s The Moralists: 
’Tis this that must render Revelation probable, and secure that first step to 
it, the Belief of a Deity and Providence.  A Providence must be prov’d from 
what we see of Order in things present.  We must contend for Order; and in 
this part chiefly, where Virtue is concerned.  All must not be refer’d to a 
hereafter.  For a disorder’d State, in which all present care of Things is 
given up, Vice uncontroul’d, and Virtue neglected, represents a very Chaos, 
and reduces us to the belov’d Atoms, Chance and Confusion of the 
Atheists.15   
 
Spalding accepts Shaftesbury’s claim that one must draw attention to the order of 
the world in order to support a belief in a deity that has created the world.  
However, whereas for Shaftesbury this meant that a belief in the hereafter was 
unnecessary, Spalding contends that a belief in a hereafter is warranted by this 
very belief in a deity concerned with the order of the world it has created.  Without 
an afterlife, there would be “futility in the designs of an infinite wisdom.”16 
                                                 
13 This is the basic argument of the chapter of Die Bestimmung des Menschen titled “Religion”, ibid., pp. 
68-79. 
14 Schwaiger shows that Shaftesbury and Wolff were the two dominant influences on Spalding’s thought.  
See "Zur Frage Nach Den Quellen Von Spaldings Bestimmung Des Menshen.  Ein Ungelöstes Rätsel Der 
Aufklärungsforschung." 
15 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 
3 vols. (London: Purser, 1732; repr., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), II, p. 156. 
16 Spalding, Die Bestimmung Des Menschen, p. 82. 
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The other pillar of Spalding’s argument - that we have powers and 
capacities that we ought to perfect, but which cannot be perfectly developed in the 
present life - finds its precedent in Wolff.  Wolff argues that there is a universal 
rule governing human actions according to which a person is to “do what makes 
yourself, your condition or the condition of others more perfect.”17  In light of this 
rule, the highest good for a human being, according to Wolff, is “an unhindered 
progress [Fortgang] toward greater perfections.”18   
Spalding’s argument for immortality thus brings together Shaftesbury’s 
argument for religious belief and the basic principles of Wolffian perfectionist 
ethics in order to develop a case for the vocation of man as an unhindered progress 
towards perfection which begins in this life and continues in an afterlife.  The 
achievement of the highest good, and the realization of our vocation, is possible 
only if the pursuit of perfection begun in the present life extends to eternity.  If 
that were not the case it would mean that a vast distance would remain between 
the optimally possible state of perfection, and the actual state of perfection which a 
human being achieves by the time of his or her death.  This would appear to make 
the small bit of perfection which even the best human being is capable of achieving 
appear to be in vain, since even that remains grossly inferior to the complete state 
of perfection which is possible. 
This argument also entails that the self which is immortal is not bodily, but 
rather is an immaterial soul or mind.  It is the rational faculty which is source of all 
                                                 
17 Christian Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken Von Der Menschen Thun Und Lassen, Zu Beförderung Ihrer 
Glückseligkeit (Frankfurt and Lepzig1733), section 12. 
18 Ibid., section 44. 
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thought: “I am actually that in me which has representations, judges, decides...“19  
Spalding holds that the ‘I’ which is immortal is thus a purely rational or spiritual, 
not a sensual being, and its being and its activity are not fundamentally dependent 
on the senses.20  Hence, the afterlife in which a human being is able to maximally 
perfect himself is a spiritual afterlife, in which a human being exists free of a 
physical body.   
 Spalding’s argument is an attempt to address the classical philosophical 
problem of the highest good.  This is a problem concerning the object of greatest 
value, the pursuit of which gives structure and significance to an agent’s life.  The 
highest good is characterized by Aristotle as an end that is desirable for its own 
sake, and that for the sake of which all goods that are merely desirable as means 
are sought.21  In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle canvasses a set of different 
ends which his contemporaries held to be the highest good – such as pleasure, 
honor, and happiness.  To be the highest good, according to Aristotle, an end or 
value must be self-sufficient, and a life devoted to it would be the best life for a 
human being, a life of complete eudaimonia.22  Cicero characterizes the question 
about the highest good as the inquiry into “the end, the ultimate and final goal, to 
which all our deliberations on living well and acting rightly should be directed.”23  
Augustine goes so far as to say that developing an account of the highest good is 
                                                 
19 Spalding, Die Bestimmung Des Menschen, p. 82. 
20 Ibid., p. 83. 
21 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094a-b.  In Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b-1096a and Eudemian Ethics, 1214b. 
23 Cicero, On Moral Ends, trans. Raphael Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 7. 
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the central aim of all philosophy, and “a sect which does not have its own view of 
that Supreme Good is not to be called a sect of philosophy.”24 
In the disputes that developed over the nature and content of the highest 
good in the ancient world, a major divide opened up between those philosophers 
who held that the highest good is immanent (i.e. attainable in the present life) or 
transcendent (i.e. attainable only in an afterlife).25  The Stoics, for example, 
defended an immanent account of the highest good, arguing that the highest good 
is virtue, which produces happiness, and can be attained by living in agreement 
with nature.26  Augustine, by contrast, defended a transcendent conception of the 
highest good, employing arguments that are similar in many ways to Spalding’s.  
Augustine held that anything short of an assurance of an afterlife would make 
human life meaningless and empty.27  Augustine argued, against the Stoic and 
Epicurean accounts of the highest good, that the only way in which a human being 
can achieve the peace that is constitutive of a good life is on the condition that he 
knows that he will continue to exist after his death, and that his moral conduct in 
this life will be rewarded with a good existence in the hereafter.28  Spalding’s 
                                                 
24 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), Book XIX, ch. 1, p. 913. 
25 There are many other distinctions to be made between the views of the highest good.  The Epicureans 
and the Stoic were far from being in agreement with each other, even though they both accepted an 
immanent view of the highest good.  My discussion in the present chapter does not pretend to be 
comprehensive.  A fairly comprehensive survey of the arguments about the highest good in the Roman era 
prior to the rise of Christianity is found in Cicero’s De finibus bonorum et malorum.   An English 
translation is available in Cicero, On Moral Ends.   
26 Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.6 and 2.6e,  included in The Stoics Reader, trans. Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. 
Gerson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2008).  See also Seneca’s De Vita Beata, included as “On the Happy Life” 
in Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Hardship and Happiness, trans. Elaine Fantham, et al. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2014). 
27 Augustine, City of God, Book XIX, ch. 4. 
28 Augustine’s argument for the superiority of the Christian, and transcendent, view of the highest good is 
given in ibid., Book XIX, ch. 13.  However, the entirety of Books XIV and XIX are relevant. 
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arguments follow in step with this Christian conception of the highest good as 
something that transcends the earthly life of a human being. 
 Among the many German intellectuals of the eighteenth-century who read, 
discussed, and were inspired by Die Bestimmung des Menschen were such 
philosophical luminaries as Kant, Fichte, and Schleiermacher.29  Fichte went so 
far as to give one of his own books the same title, in order to indicate the 
importance that Spalding’s text and the discussions surrounding it had for him.   
The young Johann Gottfried Herder was also interested in Spalding’s tract, 
and he composed a brief set of notes on it towards the end of 1766.  The notes are 
incomplete, but nonetheless make it clear that Herder was in sharp disagreement 
with Spalding on at least two issues.  First, Herder rejects the idea of an afterlife.  
He states “I am in the world once, where I must go: here abilities [Fähigkeiten] 
[text incomplete in original].“30  While Herder does not complete the second 
phrase, it is safe to assume that his claim is that the development of one’s abilities 
can only be the purpose of one’s life in this world, since a person is only in the 
world once.  Herder thus denies both Spalding’s claim that a person is an 
immortal mind distinct from the body, and that the development of our abilities 
requires or justifies a belief in an afterlife in which the development of our abilities 
is brought to completion.   
Herder’s second disagreement concerns the value of human sensuality or 
sensibility.  Herder asserts that “Senses are primary drives [Haupttriebe], primary 
                                                 
29 For a discussion of the influence of this issue on Kant, see Brandt, Die Bestimmung Des Menschen Bei 
Kant; Kuehn, "Reason as a Species Characteristic."   
30 SWS 32: 160. 
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purposes [Hauptzwecke]: they are in themselves not a restriction“.31  The context 
in which this passage appears does not make it clear whether Herder in fact 
endorses the view that the satisfaction of the senses is the main purpose, or the 
highest good, of a human life.  It does, however, make it clear that Herder denies 
that the senses are a limitation on human beings which ought to be overcome, as 
Spalding claims.  Herder goes so far as to sketch what he calls the “Bestimmung 
des sinnlichen Menschen”: 
a. He enjoys: and does not think etc. 
b. What he cannot be, he does not wish to be. 
c. He does not hope etc.32 
 
Herder concludes that he is able to find a “complete vocation [Bestimmung]” in 
such an existence.33  Given the fragmentary character of the notes, it is unclear 
what Herder means precisely by a “complete vocation”, and how he would 
elaborate on his differences with Spalding on this basis.  What can be safely 
concluded, however, is that Herder was chagrinned by the negative attitude which 
Spalding manifests toward the sensual character of human existence.  This text 
allows us to say that by as early as 1764 Herder was beginning to think that the 
highest good of a human life should be thought of in immanent terms, and that 
the body and senses should be included as essential and valuable elements of the 
vocation of a human being.  
 
III 
                                                 
31 SWS 32: 160. 
32 SWS 32: 161. 
33 SWS 32: 161. 
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 In January of 1764, Thomas Abbt sent a letter to Mendelssohn inviting him 
to discuss the newest edition of Spalding’s Die Bestimmung des Menschen,34 
which Abbt was supposed to review for Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend.  
Abbt considered the questions raised by the text to be important, but he thought 
that Spalding’s arguments were deeply flawed.  Abbt expressed skepticism about 
both Spalding’s arguments for immortality and the notion that immortality was 
necessary for human beings to fulfill their vocation and have a meaningful life.  
Mendelssohn, on the other hand, was himself committed to the view that human 
immortality was both knowable and necessary for the fulfillment of the vocation of 
man.  Each of the friends wrote a letter to the other, under the guise of 
pseudonyms.  Abbt (going by the name of Euphranor) criticized Spalding’s 
conception of immortality and the highest good, and Mendelssohn (going by the 
name of Theodul) acted as Spalding’s defender.  The exchange was published in 
the Briefe in July of 1764, under the title Orakel und Zweifel über die Bestimmung 
des Menschen.   
 In the next two sections, I will discuss the views of Abbt and Mendelssohn 
in turn.   
 
IV 
 
                                                 
34 This was the seventh edition, published in 1763.  See Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical 
Study, p. 130.  
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 Abbt puts forward a series of skeptical challenges to Spalding, calling on the 
specter of Pierre Bayle to be his muse.35  Abbt denies that it is reasonable to 
believe that we are immortal, that the development of reason is the purpose of 
human life, and that belief in providence and personal immortality are necessary 
constituents of a meaningful life.  Though we can have no certainty about our fate 
after the present life, Abbt avers that nonetheless we are still capable of living well 
and can fulfill our vocation.   
 One of Abbt’s complaints about Spalding is that the latter fails to take into 
account a wide variety of kinds of human lives and occupations.  Due to this, his 
theory of the vocation of man is inadequate.  Abbt argues that to assume that the 
development of reason, as opposed to sensibility, is the purpose of human life, is 
to characterize what is perhaps the vocation of intellectuals.  This does not tell us, 
however, about the vocation of persons who never develop their intellect by 
engaging with abstract ideas.   
This is deeply troubling as an account of the vocation of man, since most 
human beings do not develop the capacity for such forms of contemplation.36  
Spalding, Abbt worries, treats the meditative intellectual as the paradigm of 
humanity, whereas if his reflections took into account the lives of soldiers or 
Laplanders, he would see that some lives that do not involve refined intellectual 
                                                 
35 JubA 3.1, p. 10.  Abbt’s Zweifel and Mendelssohn’s Orakel are included in volume 3.1 of Moses 
Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften: Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. Fritz Bamberger, et al., 39 vols. (Stuttgard-
Bad Cannstatt: Frommann Holzboog, 1972).  Following standard practice, I cite this edition as JubA.   
36 „Die ganz Schrift ist die Monologe eines unterrichteten und nachdenkenden Mannes.  Daher passet sie 
keineswegs auf die ungeheuere Menge von Menschen, die fast allein durch die äussern Gegenstände zu 
ihrer Glückseligkeit, oder zu dem Gegentheile bestimmet werden.“  JubA 3.1, p. 12. 
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activity can be happy and fulfilling ways of living.37  Spalding’s claim that a human 
being could not possibly be satisfied by a sensual life is not supported by a survey 
of the facts.  This calls into question Spalding’s claim that only a life in which a 
human being frees him or herself from his or her sensual nature could be 
experienced as fulfilling.   If what is at issue is the vocation of human beings as 
such, then Spalding’s account turns out to be too narrow.  
Spalding attempted to identify a single form of highest good for human 
beings, and Abbt here attempts to open up the logical space for a kind of pluralism 
which concedes that human beings can fulfill their vocation in a plenitude of ways.  
The portrait of the vocation of man, hence, must be painted with colors borrowed 
from the various kinds of lives of that human beings are found to live.38 
Abbt further parts from Spalding by rejecting the notion that we need to 
make reference to either providence or God’s commands to know how we ought 
to live.  For one, a belief in providence is unjustified.  Abbt contends, contrary to 
Spalding, that the present order of the world gives us no grounds for confidence 
that it is governed in accordance with moral intentions.  History shows us that the 
evil prosper and the good suffer without respite.39  Further, a glance at the present 
reveals that we live in a world where infants die before they can develop their 
capacities, thus being denied the opportunity to even begin the process of working 
towards fulfilling their vocation.40  Consequently, according to Abbt, any belief in 
                                                 
37 Laplanders were commonly employed as an example of an allegedly uncivilized and unrefined people for 
many eighteenth century authors.  They were used in this manner by Hume, Voltaire, and many others.   
38 JubA 3.1, p. 10.   
39 JubA 3.1, p. 16.  John Zammito discusses how Abbt’s study of history drove him into the arms of 
pessimism.  See Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology, pp. 168-9. 
40 JubA 3.1, p. 17. 
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providence and an afterlife in which people receive their just deserts can only be a 
“hope” and never a truth demonstrated by reason.41 
In order to support the idea that it is possible to understand the vocation of 
man without a belief in God, Abbt presents an allegorical story worthy of Kafka.42  
Abbt tells of a regiment of troops awaiting orders, but who are not actually sure if 
orders are on the way.  They spend a long time waiting without receiving any word 
of what their directives are, and this leads to worry and concern on the part of 
many in the company.  Some fear that the prince has forgotten their regiment, 
others worry that the prince may not even be alive.  Even the commanding officers 
are in the dark about what their task is, or when they will hear from the prince.  
Abbt holds that even in a condition as uncertain as this, such soldiers would still 
be able to understand what kinds of actions are worth doing, and which are not.  
Abbt admits that some soldiers might turn to criminal acts, while others become 
lazy and sluggish.  However, even without orders, it is possible to know that it is 
wrong to act in certain ways – that it is contrary to one’s calling or vocation.43  A 
soldier who behaves like a beast towards those whom he is commissioned to 
protect can be regarded as failing to do what he should, even if he has not received 
any specific orders from his commander to refrain from such an act or to do 
something else.  Abbt considers all human beings to be in a position much like his 
                                                 
41 JubA 3.1, p. 16. 
42 JubA 3.1, p. 11.  The comparison with Kafka is also made by Altmann, but similarities are so striking 
that it is almost impossible for a modern reader to avoid them.  Abbt’s story bears a striking thematic 
resemblance to Kafka’s “Beim Bau der Chinesischen Mauer”.    This story is included in Franz Kafka, Die 
Erzählungen (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1996). 
The main difference is that whereas Kafka seems to despair of the insurmountable sense of 
meaninglessness of such a condition, Abbt is more optimistic about our prospects for finding some sense of 
meaning and fulfillment. 
43 JubA 3.1, p. 11. 
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fictional soldiers.  We lack any direct contact with God, and we have not received 
any specific commands from God informing us about what to do or how to live.  
Nonetheless, it is possible for us to find ways to live that are fitting of our station. 
Abbt refrains from committing himself to the claim that God does not exist.  
His concern is rather to deny the conditional claim that if God does not exist, then 
the vocation of man cannot be fulfilled and human life would be empty and 
meaningless.  Human beings may still fulfill their vocation by living virtuously 
even if they are not assured of immortality or the existence of a creator.44  Hence, 
Abbt would also deny Voltaire’s claim that if God did not exist then he would 
have to be invented, as well as Ivan Karamazov’s claim that if God does not exist 
then everything is permitted.  Abbt wishes to show that our vocation is something 
that both must and can be determined without appeal to either providence or an 
afterlife: 
And it is thus clear that man, before whom the door of his entry into the 
present life, and the door of the exit from the same, is shrouded by mist, 
that man, I say, yet has enough light for the path which he shall travel.45  
 
Abbt’s point here is a skeptical one, which makes his summoning of Bayle’s spirit 
appropriate.  Given the failure of Spalding’s alleged proof of an afterlife, human 
beings are in a state of ignorance concerning the hereafter.  Abbt does not infer, 
however, that the highest good is unattainable for a human being, but only that it 
should be understood as an immanent highest good, attainable within the finite 
                                                 
44 In Vom Verdienste, Abbt relates another story to make a similar point.   There he presents the case of a 
servant whose master has been away for an exceptionally long time without contact.  The servant continues 
to do his work even when others doubt whether the master will ever return.  Such a servant, Abbt contends, 
is a shining example of virtue, specifically of the virtue that Abbt calls “strength of soul”.  Thomas Abbt, 
Vermischte Werke, 6 vols. (Berlin: Friedrich Nicolai, 1772; repr., Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1978.), I, p. 98. 
45 JubA, 3.1, p. 15. 
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life of a human being.  For this we have “enough light for the path.”  What 
happens beyond the boundaries of a finite human life, though, is as irrelevant for a 
human being, as knowledge of it is unattainable.   
Our moral life does not require knowledge of the divine or the hereafter, 
according to Abbt, and this allows human beings to retain the hope for a 
meaningful life in which their vocation is fulfilled by living virtuously.  Human life 
itself, thus generates its own standards autonomously.46  There are two general 
kinds of virtuous life, according to Abbt.  There is the life devoted to serving one’s 
country, and also the life of merit in which a person devotes him or herself to 
improving the lives of others.  Abbt worked to contribute to a better 
understanding of these kinds of public virtues in his two major works – Vom Tode 
fürs Vaterland and Vom Verdienste.47  It is a life of public service devoted to the 
advancement of the good one’s community which has meaning and value, 
according to Abbt.  Abbt thus argues that our vocation can be fulfilled in the 
present life, and is something that is within the reach of most human beings.   
 Abbt’s argument thus rejects almost every substantive part of Spalding’s 
conception of the vocation of man.  He thus provides an important counterpoint 
to the transcendent conception of the highest good defended by Spalding.      
  
                                                 
46 Stefan Lorenz helpfully sum up Abbts view as follows: “Abbts Bedeutung liegt nun darin, dass er 
solchen Fideismus [i.e. Mendelssohn’s and Spalding’s] zurückweist.  Statt dessen wendet er die 
Mängelsituation der Unerkennbarkeit von Providenz und Jenseits ins Praktische, und damit werden die 
Konturen einer autonomen Moral erkennbar.“  Lorenz, "Thomas Abbt Und Moses Mendelssohn in Ihrer 
Debatte Über Johann Joachim Spaldings Bestimmung Des Menschen," p. 132. 
47 Vom Verdienste is included in volume 1 of Abbt’s Vermischte Werke.  Vom Tode fürs Vaterland is 
included in volume 2.  There is a helpful discussion of these texts in chapter 3 of  Benjamin W. Redekop, 
Lessing, Abbt, Herder, and the Quest for a German Public (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2000). 
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V 
 
Moses Mendelssohn was not convinced by Abbt’s skeptical critique of 
Spalding, but he did think that Abbt raised serious challenges that needed to be 
taken into account.  Where Abbt found his muse in Bayle, Mendelssohn by 
contrast enlists the spirit of Leibniz in his riposte to Abbt.48  Mendelssohn accepts 
the standard German rationalist view that the purpose of human life is the pursuit 
of perfection, but he concedes Abbt’s claim that an adequate account of the 
vocation of man must apply to a broad variety of kinds of lives.  He calls for a 
consideration of “the savage and the cultivated, the king, the beggar, the 
philosopher, the courtiers, Abauzit, Voltaire, yourself and the Greenlander in his 
filthy hut,” because “all make a claim on the same vocation.”49  This will yield a 
more accurate account of what all human beings have in common, and thus what 
all human beings are determined to become according to their nature.  It is even 
important to extend our comparison to nonhuman beings as well, in order to grasp 
more distinctly what the vocation of man is.   
Mendelssohn insists that the vocation of man consists in the ability to 
perfect oneself through the development of one’s powers: 
But you possess something peculiar, which makes you a person.  You can 
and will become more perfect through practice.  Your life is a continual 
                                                 
48 Orakel, die Bestimmung des Menschen betreffend, JubA, 3.1, p. 21-3.     
Mendelssohn aligns himself with Leibniz not only to signal his general sympathy with Leibniz’s 
metaphysics and philosophy of religion, but also to recall the dispute between Bayle and Leibniz over the 
possible knowledge of God and the purpose of human life.  Leibniz’s Theodicy and Bayle’s article 
“Rorarius” in his Historical and Critical Dictionary thus form the acknowledged background of the 
dispute.  On the dispute between Bayle and Leibniz, see Richard Popkin, The History of Skepticism: From 
Savanarola to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 263-4.  
49 JubA 3.1, p. 19.  
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endeavor to unfold the capacities enfolded within you.  Your powers work 
ceaselessly on their own improvement.  You may die as an infant or an old 
man, but at any time you would depart from this life more developed 
[ausgebildet] than you entered it.  The distance from an embryo to a 
babbling child is perhaps greater than that from a pupil to Newton.50 
 
The actual vocation [Bestimmung] of man here below, which the foolish 
and the wise both fulfill, though in unlike measures, is thus the 
development of our soul’s capacities [Seelenfähigkeiten] according to divine 
intentions.  All of man’s works on earth have this aim [denn hierauf zielen 
alle seine Verrichtungen auf Erden].51  
 
According to Mendelssohn, every human being has a set of inherent powers or 
capacities which they are driven to develop.  We are born with them “enfolded” 
within us, and as we live we “unfold” them through learning, practice, and natural 
growth.  This task of perfecting our powers carried out by each person to a greater 
or lesser degree, but it is an essential feature of any human life.  Mendelssohn 
marshals this claim in order to show that his own position is not susceptible to 
Abbt’s objection against overly intellectualized conceptions of the vocation of 
man.   
The conception of human perfection employed by Mendelssohn is broader 
than that of Spalding, as the former accounts even the natural development of 
capacities in an infant as steps taken towards the fulfillment of a human being’s 
vocation.  For Mendelssohn, a person need not devote him or herself to refined 
intellectual tasks in order to pursue or fulfill their vocation as a human being.52  
Whatever degree of perfection a human being achieves – whether it be the infant’s 
development of the ability to perceive medium-sized physical objects, the farmer’s 
                                                 
50 JubA 3.1, pp. 19-20. 
51 JubA 3.1, p. 20. 
52 JubA 3.1, p. 24. 
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ability to plant and harvest wheat, or the scientist’s ability to grasp the natural laws 
governing the physical world - Mendelssohn claims that important moves towards 
the development of human powers and the unfolding of human capacities have 
always been made.  Hence, the vocation of man is fulfilled to some degree in any 
and every life.  Mendelssohn goes so far as to assert that even an infant who dies 
within its first days has already become more perfected than when it first came 
into existence, and such cases serve as no objection to his view.53   
While Mendelssohn agrees with Abbt that Spalding’s conception of the 
capacities whose development is constitutive of the vocation of man is unduly 
intellectualistic and narrow, Mendelssohn agrees with Spalding that there are 
grounds for the belief in human immortality.  Immortality is a necessary part of an 
adequate conception of the vocation of man.  Solid grounds for the belief in 
immortality can be established by metaphysical and ethical arguments.   
Mendelssohn’s basic argument is that “no substance is annihilated [wird 
vernichtet], and as long as it is there it fulfills the intentions of its preserver 
[Erhalter].”54  Mendelssohn thus justifies his claim that a human soul cannot 
cease to exist on explicitly Leibnizian grounds.  He accepts the view advanced by 
Leibniz that all substances are indestructible, and once they exist they cannot 
cease to exist.55  The human soul is a substance, and hence cannot ever cease to 
exist. 
                                                 
53 JubA 3.1, p. 24.  This was not a merely abstract concern for Mendelssohn, as it was written not long after 
the death of his infant daughter.  Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, p. 137.   
54 JubA 3.1, p. 21. 
55 Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, §9 and Monadology, §1-6.  Both are included in G.W. Leibniz, 
Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).   
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Even if Mendelssohn’s Leibnizian argument for immortality is granted, an 
important question remains open concerning the nature of immortality: in what 
manner does the soul continue to exist after the death of the body?  This seems to 
offer another opening for someone like Abbt to present a skeptical objection.  For 
all we know, the soul might exist without any memory of its time bound to a body, 
or it might take on a fundamentally different form which we could not possibly 
imagine.   
Mendelssohn attempts to head off such a move by answering this question 
in good rationalist fashion – by comparing human life to a geometrical 
demonstration.  Since all that occurs in a human life depends on what came 
before, what happens in the afterlife will likewise depend on what happens in the 
course of the present life.  Our present life is related to our future condition as 
“the grounds of a long demonstration” are related to a conclusion.56  Given that 
we are rational beings, whose purpose is to strive for perfection through the 
development of our capacities and abilities, we can expect to have the same mode 
of being in the afterlife.  We will continue to have the same nature, and hence will 
have the same vocation – the continued perfection and development of our 
capacities and powers.  In fact, if we ceased to exist at moment when our body 
dies, then our vocation could not be fulfilled.  We would not be able to complete 
the development begun during our earthly life.  We are destined or determined to 
perfect ourselves, but this cannot be accomplished in a finite period of time, and 
hence requires an eternal life of striving to perfect ourselves.  Mendelssohn’s 
                                                 
56 JubA 3.1, p. 21. 
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conclusion, then, is that we must carry our perfected capacities with us from the 
present life into the next, where we will persist in developing ourselves into ever 
more perfect beings. 
Mendelssohn sums up his account of the vocation of man as follows: 
What is the vocation of man [Bestimmung des Menschen]? – Answer: To 
fulfill the intentions of God in the condition of rational knowledge, to 
persist [fortzudauern], to become more perfect, and to be happy in this 
perfection.57 
 
The final end of human striving and the purpose of our existence, according to 
this view, is a state of perfection achieved through an agent’s own activity.  In this 
state of perfection, a rational being can also count on being happy.  If 
Mendelssohn follows Wolff here – as is likely - the happiness of the perfected state 
is not an external consequence of an agent’s perfection, but is constituted by the 
development and perfecting of the agent’s powers.58  Thus, the vocation of man is 
the perfection off oneself through the perpetual development of one’s powers, and 
also makes for the agent’s happiness.    
 Thomas Abbt died in 1766, shortly after the publication of Zweifel und 
Orakel über die Bestimmung des Menschen.59  The two friends had not been able 
to come to an agreement about the issues raised in their exchange, but 
                                                 
57 JubA 3.1, p. 23. 
58 For Wolff’s account of the relationship between perfection, the highest good and happiness, see Wolff, 
Vernünftige Gedancken Von Der Menschen Thun Und Lassen, Zu Beförderung Ihrer Glückseligkeit, 
sections 51, 53, 57, 68, 70, and 71. 
59 Mendelssohn and Abbt continued their discussion after the publication of Zweifel und Orakel über die 
Bestimmung des Menschen in private letters.  There is more of interest in them, but I have focused solely on 
the published arguments, as my purpose is to trace the influence of these arguments on Herder, who 
certainly read the published version, but would not have had access to the private correspondence.  Helpful 
accounts of the extended discussion between Mendelssohn and Abbt can be found in Lorenz, "Thomas 
Abbt Und Moses Mendelssohn in Ihrer Debatte Über Johann Joachim Spaldings Bestimmung Des 
Menschen."; Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, pp. 130-40.   
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Mendelssohn developed his account of the vocation of man in more detail in his 
Phädon, which Herder, among others, recognized as Mendelssohn’s tribute to his 
departed friend.60  Phädon is a peculiar text.  It is part direct translation of Plato’s 
Phaedo, part loose adaptations of arguments in Plato’s dialogue, all interspersed 
with Mendelssohn’s own original arguments for the immortality of the soul.    
 In Phädon, Mendelssohn repeats, extends, and alters the arguments that he 
presented for the immortality of the soul in his Orakel.   His fundamental premise 
is that human beings exist in order to develop their powers to the highest degree of 
perfection possible, and paramount among human powers are the powers of 
reason.  That is, it is the perfection of reason and the development of our cognitive 
faculties that is our Bestimmung.  The argument of the Phädon offers a fuller 
account of the philosophical anthropology and metaphysics underlying 
Mendelssohn’s arguments for immortality, and it was these arguments which 
would be challenged in provocative ways by Herder.  
 In the Phädon Mendelssohn distinguishes between two kinds of living 
beings – sensual and rational.61  Among living creatures, rational beings have the 
“noblest place”, and have their own particular vocation – they are capable of self-
perfection.  It is thus by virtue of the rational nature of man that man has the kind 
of vocation ascribed to him in Mendelssohn’s Orakel.  A human being can learn of 
his or her vocation by carefully examining human nature: 
If you want to know man’s vocation [Bestimmung] here below, simply look 
at what he performs here below.  He brings with him onto this stage 
                                                 
60 Herder, „Über Thomas Abbts Schriften“, DKV 2: 568. 
61 Moses Mendelssohn, Phädon, in Moses Mendelssohn, Schriften Zur Philosophie, Aesthetik Und 
Apologetik, 2 vols. (Leipzig: L. Voss, 1880), I, p. 227. 
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[Schauplatz] neither skill, nor instinct, nor innate aptitudes; neither 
defenses nor protection; and appears at the moment of his first scenes 
[Auftritte] needier and more helpless than any irrational animal.  But the 
striving and the ability to make himself more perfect, these most sublime 
gifts of which a created being is capable, variously supersede the 
deprivation of bestial instincts and skills which are capable of assuming no 
higher degree of perfection.62 
 
The characteristic capacity of a human being, according to Mendelssohn, is not a 
particular talent or instinct with which a human being is innately endowed, but the 
capacity to develop and perfect an indeterminate set of abilities through one’s own 
striving.  Animals are born with instincts that develop quickly and in a uniform 
way, but human beings come into the world with fewer abilities and are 
consequently compelled to develop their capacities through their own activity.  
Human beings are different from sensual beings because they are self-perfecting 
beings, and this characteristic grants them membership in the kingdom of rational 
beings.  The vocation of man is to actualize this distinctive ability – that is, to 
strive to become more perfect.  
Mendelssohn argues that human beings never exhaust this pursuit of 
perfection: “The goal of this aspiration [Bestreben] consists, as does the essence of 
time, in progress [Fortschreitung]…Accordingly, in a human life the striving for 
progress [Fortstreben] knows no limits.”63  Because this task cannot be completed 
in the present life, and given that the world is a well-designed one in which 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., I, p. 229. 
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nothing happens without purpose, Mendelssohn argues that there must be an 
afterlife.64 
 An afterlife of just any sort, however, would not be enough, according to 
Mendelssohn.  It would have to be the case that the same being that strives to 
perfect itself in this life persists with its acquired perfections and cultivated 
capacities into the next life.  If the capacities were lost, as well as the consciousness 
of what the agent had done, then the mere fact of continued existence would have 
no bearing on the practical life of the agent.  It would be a morally irrelevant form 
of immortality.65  Mendelssohn claims that while the human body dies at the end 
of life, the rational soul exists in the hereafter and is capable of continuing the 
activity of perfecting its capacities.  Hence, all of the perfections developed and 
acquired are carried forth into the hereafter. 
This seems to imply or assume that an individual’s body plays no essential 
part in the process, since the pursuit of perfection can be completed by the mind 
independently of its sensual capacities.  But Mendelssohn is unclear on this point, 
for he claims that the powers of the human soul are in some way always bound up 
with a body.66  When the body dies, it can be observed to cease its activity and 
decompose.  In such a state it is not perfecting itself any longer.  Given this 
condition of the body, Mendelssohn argues that one must believe that the soul, by 
contrast, persists and endures carrying on the task of self-perfection begun by the 
                                                 
64 Ibid., I, pp. 230-1.  Ibid., pp. 230-1. 
65 Ibid., I, pp. 230 and 39.  Leibniz makes a similar argument in Discourse on Metaphysics, §34. 
66 See, for example, his reply to Herder from May 2, 1769.  The problems that this letter raises for 
Mendelssohn are discussed in Frederick C. Beiser, "Mendelssohn Versus Herder on the Vocation of Man," 
in Moses Mendelssohn's Metaphysics and Aesthetics, ed. Reinier Munk (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011); 
Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, pp. 171-6. 
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composite human being.  The human being’s vocation, then, is capable of being 
carried out independently of the body.  Consequently, the essential Bestimmung 
of a human being is the development of rational and spiritual capacities, and the 
body has only a peripheral, perhaps a dispensable, place in the vocation of man.  
 
VI 
 
In April of 1769, Herder sent a letter to Mendelssohn criticizing the 
arguments presented in Phädon.67  Mendelssohn read Herder’s arguments, and 
found that they warranted a response, which he sent to Herder in May of 1769.  
Herder was not satisfied with Mendelssohn’s reply, and wrote Mendelssohn a 
second letter in which he expanded on the major points raised in the first, 
clarifying the central disagreement.   
Herder’s letters to Mendelssohn offer important insight into his conception 
of the vocation of man – including his views of human nature and the highest 
good.  The letters are, for this reason, one of the best expressions of Herder’s 
ethical thought which he authored during his early period of intellectual activity.68  
Some scholars have claimed that Herder’s exchange with Mendelssohn is an 
instance of a deep parting of ways between Herder and the rationalist 
philosophical tradition.69  Such an interpretation is far from correct, however, as 
Herder accepts and retains several of the tenets of the rationalist account of the 
                                                 
67 Herder, Briefe, I, pp. 137-143. 
68 Rudolf Haym discusses the letters, but only emphasizes the way in which they reveal Herder’s 
unorthodox religious views, completely neglecting the ethical side of the issue.  Rudolf Haym, Herder: 
Nach Seinem Leben Und Seinen Werken, 2 vols. (Berlin: Rudolf Gaertner, 1877-85), I, pp. 295-8.   
69 See, for example, Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology, p. 171. 
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vocation of man.  This is not to deny that Herder differs from Mendelssohn in 
important respects – namely with regard to the importance of immortality and the 
relationship between rationality and sensibility – but his position is best 
understood as an innovative form of perfectionism (the ethical theory of the 
German rationalist tradition), rather than as a radical rejection of it.  The critique 
does not mark a “calving” of the rationalist tradition and a radically opposed 
anthropological tradition of philosophy inaugurated by Herder.70 
One gravamen raised by Herder is that Mendelssohn’s account of the 
Bestimmung of human beings is “too philosophical [etwas zu philosophisch]”: 
Even in your Orakel the vocation of man [Bestimmung des Menschen] 
appears to me in its entire scope somewhat too philosophical, in that it 
would be the formation of the capacities of the soul.  If this proposition 
were strictly followed, even with the best proportion of the powers of the 
soul, but these exclusively – then the greatest barbarian [Unmensch] would 
be created, without purpose and without happiness.71 
 
Herder complains that Mendelssohn’s conclusion is one that an intellectual might 
be inclined to draw when considering the issue in abstraction, but only if they 
ignore the consequences that such a view would have if applied to an actual 
person.  The result of developing the intellectual powers, or any other powers of 
soul, exclusively would produce something inhuman.  Thus, given that only an 
inhuman being [i.e. an Unmensch] would be the result of living according to this 
idea, this could not be the vocation of a human being.  Instead we must 
acknowledge that “in our nature there is more or less a greater measure of animal 
nature [Thiernatur] than of pure spirit [Geist],” and a human being must be 
                                                 
70 Pace ibid.   
71 Briefe, I, p. 138. 
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regarded as “a compound nature [vermischte Natur].”72  The body is a part of 
what we are “not merely through an arbitrary association”, but we are essentially 
embodied.73  Hence, the development and care of the body must be included in 
any adequate account of the vocation of man.   
We can see that, according to Herder, Mendelssohn’s conception of the 
vocation of man is based on an inadequate and one-sided theory of human nature.  
Human beings have intellectual and spiritual capacities, but these are not the 
exclusive elements constituting a human being.  Consequently, the vocation of an 
actual human being cannot be determined by appeal to what would only be valid 
for a pure Geist.  The positive implication of this is that, according to Herder, a 
human being must be a well-rounded and properly developed whole.74  To 
exclusively develop one characteristic aspect of one’s self at the expense of all 
others would result in a malformed and unhappy human being.  To become a 
well-formed individual whose capacities have a harmonious relationship to one 
                                                 
72 Briefe, I, pp. 138-9. 
73 Briefe, I, p. 138. 
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 Mendelssohn also endorses this idea.  For example, Mendelssohn writes:  “Since nature gave us the the 
capacity to perfect ourselves, she has at the same time implanted in our essence [the capacity] to raise up all 
our capabilities in the most perfect harmony… None should be repressed, none should be forgotten, but on 
the other hand we must not unjustifiably enthrone any of them.”  JubA 2, p. 89.     
 Herder may have been influenced by Mendelssohn on this point, though Herder thinks that the 
physical body must be seen as more important in this harmonious development than Mendelssohn does.  I 
am grateful to Aaron Koller for drawing my attention to this passage. 
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another is thus taken by Herder to be the proper goal of human life.75  This is an 
idea that is persistently advanced by Herder in his philosophical works.76 
Unlike Abbt, however, Herder does not think that this supports a 
skepticism concerning the immortality of the soul.  In fact, Herder thinks that 
Menselssohn’s proof of immortality is a success.77  Herder explicitly endorses the 
Leibnizian argument that no substance can ever be destroyed, and the additional 
idea that human soul is a substance: “I myself think that your proof is firm, insofar 
as it concerns the indestructibility of the human soul through death.  Only a 
phenomenon ceases thereupon, and the thinking substance remains.“78  That is, 
he accedes to the claim that a substance cannot cease to exist and that the soul is a 
substance with unique powers (Kräfte) which persist in the universe after death of 
what we perceive as its body.  But the soul and its powers cannot exist without a 
body, and the soul must form a new perceptible body.  The process by which the 
soul finds and forms other matter into a new body is, admittedly, obscure and not 
developed in any detail by Herder.  What is clear, however, is that while Herder 
concedes that the soul may be immortal, he nonetheless denies that the kind of 
immortality that it has necessitates the other claims that Mendelssohn wishes to 
draw from it – namely, that the development of the human rational capacities is 
                                                 
75
 In his reply to Herder, Mendelssohn concedes to Herder that a human being is not a pure Geist, but is 
necessarily an embodied being.  Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, 7 vols. (Leipzig: F.A. 
Brockhaus, 1844), V, pp. 485-6.  However, this is hard to square with some of Mendelssohn’s arguments.  
At the very least, Herder would still be justified in his complaint that Mendelssohn doesn’t take adequate 
account of the ways in which the human vocation is shaped and determined by our ‘mixed nature’. 
76 I will discuss how this idea is employed and defended in other texts written by Herder in chapters 5 and 
6.  See also Hans Dietrich Irmscher, "Gegenwartskritik Und Zukunftsbild in Herders Auch Eine 
Philosophie Zur Geschichte Der Bildung Der Menschheit," in "Weitstrahlsinniges" Denken: Studien Zu 
Johann Gottfried Herder (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009). 
77 Herder, Briefe, I, p. 178.   
78 Herder, Briefe, I, pp. 138 and 178.  See also Wahrheiten aus Leibniz, SWS 32: 215. 
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the highest good for a human life and that the rational soul can carry its 
perfections with it into the next life.79  
Though Herder agrees that the soul is immortal, there is nonetheless a deep 
disagreement between Herder and Mendelssohn concerning the nature of 
immortality, and also its ethical significance. For understanding our vocation, 
Herder claims that the issue is not whether our being is negated at the moment of 
our bodily death or survives, but rather what can be known of our future state.80  
What is most likely, Herder claims, is that our “human substance again becomes a 
human phenomenon.”81  That is, a human being that is composed of both a 
bodily and a spiritual-intellectual element will once again be a composite being if it 
is to exist again in another life.  Herder avers that the most likely form of 
immortality is palingenesis, rather than the subsistence of a soul transmogrified 
into an entirely new form.82  This new human form would not have the developed 
powers of the prior existence, and there would not be any successive improvement 
                                                 
79 Marion Heinz claims that Herder’s argument can be described as a “Radikalisierung der Position Abbts.”  
This is not exactly correct, as on one of the key issues –the demonstrability of immortality on the basis of 
the alleged simplicity of the soul – Herder is in agreement with Mendelssohn, rather than Abbt.  See 
Marion Heinz, "Die Bestimmung Des Menschen: Herder Contra Mendelssohn," in Philosophie Der 
Endlichkeit, ed. Beate Niemeyer and Dirk Schütze (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1991), p. 272.   
80 Briefe, I, p. 139. 
81 Briefe, I, p. 139. 
82 Briefe, I, pp. 141-3.    On Herder’s view, palingenesis is a form of reincarnation whereby the same kind 
of soul forms for itself the same kind of body in the next life.  For example, a human soul will constitute a 
new human body after the death of the present one, and an aardvark soul will constitute a new aardvark 
body.  He contrasts this view with metempsychosis, which is a conception of immortality in which a soul 
can be born into different kinds of bodies in each life.  
Herder remained concerned with palingenesis throughout his life and defended this conception of 
immortality in several later works.  See, for example, “Palingenesie.  Vom Wiederkommen menschlicher 
Seelen”, DKV 8: 257-282; “Über die menschliche Unsterblichkeit”, DKV 8: 203-219; and “Vom Wissen 
und Nichtwissesn der Zukunft”, DKV 8: 283-296.   
While I disagree with Rudolf Unger’s general portrayal of Herder as an enemy of reason and the 
enlightenment, there is a helpful and fascinating discussion of Herder’s later conception of palingenesis in 
Unger, Herder, Novalis Und Kleist: Studien Über Die Entwicklung Des Todesproblems in Denken Und 
Dichten Vom Sturm Und Drang Zur Romantik, pp. 6ff.   Unger’s understanding of Herder’s earlier views, 
and consequently the relationship between those views and his later thought is seriously distorted, however. 
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between lives.  It would be a new incarnation of the powers in a body, but these 
powers would be in an undeveloped state.      
Herder argues that because all human beings that we have ever been aware 
of are compound beings (i.e. are an admixture of spiritual-intellectual and physical 
nature), we have no ground for thinking that a purely spiritual human being is 
possible.  A pure spirit may possibly exist, Herder concedes, but he denies that 
such a being would be properly called a human being: 
I do not want to regress to the conceivability or inconceivability of a soul 
without a body; only how could we know of an existing human soul without 
a body?  We are acquainted with none in such a condition.   For us a 
human soul without a body is inconceivable in its efficacy: could it, will it 
be so in the future?83 
 
Herder’s objection to the conception of human nature presented by Mendelssohn 
and Spalding is that we are unacquainted with any human souls that exist without 
a body.  From this Herder argues that there are no grounds for believing in an 
afterlife in which a disembodied soul maintains a continuous identity with that of 
an embodied person.84  The charge is not that the idea of a disembodied soul or 
spirit is inconceivable.   It is that even if it is conceivable for a soul to exist without 
a body, we have no grounds for thinking that this is a real possibility for a human 
soul.  If we are interested in understanding the vocation of man, or what kind of 
good is possible for a human being, then we must allow our reasoning to be 
confined to the framework of what we know is true of human beings.  That is, we 
                                                 
83 Briefe, I, p. 138. 
84 While Herder does not mention Spalding’s tract in his letter to Mendelssohn, he does refer to a sermon 
published by Spalding in 1768, „Über den Zustand des zukünftiges Lebens als eine eigentliche Folge des 
gegenwärtigen.“  The sermon is the eleventh one included in Johann Joachim Spalding, Predigten (Berlin: 
Gottlieb August Lange, 1775), pp. 331ff. 
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must consider beings that are physical, and whose rational or spiritual character is 
not entirely distinct from their sensual or bodily character.  The vocation of man 
cannot be understood if one takes into account only one part of human nature, as 
the reasoning based on such partial considerations would be dreadfully 
incomplete.   
This argument may appear at first sight to be a simple empirical statement 
about what is normally observed, but if we look at it in context it is in fact much 
cleverer than that.  Mendelssohn himself had written in his Orakel that we can 
know what the afterlife is like because the present life supplies the premises from 
which we can draw conclusions about the hereafter.85  Herder’s argument here 
turns this same claim back against Mendelssohn.  Herder makes use of this general 
principle.  Since we only have a basis for believing that human beings are 
compound sensual-spiritual beings, we cannot validly conclude that a human soul 
can exist without a body in the afterlife.  The premises supplied by our knowledge 
of the present life do not support the conclusion about the hereafter drawn by 
Mendelssohn. 
Herder insists that even if the vocation of a pure spirit consists in the 
infinite perfection of spiritual and intellectual capacities, this would not be the 
vocation of man, and is consequently beside the point.86  The proper vocation of a 
human being, by contrast, is the development of both its sensual and intellectual 
capacities in harmony.  This is a task which cannot be completed in the next life 
                                                 
85 JubA, p. 21. 
86 Briefe, I, p. 138. 
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because the body which is an integral part of this process of self-perfection and 
cultivation perishes and decays.  
The consequence of this is that our vocation can only be fulfilled in the 
present life:  
...we have in our present existence exactly the periods of life [Lebensalter] 
of the vocation [Bestimmung] which plants and animals, and we as 
animals, so obviously have.  This formation and development in this life, it 
is the purpose [Zweck]; it is the vocation [Bestimmung].  It is an unjustified 
standpoint to live, so that one departs from the world more perfect than 
one entered it.  We enter the world, in order to become more perfect here, 
to augment and diminish, to learn and to put to use, and always to take 
pleasure in ourselves and the world – that was the intention of nature.  All 
would be madness [verrückt] if I were to acquire for myself an individual 
perfection which is only a perfection for abandonment of the world.87 
 
As embodied beings, our physical and natural character is just as significant a part 
of our being as are our putatively purely rational capacities.  Our development is 
similar to that of other organisms, and hence our nature and vocation 
[Bestimmung] must have something in common.  Whereas Spalding had argued 
that immortality was required in order to vindicate and justify our belief in 
providence, Herder by contrast argues that the order of nature would be verrückt 
if a human life were spent perfecting all of our faculties only in order that one of 
them - our reasoning mind - would continue to perfect itself while the others 
which are an essential part of our present existence were abandoned.  For Herder, 
our highest good consists in the perfecting of all of our characteristic capacities 
into a complete and well-balanced whole which enables us to have the greatest 
                                                 
87 Briefe, I, p. 140.  The emphases in the present paragraph are in the original, though I have de-emphasized 
some parts of the passage.   
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enjoyment of the present life, not a one-sided development of a single capacity 
that endures in an afterlife while the others are left behind as if they were merely 
contingent appendages to our rational nature. 
 Herder develops this point further, arguing that we should see our “soul to 
be our I, and our body to be more or less only the phenomenon of its existence, 
and the mediate organ of its representations.“88  This places the body in the 
position of being the source of the representations taken up by the soul.  Hence, a 
soul without a body would be a soul without representations, or at least a soul 
whose representations were nothing like human representations.  Herder here 
makes use of Leibnizian concepts in order to draw out a deep tension in 
Mendelssohn’s account.  Mendelssohn, in his reply to Herder’s first letter (as well 
as in the introduction to Phädon), acknowledges that a human soul requires a 
body in order to form the proper kinds of representations that enable it to become 
more perfect.  But, if this is the case, then the body is more intimately connected 
to the essential character of the soul than Mendelssohn (and Spalding) had made 
clear, and thus the belief in an immortal soul that is disembodied and yet capable 
of having representations (not to mention consciousness and apperception) is 
undermined.      
This argument opens up on another important disagreement between 
Herder and Mendelssohn concerning the idea of perfection.  Herder argues that 
what counts as a perfection is relative to a situation in which a developed ability is 
put to use: “Take any small, individual skill.  It will have its situation in which it 
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was formed, and for which it is valid.  Situation, application taken away – and the 
skill vanishes; it is no longer a perfection.”89  What Herder has in mind is 
something like the following.  The perfection of a surgical knife is that it be 
capable of cutting through the skin.  This counts as a perfection for the knife 
because the purpose of a scalpel is to assist a doctor in performing operations that 
require cutting through flesh.  However, suppose a similar object existed in a 
social setting with neither knowledge of the practice of surgery nor a single doctor.  
Deprived of the proper context, the specific qualities that make the knife an 
excellent instrument for surgical operations would no longer be effectively 
perfections of that kind.  Likewise, if a person with a certain set of military skills 
and virtues were to live through a radical change in their society’s form of life such 
that there were no longer any battles or wars in which those skills could be put to 
use, these mere capacities would no longer be excellenced.  It would be difficult to 
see any way in which having had such capacities in the past makes one more 
perfect in a situation in which they are deprived of all possible contexts of 
application.90  This is the meaning of Herder’s claim that a perfection is relative to 
the situation in which an object exists.   
There are two significant implications of these considerations for human 
perfection.  First, it means that the perfection of a human being must be 
understood relative to the general features of humanity shared by all persons.  The 
possession of a body and a soul is constitutive of human identity, according to 
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90 Some possible cases of fundamental forms of change in forms of life, and the philosophical import of 
such changes, have been discussed recently in Jonathan Lear, Radical Hope, vol. Harvard University Press 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2006). 
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Herder, and consequently it would not be a human perfection to develop the 
rational capacities at the expense of the bodily capacities, or to enjoy intellectual 
pleasures while denying oneself all bodily pleasures.   
The second implication is that perfections are only perfections within a 
specific context in which a person is situated.  The context in which a person lives 
involves many specific features that are not true of the context of any and every 
other human being.  Thus, understanding what perfection would be for a person 
will require that one understand the specific features of the situation they are in, 
and what skills or abilities would contribute to their well-being in such a position.  
The skills that need to be developed by a hunter living in the sixth century B.C.E. 
are different from those that need to be developed by an architect in 2015 C.E.91   
This idea will become increasingly important for Herder’s inquiries into the 
historical character of human beings, for he will argue that each Volk and each 
individual has a unique history that shapes who they are, what they might become, 
and hence that the virtues conducive to the well-being of a Greek many not be 
salubrious for a Roman, a Laplander, or a modern European.92     
It is important to recognize how the conception of perfection that Herder 
develops through his critique of Mendelssohn’s depends on not only ethical, but 
also metaphysical ideas.  Herder contends that every human being has a set of 
                                                 
91 It’s also true that the skills needed by an architect in 2015 C.E. are different from those  needed by an 
architect in 1915 C.E.  The point I intend to draw out is one about  both the character of the institution or 
practice and  the historical period. 
92 This line of argument receives its fullest expression in the 1774 Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte.  I 
discuss this further in chapter 4. 
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basic Kräfte, or powers, which belong to its being essentially.93  One enters and 
departs the world with the very same Kräfte.   However, they subsist in our being 
only obscurely in an embryonic form until they are developed in particular 
contexts through education and practice: 
First of all I myself am sure that all of our formation [Ausbilden], learning 
and becoming complete [Fertigwerden] are nothing other than the 
development of the powers [Kräfte] which lie in us, which we have brought 
all together [ganz] into this world, and which compose the essence of our 
soul.  Just as little as we are able to give ourselves a new sense, so little are 
we able to add to ourselves new powers, realities or perfections, which are 
substantially [materiell] new.94  
 
All of the basic powers that human beings have compose their essence, according 
to Herder.  Anything that happens during the course of education or learning is 
only the development of these powers from merely latent capacities into an 
actualized skill or ability.  These powers do not change in their substance or 
essence, but only in their form.  Herder thus accepts the Platonic (and Leibnizian) 
account of learning, that it is a form of memory, in which the latent abilities of the 
soul are drawn out and made explicit.95  Though these powers subsist in our soul 
                                                 
93 For the role of Kräfte in Herder’s early thought, see his early essay “Versuch über das Sein”, DKV 1: 9-
21, along with the excellent analysis of the essay by Marion Heinz in chapter 1 of  Marion Heinz, 
Sensualistischer Idealismus (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994).   
A more general treatment of the concept of Kräfte in Herder’s thought can be found in Robert 
Clark, "Herder's Conception of 'Kraft'," Publications of the Modern Language Association 57 (1942); Hugh 
Barr Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science (Cambridge: Modern Humanities Research 
Association, 1970), pp. 8-16.   Nisbet’s account, while generally helpful, suffers from not attending 
carefully enough to the places where Herder uses ‘Kraft’ in a somewhat technical and metaphysical sense, 
and those passages where Herder employs the term in the way it is ordinarily used by German speakers.  
For this reason, Nisbet’s account makes Herder’s conception of Kraft appear  more confused and 
problematic than it, in fact, is. 
94 Briefe, I, p. 178. 
95 Briefe, I, p. 178.  The locus classicus of Plato’s account of learning as recollection is, of course, the 
Meno.  This argument also plays a significant role in the Phaedo, which makes Herder’s reference to 
Plato’s theory of recollection especially significant in the context of his discussion of Mendelssohn’s 
Phädon.   
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essentially and eternally, all learning and development is “in and for [our present] 
condition.”96  The perfections a person acquires through their lives are relative to 
their context, but they depend upon the set of powers contained in the soul that 
do carry on from one life to the next. 
Because the perfections we develop in our lives are contextual and 
relational qualities, rather than substantive ones, these perfections could only be 
modes or accidents of a substance, not themselves substantial things.  This means 
that any arguments for the continued development of perfections outside of the 
present life are untenable, as anyone asserting such a view must treat perfections 
as if they were substances that could be carried into qualitatively different 
contexts.  The powers which are capable of being developed through education, 
practice and experience, may become perfections in the situations in which they 
are developed.  Once the life that is the context of this development has ended, the 
perfections persist in the soul no more.  Nevertheless, according to Herder, the 
essential substance of the person remains the same, and it is merely the modal or 
accidental character which has changed.  Even if the human soul is immortal and 
will thus continue to exist after the present life, this does not entail that the 
accidental features of its present existence continue to exist along with it.  This is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Herder was very interested in, and sympathetic to, the theory of recollection, and in either 1766 or 
1768 he wrote a text titled “Plato sagte: dass unser Lernen bloss Erinnerung sei”.  The text was never 
published by Herder, and is not included in Suphan’s edition of Herder’s works.  It has been published 
more recently as an appendix in Heinz, Sensualistischer Idealismus, pp. 175-82.  Heinz also discusses the 
text in the third chapter of the same book.   
96 Briefe, 1: 178. 
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the meaning of Herder’s insistence that “What is, is; but not ‘whatever something 
with all of its accidents has become must also remain.’”97   
 Herder thus diagnoses the cause of Mendelssohn’s error as an unwarranted 
hypostatization of relative concepts or qualities: 
I believe that nothing in the world has engendered more opinions and also 
more errors than that one considers and treats abstract concepts as 
individual existences.  So do we treat the words nature, virtue, reality, 
perfection.  Originally these concepts were nothing but abstractions, 
relations between this and that, more or less shadows and colors of things.  
We make them into things, and think of them into things.  And we likewise 
think of skills as realities, and attribute these perfections to the soul, which 
it collects as gold pieces – though they were originally only relations which 
we have thought of as positions.98 
 
Herder does not deny that the human soul is itself a substance, even a substance 
which is immortal, but only that the perfections and abilities that the soul acquires 
in the present life are themselves substantial.  They are not like pieces of gold that 
can be gathered and carried with one wherever one may go and whatever one may 
become.  Deprived of their substantial quality, all perfections are only what they 
are in the context in which they are developed, in an individual human life and in 
the kinds of social and historical context in which such a life is lived.   
Though it is not emphasized explicitly, this argument of Herder’s implies 
that Mendelssohn’s concept of a perfection is excessively individualistic, perhaps 
even solipsistic, as it assumes that perfections or skills are things which a person 
can possess in isolation from all of the conditions in which the perfections were 
                                                 
97 Briefe, I, p. 180. 
98 Briefe, I, pp. 179-80.  I have made a number of emendations to the structure of Herder’s last sentence in 
translating this passage in order to make it intelligible in English. 
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developed or acquired.99  That is, a human being can develop, apply and retain 
perfections in isolation from any social or historical setting.  By contrast, for 
Herder any perfection that a person can attain is only possible in a particular social 
and historical situation.  This makes individual human beings much less self-
sufficient and autonomous than they are according to the theories of Mendelssohn 
and Spalding.  Herder does not develop this point in detail in his letters, but the 
historical character of human virtues and capacities will be a theme his Auch eine 
Philosophie der Geschichte of 1774, which will be discussed in chapter 4 below. 
 Herder’s metaphysical argument about the nature of perfection shows that 
his conception of our vocation, and of the highest good, is an immanent one.  
Since we are necessarily embodied beings and the perfections we develop are only 
perfections in the context of the present life, the meaning or vocation of our lives 
cannot be determined by the continued existence of our spirit after this life.  It 
must be understood in terms of our present existence, to our embodiment and 
determinate situation.  Herder sums up his view by saying: “The five acts are in 
this life.  What use is wanting to look behind the curtain [Decke], which no one 
can penetrate, in order to find clues about what already must make up a whole in 
itself.”100     
Our vocation and our highest good, according to Herder, consists in the 
enjoyment of one’s being and the development and use of one’s powers in the 
present life: “encircled, limited enjoyment within the limits of his being, use of all 
                                                 
99 This may not be true of Mendelssohn’s overall views, but I am here only trying to see how Herder 
responded to these particular arguments.  For a passage that seems to show that Mendelssohn was attentive 
to social context, see JubA 1: 405-8.  I am again grateful to Aaron Koller for pushing me to be more 
cautious with respect to my assertions about Mendelssohn. 
100 Briefe, I, p. 142. 
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his powers and dispositions – that is our vocation and happiness!  In that we are all 
alike!”101  It should be emphasized that Herder agrees with Mendelssohn and the 
German rationalists that the vocation of a human being consists in the perfecting 
and development of one’s characteristic capacities and powers.102  The difference 
concerns what a human being essentially is, and whether the perfections cultivated 
and developed are circumscribed by the boundaries of the present life or not.  
Herder’s conception of perfection is broader and more contextual than 
Mendelssohn’s.  But Herder does not reject the basic contention that it is our 
ability to become more perfect which determines our vocation, happiness, and 
highest good.  Herder thus retains one aspect of the general rationalist conception 
of the vocation of man, as he agrees that our vocation consists in the most 
complete development of a person’s powers that is possible.  Herder gives this 
theory an immanent rather than a transcendent interpretation, and therein lies the 
significant difference.  The highest good for a human being - the end toward 
which human life is directed - is an immanent good.  It is the development, use, 
and enjoyment of all of one’s characteristic powers in the present life, and the task 
is circumscribed by the finite, social and historical character of human beings.  
One difficulty that Herder’s account of the vocation of man faces is that it 
threatens to make the achievements of individuals meaningless, given that the task 
of self-perfection can never be fulfilled.  Herder implies at some places that the 
development of one’s capacities results in happiness, but that is an obviously poor 
                                                 
101 Briefe, I, p. 141. 
102 Nigel DeSouza, by contrast, tends to read Herder as opposed to perfectionism as such.  See Nigel 
DeSouza, "The Soul-Body Relationship and the Foundations of Morality: Herder Contra Mendelssohn," 
Herder Yearbook 21 (2014). However, his characterization of perfectionism is, I think narrower than mine. 
87 
 
attempt to answer worries about whether the good what one has achieved endures 
after one has passed from this life.  The worry is most salient in cases where good 
human beings die unjust deaths prematurely and in miserable circumstances, 
unjustly deprived of the opportunity to develop their capacities.  Mendelssohn or 
Spalding appealed to the hope of an eternal afterlife in order to allay these very 
worries, but if Herder is to respond to such concerns he will have to do it in a 
different way.  In the letters to Mendelssohn, Herder does not address this 
potential problem for his view.  An examination of Herder’s other works, however, 
I believe shows that Herder’s position developed into an understanding of the 
vocation of humanity as an ongoing, collective enterprise which all human beings 
contribute to and benefit from.  This is developed in his philosophy of history and 
his account of the social character of human nature, though he revises his views in 
important ways.  I will try to indicate how this is so in chapters 3 and 4. 
Another inadequacy of Herder’s account is that it vague about the kinds of 
capacities whose development contributes to the fulfillment of the vocation of 
man.  Are all capacities capable of development to be counted equally, or do some 
count for more than others?  Further, in the letters to Mendelssohn Herder does 
not state explicitly just how the powers inherent in every human soul are 
developed.  He claims that they need to be developed in a context, but does not 
describe in detail just what kind of context he has in mind.  The account in the 
letters is incomplete, but I believe that Herder’s later philosophy of history and 
philosophy of language provide a fuller account of the ways in which human 
beings are shaped and formed by their history, language and experience, and that 
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those texts can be fruitfully read as extending the account of the vocation of man 
initially developed in his letters to Mendelssohn.   
 
VII 
 
 There are indications that prior to 1769, Herder’s view of the vocation of 
man was different and more akin to the views of Mendelssohn and Spalding.  For 
example, during his years in Königsberg Herder wrote several introspective poems 
in which he attempted to come to terms with the direction of his life, and in which 
he suggests that human beings have an intimation of their immortality and the 
continuation of their existence in an afterlife.103   
Additionally, in 1766 or 1768 Herder delivered a sermon in Riga in which 
he claimed that belief in an afterlife is justified because human beings could not 
fulfill their obligation to perfect themselves and develop their powers if their lives 
had merely a finite duration.104   The difference between the sermon and the views 
expressed in Herder’s letters are striking.  The conflict between the two views 
might be explained by regarding the sermon as a dishonest work, given that 
Herder might have needed to put forth a more religiously orthodox face to the 
                                                 
103 See, especially the poems  Selbstgespräch and Morgensang, in SWS 19: 245-6 and 19:242-3.  Hans 
Dietrich Irmscher discusses this aspect of Herder’s early poetry in an excellent essay, “Die Bestimmung 
des Menschen: Ein Blick in Herders frühe Lyrik (1764-1770)”.  The essay is included in Hans Dietrich 
Irmscher, "Weitstrahlsinniges" Denken. Studien Zu Johann Gottfried Herder (Würzburg: Königshausen 
und Neumann, 2010).  My understanding of the philosophical position inherent in Herder’s early poetry is 
indebted to Irmscher. 
104 SWS 32: 333ff.     
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public.105  The sermon might be the exoteric face concealing Herder’s esoteric 
doctrine of an immanent highest good.  The date of the sermon is, however 
uncertain, having been delivered in either 1766 or 1768.106  If the sermon was 
delivered in 1768, then I believe prevarication would be the best explanation for 
the dissonance between it and the letters to Mendelssohn.  However, if the sermon 
was delivered in 1766, then a change of position rather than disingenuity would 
perhaps best account for inconsistency between Herder’s views in the letters and 
the sermon.   
Another consideration also seems to be relevant.  As mentioned above, in 
1766 Herder composed a set of notes on Spalding’s Die Bestimmung des 
Menschen which were critical of the account of the vocation of man offered by 
Spalding.  It may very well be the case that in 1766 Herder was swithering 
between views about the importance of immortality and the nature of the highest 
good.  His engagement with Spalding’s text may, in some way, have been 
connected to his writing and delivering the sermon when he did, and hence it 
might offer greater reason for ascribing the earlier year to the sermon rather than 
the latter. Even if Herder’s views on the vocation of man in the sermon were 
disingenuous and do not give one reason to ascribe a different view of the vocation 
of man to him at the time of its delivery, the early poetry reveals that Herder 
subscribed to a transcendent view at one time.  The reasons for Herder’s change 
                                                 
105 Haym is surely onto something in noting the close connection between the views that Herder expresses 
in the letters to Mendelssohn and his growing sense of alienation from his position as a minister in Riga.  
See Haym, Herder: Nach Seinem Leben Und Seinen Werken, I, pp. 295-8. 
106 SWS 32: 333ff.  See the editorial notes about the uncertainty of the date of the text.   
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of position are unclear, but this turn had great importance for the direction of 
Herder’s thought throughout the rest of his life. 
Herder’s later essays show that Herder maintained an immanent and 
historical conception of the vocation of man and the highest good.107  In his 
collection of essays from the 1780s and 1790s, Zerstreute Blätter, Herder returns 
to the question of the possibility and significance of immortality.108  In those 
essays, Herder even draws back a bit from some of the views that he presented in 
1769.  For example, in his Vortrag from 1791, “Über die Menschliche 
Unsterblichkeit”, Herder argues that the immortality of the soul is merely “eine 
Blüte der Hoffnung” [“a bloom of hope”], which cannot be an object of human 
knowledge.109  This suggest that he does not accept the kinds of proofs that he 
does in his letters to Mendelssohn.    
Herder, in the same piece, asserts that there are two kinds of immanent 
immortality possible, however.  First, there is the immortality available to a few 
great artists and thinkers whose works are recognized as models of excellence for 
ages after their death.  Such immortality is only available to a few, and is 
                                                 
107 There is, as many scholars note, a somewhat ‘mystical’ period that Herder passes through that coincides 
roughly with his time in Bückeburg from 1771 to 1776.  This is discussed by Haym, who christened the 
time the “Bückeburg Exile”.  See Haym, Herder: Nach Seinem Leben Und Seinen Werken, I, pp. 500ff.  I 
am not sure that even during that period, however, that Herder turns to an embrace of a transcendental 
conception of the highest good, since he appears rather to embrace a position closer to Hamann’s, 
according to which the present world reveals the language of God.  Nevertheless, during his Weimar years 
Herder does not seem to maintain some of the mystical and more traditional religious views that he 
professes during his time in Bückeburg. 
108 Rudolf Unger offers an interesting discussion of the theme of immorality in Herder’s later thought in 
chapter one of Herder, Novalis, Kleist.  There are many faults with Unger’s interpretation, however, as he 
often insists that Herder was an enemy of reason and rational argument, basing his views on purely 
idiosyncratic feelings.  Part of Unger’s argument is based on an assumption that all readers will see Herder 
as hostile to every aspect of both the enlightenment and German rationalism, whereas Herder’s attitude 
towards both of these intellectual movements was far more nuanced. 
109 DKV 8: 203. 
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increasingly difficult to obtain for modern persons, who must compete both with 
their own contemporaries and with the ancients.110  However, Herder also 
attempts to describe an immanent immortality available to all human beings.  We 
all have received the benefits of the cultural and social developments of past 
generations, and we too contribute to such a historically continuous procession of 
humanity:   
Divine forms grow from these seeds.  Heroes and doers of good deeds 
[Wohltäter] have sprung up and planted forth.  They have also had their 
affect on us.  We have a calling to bring forth more effects from their work, 
as well as the power [Macht] to do so.  In doing this we eternalize in our 
species [Geschlecht] the noblest and most beautiful part of ourselves.111 
 
As in the early letters, Herder here states that we have a task to work to improve 
ourselves.  However, in his later thought his conception is shaped by a more 
precise conception of the terrain on which the pursuit of perfectibility occurs – the 
field of history.  Herder’s philosophy of history, which begins to bloom in the 
1770s and reaches its full maturity in the 1780s and 1790s, will enable Herder to 
venture a response to the potential worries that an immanent conception of the 
highest good might raise, such as the potential meaninglessness of many individual 
lives.112  The development of Herder’s views will be the subject of the following 
chapters. 
  
 
                                                 
110 DKV 8: 203-6. 
111 DKV 8: 207. 
112 A recent philosophical view similar in many ways to this can be found in Samuel Scheffler’s work.  
Scheffler has argued that it is more important for each individual that the human species endure and 
progress than that they themselves life for a long time, or have an eternal life.  See Samuel  Scheffler, 
Death & the Afterlife (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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Chapter 3: Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache 
 
 
Tod und Leben stehen in der Zunge Gewalt; wer sie liebt, wird ihre Frucht essen. 
Sprüche 18:21, Luther Übesetzung 
 
Da er auf keinen Punkt blind fällt und blind liegen bleibt: so wird er freistehend, kann 
sich eine Sphäre der Bespiegelung suchen, kann sich in sich bespiegeln.  Nicht mehr ein 
unfehlbare Maschine in der Händen der Natur, wird er sich selbst Zweck und Ziel der 
Bearbeitung.   
Herder, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, DKV 1:717 
 
 
I 
  
Herder’s Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache has a broader scope than its 
title suggests.  It deals with issues such as the distinguishing features of human beings, 
the basis of human sociability, and the grounds of historical change and development.  
While some scholars have seen that the essay is concerned with more than just the 
philosophy of language narrowly construed, the ethical dimension of the treatise has not 
been adequately thematized or understood.1  In what follows, I will argue that the 
Abhandlung can be fruitfully read as a development of Herder’s conception of the 
vocation of man which he began to sketch in his letters to Mendelssohn in 1769. 
                                            
1 For example, Charles Taylor sees Herder’s treatise as developing a rich philosophical anthropology 
grounded in a conception of language that Taylor calls “expressivism”.  See "The Importance of Herder," 
in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  Frederick Beiser argues that 
one of the deeper issues at stake in the Abhandlung is the ability to show that naturalistic explanations are 
not hopelessly limited.  See The Fate of Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 
130. 
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 Language plays an important role in Herder’s conception of human nature and 
morality in both his early and his later thought.2  The Abhandlung über den Ursprung 
der Sprache contains several arguments about the relationship between language and 
morality, human nature and Herder’s conception of progress.   And while Herder’s 
general conception of linguistic meaning in the Abhandlung may be at variance in several 
respects with his other writings on language, there is continuity between the ethical views 
articulated in the Abhandlung and Herder’s earlier and later writings.3 
 There are three ways that the Abhandlung extends Herder’s account of the 
vocation of mankind.  First, in the Abhandlung Herder offers an account of 
Besonnenheit, an intellectual and practical capacity which he argues is the distinguishing 
feature of mankind.  Second, Herder presents an account of progress and historical 
development in the Abhandlung, grounded in a conception of perfectibility made possible 
by Besonnenheit.  Third, he attempts to show that our nature reveals that we are 
naturally disposed to feel sympathy for other beings.  Fourth, Herder argues for the 
essentially social character of human beings, and that this social character is an 
indispensable condition of the development and perfection of our capacities.  
 
 
II 
 
 
                                            
2 This is a theme in “Über den Fleiss in mehreren gelehrten Sprachen”, Journal meiner Reise, and also in 
several parts of the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit and Briefe zu Beförderung der 
Humanität.  In all of these texts, Herder argues that there is a connection between having a refined 
language and more precise ethical concepts.  This is not necessarily a good thing, according to Herder, 
because excessive refinement and rationalization can lead to enervation and a lack of emotional and sensual 
development that also are important for living a full moral life. 
3 Michael Forster, in particular, argues that Herder’s conception of language in the Abhandlung is not only 
different from his other work in philosophy of language, but is also inferior.  See After Herder: Philosophy 
of Language in the German Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 63-4 and 132-3  
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 The attempt to delineate the distinctive difference between human and nonhuman 
animals is one of the central aims of Herder’s Abhandlung, as it forms the pillar of his 
argument against both the divine-origin theory of language and reductionistic naturalism.  
As Rudolf Haym insightfully writes: “The major emphasis of the entire Treatise is the 
thorough distinction of kind which lies between humans and animals.”4  Thus, the issue 
of first importance that Herder discusses in the Abhandlung is the difference between 
human and animal Bestimmung.  The term ‘Bestimmung’ is one of the most commonly 
used in the Abhandlung, and attending to the passages in which the concept is central 
yields great insight into what Herder understands the vocation of the human being to be.5   
 A key difference between human beings and animals, according to Herder, is that 
human beings are capable of a variety of Bestimmungen, whereas each animal is capable 
of only one Bestimmung.  Each animal has a uniform sphere of activity determined by its 
nature, but “the human being has no such uniform and narrow sphere, where only one 
work awaits him: - a world of occupations and Bestimmungen lies about him.”6  Human 
beings, on this view, are distinguished from animals by being less narrowly determined to 
a particular form of life by instinct.   
All organic beings, according to Herder, have a “sphere of activity” determined by 
their physiological structure.7  For the most part, animals are determined by their natural 
                                            
4 Rudolf Haym, Herder: Nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken, 2 vols. (Berlin: Rudolf Gaertner, 1877-
85), I, p. 404. 
5 I hope to recall the discussion in the previous chapter of the vocation, or Bestimmung, of man.  In the 
present chapter I often leave the term untranslated because it is easier to make sense of Herder’s claims in 
this way. 
6 DKV 1: 713.  Translations in the present chapter are my own, but I have frequently consulted Michael 
Forster’s translation for assistance.  See Johann Gottfried Herder, Philosophical Writings, trans. Michael 
Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
7 DKV 1: 712-5. 
  
95 
 
endowments to live in one particular way.  Beavers are capable of building small 
structures, but only one kind of structure, which is repeatedly built in the same way.  
This sphere of activity is determined by the beaver’s biological structure, and a beaver 
can never act and live in ways that are unexpected or novel.  An animal capable of this 
kind of building, Herder says, “builds in its childhood just as it builds in its old age, and 
will build in the same way until the end of the world as in the beginning of creation.”8   
A human being’s sphere of activity, by contrast, is less narrowly determined.  A 
human can make a dam, but is also capable of making a house, a boat, or a bowl.  
Additionally, a human being can design and build a single kind of artifact, such as a dam, 
in more possible ways than an animal that builds the same kind of artifact.  All of this is 
evident even if we restrict our attention to the production and reproduction of simple 
crafts.  Beyond this, though, we can observe that human beings are capable of perfecting 
themselves in even more interesting and important ways.  They can take a reflective 
interest in their own moral lives, as well as the social lives of their communities, and 
attempt to improve their ways of living by means of their own creative activity and effort.  
This means, according to Herder, that a human being can “himself become the purpose 
and goal of his working [Bearbeitung].”9 
 This ability is intimately connected with a second a second difference between 
human and animal Bestimmung that Herder discusses, Besonnenheit.  Besonnenheit is a 
capacity for reflective self-awareness that allows human beings greater latitude with 
respect to the possible activities they can take up, and which also enables human beings 
                                            
8 DKV 1: 772.  This passage refers specifically to bees, but the point is intended to be more general.  
9 DKV 1: 717. 
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to perfect and develop a richer variety of powers and abilities than other animals.  Herder 
states: 
If animal sensuousness and limitation to one point were to fall away, then a 
different creature whose positive force [Kraft] expresses itself more clearly in a 
larger space space, in accordance with a finer organization would come into being.  
That creature, separated and free would not merely cognize, will and act [würkt], 
but also know that it cognizes, wills, and acts.  This creature is the human being 
and we wish to call this entire disposition of his nature Besonnenheit, in order to 
escape the confusion of it with the particular forces of reason [Vernunftkräften].10  
 
 
Human beings have the capacity to reflect on their own activity, ways of living, and ways 
of thinking.  Because of this, they are not as narrowly bound to particular kind of life and 
form of thought as other animals are.  The objects of their senses have a less immediate 
effect upon them, as what they perceive is capable of being not only perceptively 
apprehended, but apperceptively considered and judged.  This makes it possible for 
human beings to alter and improve themselves. 
Herder’s conception here bears a prima facie resemblance to Mendelssohn’s 
account of the character of rational beings.  According to Mendelssohn, the 
distinguishing feature of a rational being is that it is able to perfect itself.11  However, 
whereas Mendelssohn thought that the human capacity for perfectibility was grounded in 
having a nature that was less sensual because it had a distinctive non-sensual faculty of 
reason, for Herder this ability is grounded in the kind of sensual character that human 
                                            
10 DKV 1: 719.   
‘Besonnenheit’ was the German term used to translate Locke’s ‘reflection’. Also important in this 
context is that Leibniz, in his New Essays, claimed that it was the capacity for reflection that made it 
possible for human beings to change their manner of living over time.  This is something that animals 
cannot do because of their inability to take up a reflective stance towards their own activities and mental 
states.  See G.W. Leibniz, New Essays on the Human Understanding, trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan 
Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 50-1.  
11 Moses Mendelssohn, Schriften zur Philosophie, Aesthetik und Apologetik, 2 vols. (Leipzig: L. Voss, 
1880), I, p. 222-7. 
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beings have.  A human being has Besonnenheit not because he is a rational as opposed to 
a sensual being, but because his sensory capacities are organized differently than 
nonhuman creatures.12  Stated generally, this is the result of human beings having a more 
dispersed sensibility and consciousness.  Herder explains his account out in more detail 
by claiming that the senses which human beings depend on – vision and hearing – are 
more ‘mediate’ capacities.  Such sensory modalities allow us to perceive an object, but to 
be aware of the perception itself.  We have both physical and psychological distance from 
what we perceive through vision and hearing.  It is the place that these senses have in our 
physiological organization which gives rise to reflective awareness, or Besonnenheit.13   
 Herder further argues that the capacity for Besonnenheit endows human beings 
with a distinctive kind of freedom: “Because he does not fall and remain lying at any one 
point, he thus becomes free-standing, can seek for himself his own sphere of reflection, 
can reflect himself to himself.  No more an infallible machine in the hands of nature, he 
becomes his own purpose and goal of refinement [Bearbeitung].”14  As human beings are 
not immediately determined to live in one way, they have a greater ability to determine 
for themselves the general shape of their lives – both the ends and the means that they 
pursue.  Beavers and bees must build damns and hives, but human beings can consider 
whether they want to build cabins or huts or houses, and decide this in light of how living 
in these ways will affect the kinds of people they become.  In reflecting, they can be aware 
                                            
12 Herder’s account is thus more similar to Aristotle’s account of the mind as the form of a living being, 
whereas Mendelssohn’s is more akin to Plato’s conception of the mind as a nonphysical entity that is 
somehow entangled with a physical body.  For a more detailed comparison of their views along these lines, 
see Nigel DeSouza, "The Soul-Body Relationship and the Foundations of Morality: Herder contra 
Mendelssohn," Herder Yearbook 21 (2014). 
13 DKV 1: 712-3.  Herder develops his account of each of the senses in greater detail in the aesthetic works 
he authored before writing the Abhandlung.  See, especially the discussion in Viertes Kritische Wäldchen,                            
DKV 2: 289. 
14 DKV 1: 717. 
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that it is themselves that they are working on, and the shape of their lives that they are 
deliberating about.   
The range of live options available to a group of people may be more or less 
narrowly determined by climate and history, but as a species there is no predetermined 
set of activities which all human beings are determined to perform simply by membership 
in our species.  Since human beings are possessed of this kind of freedom, they are 
determined by their nature to take an active role in their own development – that is, they 
are creatures who are perfectible through their own activity.  Each person becomes the 
“purpose and goal of his own refinement.”  This offers a kind of autonomy in the shaping 
of one’s own life that is unique to terrestrial creatures.  For animals, only one vocation is 
possible, but for human beings there are a variety of shapes that we can give to our 
lives.15 
 That the capacity for self-consciousness and freedom distinguishes human beings 
from animals is not a view that is particularly original to Herder.  It is worth considering 
to what degree Herder is merely following suit here and in what way his view is original.  
The distinctive and original aspect of Herder’s position is primarily that he treats the 
human capacity for freedom as dependent on Besonnenheit, which is a part of mankind’s 
natural, sensual endowment.  The human capacity for Besonnenheit distinguishes human 
beings from animals and other living beings, but “the difference is not in levels, or 
addition of forces, but rather in a completly different kind of direction and development 
                                            
15 DKV 1: 713.  See also DKV 1: 793-5, where Herder draws attention to the capacity of human beings to 
inhabit any part of the earth and live in any climate, unlike other animals.   
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[Auswickelung] of all forces.”16  That is, mankind is a distinct kind of natural being, but 
not categorically distinct from natural beings as such.   
This sounds like it could be merely a reiteration of Leibniz’s rejection of leaps in 
nature.17  This is correct to an extent, but there is an important difference between 
Herder and Leibniz concerning the structure of the human soul and its place in nature.  
Leibniz argues explicitly that rational beings have a unique power or ability which is a 
faculty added to their sensory capacities – apperception.  This apperception is something 
that is present in a particular kind of being, a soul.  Souls are qualitatively distinct from 
other kinds of substances that populate the word in virtue of being governed by laws that 
are completely distinct from the laws governing bodies.18  And, further, it is a crucial part 
of Leibniz’s view that there is no real interaction between substances.  Hence, 
apperceptive souls do not truly affect bodies, nor do bodies affect souls.19 
While Herder suggests that Besonnenheit is a form of apperception, his 
understanding of the basis and significance of this capacity is significantly different.  It is 
a form of self-conscious awareness, for sure.  But it should be understood as the form of 
self-consciousness taken by human sensory powers, not as a distinct force operating on a 
different ontological level and governed by different laws.  That human beings are 
apperceptive beings is explained by their physiological character, not by their belonging 
to a distinct kingdom or order of being.  Additionally, the human soul is not separated 
                                            
16 DKV 1: 717. 
17 Leibniz, New Essays, IV.16, p. 473. 
18 Monadology, sections 29, 30, 78, and 78.   
19 My account of Leibniz here is admittedly a bit simple, as his views changed a great deal over time.  For a 
more extensive discussion of the relationship between Herder and Leibniz, see Catherine Wilson, 
"Leibniz’s Reputation in the Eighteenth Century: Kant and Herder," in Insiders and Outsiders in 
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. G.A.J. Rogers, Tom Sorell, and Jill Kraye (London: Routledge, 
2010); Nigel DeSouza, "Leibniz in the Eighteenth Century: Herder's Critical Reflections on the Principles 
of Nature and Grace," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, no. 4 (2012). 
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from the human body, or other physical entities.  There is real interaction between soul 
and body, according to Herder, and how they interact is part of the explanation of human 
Besonnenheit.20 
Though Herder regards human freedom as a kind of autonomy or self-direction, 
he does not allege that this involves being capable of acting contrary to the order of 
natural causes.  Rather, the human capacity for self-determination emerges from the way 
in which human organisms are naturally constituted.  Human beings may act as they do 
in part because of natural causes, but they are able to direct the forces acting on them by 
means of the forces that constitute their own being, and hence to shape the direction of 
their own development.  Human freedom and autonomy, on Herder’s view, is more 
analogous to the manner in which a ship moves itself by channeling the forces of the wind 
and tide than the way in which a prime mover initiates a causal series independent of any 
antecedent determination. 
 
 
III 
 
  
 Herder contends that the capacity for Besonnenheit in human beings has broad 
significance for the way we relate to our future and past.  This capacity has import for the 
vocation of human beings, including their ethical and social life. Human beings are 
“active beings” whose “powers operate forth progressively [Kräfte in Progression 
fortwürken].”21  Herder argues, with regard to language in particular, that our capacity 
                                            
20 For a thorough discussion of Herder’s early criticism of Leibniz’s theory of pre-established harmony, see 
"Leibniz in the Eighteenth Century: Herder's Critical Reflections on the Principles of Nature and Grace." 
21 DKV 1: 769. 
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for reflection leads us to be constantly changing and developing our language.  Neither 
the grammatical structure nor the vocabulary of a language is fixed, but both are always 
being changed through creative human activity.22  With regard to human life more 
generally, this means that human beings continually recreate and refine their forms of life, 
consequently bringing about new ethical and social possibilities.  The form of life of any 
human community is not static, but is always evolving.   
It is Besonnenheit, according to Herder, that permits human beings to consciously 
attend to their experiences, and also to refine and improve upon what has been 
experienced, engendering a progressive series of improvement: 
With the human being evidently a different natural law presides over the succession of 
his ideas, Besonnenheit.  This still presides in the most sensuous condition, only less 
noticeably.  The most ignorant creature when he first comes into the world, but 
immediately he becomes an apprentice of nature in a way that no animal is.  One day 
does not simply instruct another, but every minute of the day instructs the others, 
every thought instructs the others.  Art [Der Kunstgriff] is essential to his soul.  To 
learn nothing for this moment, but rather to bring all together, either along with what 
is already known or for what is intended to be linked with it in the future.  The soul 
reckons its inventory, what it has collected and intends to collect.   It thus becomes a 
force [Kraft] of steadily collecting.  Such a chain goes forth until death.  [He is] in a 
way of speaking never a complete human being, always in development, progression, 
process of perfection.23 
 
Human beings are progressive creatures, according to Herder because of our 
Besonnenheit.  We have the ability to learn from our experiences and to reflectively 
appropriate what we have experienced.  We are in a constant condition of improving or 
developing ourselves, and the world which we inhabit.  Human beings have a nature 
which is perpetually incomplete and always oriented towards the further development of 
                                            
22 This is repeated throughout Herder’s Abhandlung, but his conception of the way in which language 
develops is especially vivid in his account of the stages by which a more complicated grammar develops on 
DKV 1: 762-7. 
23 DKV 1: 773.   
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capacities, abilities, and powers.24  This is a powerful image of human life that made a 
strong impression on German philosophy in the nineteenth century (in the work of Hegel 
and Marx, among others) and received its richest literary expression in Goethe’s Faust.25  
Herder’s conception of the human being as a progressive self-perfecting being does 
not commit him to a narrow, unitary theory of progress or perfection.26  The process of 
perfecting and developing one’s powers may lead to different outcomes in different 
persons, whose natural constitutions and sets of experiences are different from one 
another.  There is not one way in which human beings perfect themselves, but many.  
For example, a shepherd may teach his son to herd sheep, but the son may learn how to 
employ a hound in the task in order to herd more efficiently.  A different shepherd’s son 
may have no dog, but might learn more about which fauna are salubrious for the sheep.  
These two persons may be learning similar trades from their elders, and both perfect 
them to a degree beyond the manner in which they learned them, but they can do so in 
different ways according to the situation in which they find themselves, and by employing 
their different natural capacities and inclinations.  The possibility of diverse ways of 
perfecting oneself is even more apparent when one compares very different skills.  For 
example, a young shepherd’s creative activity is very different from that of a young farmer 
or a child raised in an industrialized city.   
                                            
24 “Das Wesentliche unsers Lebens ist nie Genuß sondern immer Progression, und wir sind nie Menschen 
gewesen, bis wir – zu Ende gelebt haben.”  DKV 1: 773. 
25 Herder was working on the Abhandlung when he first met Goethe in Strausburg.  Some have argued 
that Herder was Goethe’s model for Faust.  See Jacoby Günther, Herder als Faust (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 
1911). As literary history, Jacoby’s claim is too simplistic in its account of a great artist like Goethe.  
However, Herderian ideas are certainly a feature of Goethe’s masterpiece.  For a balanced discussion of 
this issue, see Robert Clark, Herder: His Life and Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1969), pp. 127ff. 
26 For discussions of Herder’s views on progress, see Sonia Sikka, Herder on Humanity and Cultural 
Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 87-106; Allen Wood, "Herder and Kant 
on History: Their Enlightenment Faith," in Metaphysics and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of 
Robert Merrihew Adams, ed. L. Jorgensen and S. Newlands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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This activity of perfecting oneself and one’s form of life, according to Herder, is 
not one that comes to a neat and tidy conclusion, but “continues on until death,” since 
we are “always in development, in progression, in process of perfection.”  This reveals a 
general form of agreement between Herder and the perfectionist ethics of the German 
rationalists.  Wolff, for example, insists that the process of perfection that human beings 
are obligated to engage in is a standing obligation that will not terminate in a complete 
and finished state of perfection.27  Though in agreement with this central tenet, Herder’s 
conception of perfection is distinct from the Wolffian one.  The most significant 
difference is that Herder extends the concept of perfection by emphasizing a plurality of 
ways in which any human being can develop and perfect him or herself.  Wolff conceived 
of perfection as having to do with the development of what he called the higher powers of 
the soul, associated with reason and the cognition of clear and distinct ideas.  For 
Herder, there is not a fundamental distinction to be made between so-called higher and 
lower forces of the soul.  The project to become more perfect is consequently for him 
something that can be done in a larger variety of ways, and in very different kinds of lives.  
In his philosophy of history, this will play an important role in his argument against the 
unitary theory of progress endorsed by several prominent enlightenment thinkers.28    
 
 
IV 
 
 
 
                                            
27 See, especially, Christian Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, zu 
Beförderung ihrer Glückseligkeit (Frankfurt and Lepzig1733), section 44.  
28 See the discussion in chapter 4.   
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Herder’s Abhandlung includes an account of what he calls “natural language”, 
which he distinguishes from fully developed human language.  The discussion of natural 
language reveals important features of Herder’s conception of sympathy, and the 
relationship that human beings stand in to other living beings.  Natural language, 
according to Herder, is the non-linguistic expression of feelings through sounds and 
gestures that is common to human beings and animals.  For example, when a dog 
whimpers upon being injured or a human being shrieks in terror, the noises can be 
understood to express pain and fear.29   
Though Herder denies that natural language explains the essence of human 
language,30 his account of it reveals important features of his ethics.  He argues that the 
natural language of beasts is not merely an auditory omission by one creature which 
disappears into the ether, but an expression that elicits a sympathetic response in other 
organisms that are properly attuned to such expressions: 
So little has nature created us as isolated stones, as egoistic Monads!  Even as the 
finest strings of animal feeling...even the strings, whose sound and straining does 
not at all arise from free choice [Willkür] and slow deliberation, yes whose nature 
has still not been able to be investigated by that all-investigating reason, even these 
strings in their entire play, without the consciousness of foreign sympathy are 
directed towards an expression to other creatures.  The struck spring does its 
natural duty: it sounds!  It calls a like-feeling echo: even when none is there, even 
when it is not hoped or expected that it will be answered.31 
 
Herder takes aim here at Leibniz’s view that each being does not interact with others, 
that all of its activity and development comes entirely from its own nature.  Against this, 
Herder contends that all natural beings are interconnected – they are not windowless 
                                            
29 DKV 1: 697. 
30 DKV 1: 701. 
31 DKV 1: 697-8. 
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monads.32  Human beings, in particular, are incredibly responsive to the pain and 
suffering of other creatures and this shows that we have a natural disposition for 
sympathy.   
Acknowledgment of a natural disposition toward sympathy with other creatures in 
mankind shows that Herder rejects a Hobbesian account of human nature, according to 
which each individual’s actions are all exclusively motivated by his or her own particular 
self-interest.  Human beings are naturally sympathetic not only toward other human 
beings, but their capacity for sympathy extends more broadly, and all other living beings 
are potential objects of sympathy.33  This tendency toward sympathy is shared by other 
creatures as well, and the mutual sympathy of natural creatures with one another is like a 
harmonious piece of music in which several instruments are attuned to one another.   
Because all living beings have some degree of attunement with each another, 
Herder further concludes that human beings are naturally directed to express their 
feelings, especially to other persons: 
Allow it now accept in the whole, as a clear law of nature: “Here is a sensitive 
being [empfindsames Wersen], which can enclose none of its living sentiments 
[Empfindungen] within itself, which in the first surprised moment, even without 
choice and intention must express each in sound.“  This was so to speal the last, 
maternal impression of the forming hand of nature, that she gave the law to all in 
the world: “do not feel for yourself alon, but sound aloud your feeling!“34 
 
                                            
32 For all of the respect that Herder had for Leibniz, he always found the doctrine of pre-established 
harmony problematic, as it did not allow for real interaction between things or persons.  It is criticized in 
1769 in Über Leibnitzens Grundsätze von  der Natur und Gnade, SWS 32: 225-7, and in 1775 in Vom 
Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele, DKV 4:336-8.  He also reiterated his criticisms in 1787 
in Gott, einige Gespräche, DKV 4: 714-7.  The first of these texts is discussed in detail in DeSouza, 
"Leibniz in the Eighteenth Century: Herder's Critical Reflections on the Principles of Nature and Grace." 
33 DKV 1: 698. 
34 DKV 1: 698.   
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The whole of nature, on this view, is a beautiful and well-proportioned whole.  The 
natural world is composed of beings in accord with one another, and it is man’s tendency 
as a natural being to concern himself with the feelings of other creatures, but especially of 
the human tendency to move and be moved by the feelings and expressions of other 
human beings:  “Because our sound of nature is determined for the expression of 
passions, it is thus natural that they also became the element of all emotional stirring 
[Rührung]!”35  The well-ordered system of the expression of affects and sympathetic 
reactions to such affects implies, according to Herder, that human nature drives us to be 
expressive, and not merely sensitive, creatures.  Human beings, as well as other 
organisms, are naturally driven to orient themselves towards and concern themselves with 
beings other than themselves, not to exist in isolation.   
 Charles Taylor has argued that Herder’s most significant philosophical 
contribution is that Herder made expression, as opposed to designation, central to the 
understanding of language.  According to Taylor, this means that human language shapes 
what can be expressed, so that by having the words ‘outraged’ and ‘seething’ in addition 
to the term ‘anger’ allows for a broader and more complex set of human emotions to be 
understood and expressed.36  For Taylor, this expressive potential is a unique feature of 
human language.  Taylor’s account of Herder is instructive, but it is important not to be 
misled by his emphasis on the term ‘expression’.  The expressive character of language is 
presented by Herder as a feature of all animal life, and not restricted to human language.  
In fact, Herder explicitly asserts that these expressive sounds are “not the actual roots, 
                                            
35 DKV 1: 705-6. 
36 Charles Taylor, Taylor, "The Importance of Herder," pp. 97-8.   
  
107 
 
but the juices which enliven the roots of language.“37  That is, though not the basis of our 
language, they are the basis of our expressive nature, and they are the juices which 
nourish our language and make it expressive.  Our more sophisticated use of language 
allows us to make finer distinctions, to search for words that fit our feelings, and to create 
new terms when our language is insufficiently rich for our purposes. But it is important 
not to overlook Herder’s insistence that the drive to express one’s feelings is something 
that humans share with other creatures, and is part of what connects us with the rest of 
the natural world.38    
One consequence of Herder’s general view of the natural attunement between 
natural beings is that a person does not require a sophisticated or refined language to 
sympathize with the feelings and sensibility of one’s fellows.  Sympathetic understanding 
arises naturally, and it is only through a process of intellectual refinement that a human 
being’s natural feelings can be weakened enough to not take part in this interplay of 
expression and feeling: 
The more harmonious the sensitive string-play of the animal is woven with other 
animals, this more does the one feel with another.  Their nerves come into a 
uniform tension, their souls in a uniform tone, they are caused mechanically to feel 
with one another.  And what a hardening of his fibers!  What power [Macht] to 
stop up all the opening of its sensitivity, is required for a human being to make 
himself deaf and hard against this!39 
 
The sympathetic reaction of one person to the cries of other persons, as well as of other 
animals, is a matter of the natural mechanism governing beings with similar physiological 
                                            
37 DKV 1: 701.   
38 Taylor himself does not sufficiently emphasize the degree to which Herder sees human beings in a close 
connection with other beings, especially with regard to our drive to express ourselves.  He is correct that 
Herder argues against deriving human language from natural cries, but he omits to discuss just what 
Herder believes the importance of natural language has for the proper understanding of human beings. 
39 DKV 1: 706-7.  Note the mechanistic language of this passage.  As in most places, Herder seeks to 
ground his in a scientific and naturalistic conception of human life.   
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structures.  Each creature feels what it does as a result of its nerves being in the state that 
they are, and certain expressions are capable of bringing about the same state in other 
beings that have similarly constituted systems of nerves.  To sympathize with the feelings 
of other sensitive creatures is the natural disposition of human beings, and the 
suppression of natural sympathetic reactions to the expressions of other beings is 
something that is accomplished only either through a great effort to become indifferent, 
or through excessive intellectual refinement that attenuates the natural passions.  Modern 
European society, especially modern French society, is marked by this kind of excessive 
refinement.  Hence one of the central problems of modern society, according to Herder, 
is an excessive intellectualism and weakened moral sentiments.40 
To a contemporary reader, Herder’s emphasis on the harmony of nature and a 
natural disposition toward sympathy is likely to appear a bit jejune.  Herder, however, 
was a thinker for whom nature was not disenchanted and emptied of purpose and value.  
He assumed that the natural world is an essentially well-ordered and hospitable habitat 
for the beings residing in it.   This is not to say that Herder was anti-naturalistic.  Not all 
naturalists accept what John McDowell calls “bald naturalism.”41  Herder’s conception 
of nature was shaped by the Shaftesbury, whose own work The Moralists contains several 
encomia to the harmony, beauty and goodness of nature.42   
                                            
40 This comes out clearly in “Wie Philosophie zum Besten des Volks allgemeiner und nützlicher werken 
kann“, as well as in the 1774 Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.  Rousseau’s influence 
is palpable here.   
41  John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. xviii.   
42 See, e.g., Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times, 3 vols. (London: Purser, 1732; repr., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), II, pp. 121-2 
and 62. 
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Herder was not entirely blind to the less pleasant aspects of the natural world – the 
violence and struggle that so frequently rear their head.43  Herder’s point in the Treatise 
is not quite to argue that all is peaceful and pleasant in nature.  The argument is that 
there is a naturally sympathetic disposition in organic beings, but not that this is the 
exclusive disposition of such beings.  There may be other aspects of the nature of human 
and other organic beings that can account for their negative and hostile behavior towards 
one another.44 
The most important thing to note, for purposes of understanding Herder’s ethics, 
is that Herder’s discussion of sympathy in the Origin of Language is an attempt to 
undermine an excessively pessimistic account of human nature, such as is found in the 
works of thinkers like Hobbes and Mandeville who minimize the place of benevolent and 
altruistic dispositions in favor of the pursuit of self-interest in their philosophical 
anthropology.45  Herder’s account of the Naturtöne of humans and animals is an attempt 
to provide a naturalistic account of sympathy in terms of the relationship between 
expressive cries and the reaction of the nerves.  However, just as the discussion of natural 
language in the early part of the Abhandlung is not the complete account of Herder’s 
understanding of human language, so is the discussion of sympathy only a part of 
Herder’s ethical vision.  At most, it offers a few arguments against Hobbesian moral 
psychology, but not a detailed account of Herder’s own positive views.  The sympathy 
                                            
43 See, for example, Herder’s discussion of how different human languages developed on DKV 1:791-9. 
44 Herder believed, under the influence of Kant’s interpretation of Newton in his Allgemeine 
Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, that the two fundamental physical forces of nature were 
attraction and repulsion, and that the actions of all beings, including animals and persons, were 
fundamentally governed by such laws.  See, for example, Zum Sinn des Gefuhls, DKV 4: 235-41.  Herder 
also makes reference to this in his later works, such as the Ideen and Liebe und Selbstheit. 
45 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Inadianapolis: Hackett, 1994), I.xiii; Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the 
Bees, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University PRess, 1924; repr., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988), I, pp. 323-
69.   
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that human beings are naturally endowed with is a passive reaction to stimuli, which is an 
inadequate basis for an account of the active process of perfecting and developing one’s 
capacities which is the vocation of humankind. 
   
V 
 
As noted above, Herder holds that there is a natural law which leads each human 
being to employ his or her powers progressively, and that this is grounded in our capacity 
for reflective self-awareness.46  This progressive character is not only a characteristic of 
individual human beings, according to Herder, but is also a property of human 
communities and humanity as a species.47  In addition to emphasizing this progressive 
self-perfecting aspect of humanity, Herder also argues that human beings are inherently 
social and historical.  Human beings are social in that each individual is dependent on 
other human beings for their identity, the development of their capacities, and even for 
their very survival.  They are historical in that each individual is educated into a society at 
a particular time and hence receives the imprint of the historical period of his or her 
society.48  The progressive, social, and historical character of human beings is a 
consequence of the intense degree of dependence of all human beings during the earliest 
period of their development. 
                                            
46 DKV 1: 769. 
47 DKV 1: 783.  See also, Über die neuere deutsche Literatur: Erste Sammlung von Fragementen, DKV 1: 
181. 
48 This was a view that Herder developed early on, and which is expressed in two fragments of 1766, “Von 
der Verschiedenheit des Geschmaks und der Denkart unter den Menschen“ and “Von der Veränderung 
des Geschmaks der Nationen durch die Folge der Zeitalter.“  Both of these fragments are published 
together as “Von der Veränderung des Geschmacks”, in DKV 1: 149-160.  
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Herder submits that the observation of nature reveals that human beings are born 
weaker and remain in a dependent condition for longer than other animals.49  This 
intensive and protracted dependence might seem to be a lamentable disadvantage for our 
species at first glance, but Herder argues that this aspect of our nature explains why 
human beings have the intellectual, social, and moral character that they do: 
The human being comes into the world weaker, needier, more abandoned by 
nature’s instruction, more completely without skills and talents, than any animal, 
precisely in order that, like no animal, he “may enjoy an education [Erziehung], 
and the human species may, like no animal species, become an affectionately 
bound whole [innigverbundenes Ganze]!”50   
 
Other creatures are able to take care of themselves much earlier than human young are, 
and are hence in less need of affection and care than human beings are.  Human beings 
do not enter the world self-sufficient, but depend on their caretakers for their 
development, even for their very survival.  Fortunately, nature has provided for this, and 
has formed human parents with the propensity to naturally care for, and love, their 
children.51  Most importantly, human infants do not depend on their parents merely for 
physical sustenance, but they also require instruction and education from their parents 
for their psychological, emotional, and moral development.  Hence, there is a bond 
knitting together each generation of human beings, and that bond is one of education and 
                                            
49 Herder was a close and careful reader of Buffon’s Natural History, which contains detailed descriptions 
of the anatomy, ontogeny, and behavior of a large variety of organisms.  His comparative claims about the 
characteristics of different organisms are grounded a study of this work and others. 
50 DKV 1: 785.  Michael Forster’s translation of this same passage is a bit misleading, as he renders 
“innigverbundenes Ganze” as “inwardly united whole” (Forster trans., p. 141), and thus excludes the sense 
of ‘affectionate’ or ‘tender’ which the German word ‘innig’ bears.  Yet it is clear that Herder intends this 
sense to be emphasized as the context in which the phrase appears involves a discussion of the importance 
of love in binding human beings together into social groups. 
51 DKV 1: 784. 
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upbringing.52  As each individual has depended on her elders, so will each person’s 
offspring depend on their parents and community for their upbringing.  Herder draws 
attention to the simple fact that if this upbringing were not provided, then it would be 
impossible for human infants to develop into well-functioning adults.  Mere instinctual 
feeding is not sufficient for raising a being as needy as a human infant.  Rather, each child 
must be instructed and enculturated in a manner requiring affection and caring attention, 
and this is well-expressed by the Greek term for parental love, στοργή or storgê.53  The 
upshot of this is that “no individual human being exists for himself, he is inserted into the 
whole of the species, he is only one for the progressive [fortgehende] series.”54 
 This has at least two implications for the moral and social character of human 
beings.  First, it entails that human beings are not naturally egoistic, but have a natural 
disposition to love and care for others, especially their own young.  Herder’s discussion of 
the caring relationship between parents and children is intended to undermine accounts 
of human moral psychology that leave room for only self-interested forms of motivation: 
If one wishes to explain everything out of blind lust or immediate self-interest, like 
our crude Epicureans – who can explain the feeling of parents for their children?  
And the strong bonds that are effected through such feelings?  Look!  This poor 
inhabitant of the earth comes wretched into to the world, without knowing that he 
is wretched.  He needs pity, without in the least being able to make himself worthy 
of it...Thus here the bonds of nature must break earliest, according to our cold 
philosophy, where they are most strongly efficacious!55 
 
Herder’s point is that the kind of care demanded of parents could not be expected to be 
part of the natural course of things if human motivation was constituted solely by the 
                                            
52 DKV 1: 785-91. 
53 DKV 1: 785. 
54 DKV 1: 785-6.  See also  “Von der Veränderung des Geschmacks der Nationen durch die Folge der 
Zeitalter,“ DKV 1: 157. 
55 DKV 1: 784. 
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desire for “immediate self-interest.”  Rather, since the natural order of human life 
involves parental care for children, this is best explained by a natural disposition of 
concern toward others – at least towards one’s own children.  These bonds go further 
than the natural disposition to sympathy characteristic of all natural beings, and which 
forms the basis of the “natural language”, because parental love is practiced over a long 
period of time and is not a merely episodic occurrence.  All of this entails the rejection of 
the moral psychology characteristic of Hobbes and Mandeville, as well as of French 
thinkers such as D’Holbach and La Mettrie. 
 The second consequence which follows from Herder’s account of human 
dependence is that it entails that human nature is thoroughly social.  This contention plys 
a major role in Herder’s critique of Rousseau’s individualistic philosophical anthropology, 
as well as of Condillac’s theory of the origin of language.56  Human beings depend on 
social relationships even for their own basic development, and by means of the 
development of an individual’s own capacities they contribute to the historical change 
that takes place in their own family and society: 
                                            
56 Herder takes aim at the conception of the state of nature depicted by Rousseau in the Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality, included in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political 
writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch, Cambridge texts in the history of political thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).   
Condillac’s account of two children developing language in isolation from a human community is 
also an important target of Herder’s.  That discussion can be found in the second part of Etienne Bonnot 
de Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Knowledge, trans. Hans Aarsleff (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).   
 In recent work, Hans Aarsleff has argued that the view of the origin of language presented by 
Herder is more individualistic and less social than that presented by Condillac.  There are some passages in 
the Abhandlung that offer support for this contention.  However, Aarsleff’s charge against Herder is more 
difficult to substantiate when one pays attention to the whole of the Abhandlung.  See Hans Aarsleff, 
"Herder's Cartesian Ursprung vs. Condillac's Expressivist Essai," in Language Philosophies and the 
Language Sciences, ed. Daniele Gambarara, Stefano Gensini, and Antonino Pennisi (Münster: Nodus 
Publikationen, 1996); "The Tradition of Condillac: The Problem of the Origin of Language in the 
Eighteenth Century and the Debate in the Berlin Academy Before Herder," in From Locke to Saussure 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). 
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Thus [for animals] everything remains individual [einzeln], the immediate work of 
nature, and so there comes to be “no progression of the soul of the species,” no 
whole, of the sort that nature wanted in the case of the human being. Nature 
consequently bound together [humanity] through necessity and a caring 
[zuvorkommenden] parental drive for which the Greeks had the word στοργή, and 
in this way “a bond of instruction [Unterricht] and education [Erziehung]” 
became essential to him.  In this case parents had not collected the circle of ideas 
for themselves; at the same time it was there in order to be communicated, and the 
son has the advantage of already inheriting the wealth of their spirit early, as 
though in epitome.57    
 
Human beings are part of a series of generations, each of which depends on the preceding 
for its education and Bildung, and which itself contributes to the Bildung of the 
succeeding generation.  When, for example, one generation invents the art of carpentry, 
this ability is taught to the next generation.  The succeeding generation transforms and 
refines the arts that it learns and passes on to its posterity a more refined and perfected 
set of abilities.  Each ability that is acquired, or power that is developed, is in this case not 
lost.  It is taken up and further developed by each new generation.  Thus, “No individual 
human being exists for himself; ‘he is inserted into the whole of the species, he is only one 
for the progressive series.’”58   
The social character of humanity is bound up with its historical character.  Each 
individual becomes who he is, and develops the skills and capacities that he does, because 
of the work accomplished by prior generations.  He then refines and develops the abilities 
further, passing on a different set of perfections to his own children.  The manner in 
which human beings perfect themselves, hence, is not atomistic or individualistic, but is 
                                            
57 DKV 1: 785.  I have followed Forster’s translation very closely here. 
58 DKV 1: 785-6. Emil Adler has noted that in the Abhandlung, “Die Entwickelung der Sprache ist also 
mit der Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts verbunden…”  Emil Adler, Herder und die deutsche 
Aufklärung (Vienna: Europa, 1968), p. 128. 
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something that takes place within a specific historical horizon through the socialization of 
individuals.59 
 It is helpful to understand Herder’s arguments here in light of his conception of 
the vocation of man.  In his letters to Mendelssohn, Herder committed himself to the 
idea that the good of a human life consists in self-perfection.  Herder did not there 
elaborate on process by which human beings perfect themselves, however.  In the 
Abhandlung, Herder shows that he is committed to two important theses about the 
human perfection and perfectibility.  First, human beings are social beings who are 
always related in important ways to the other members of their species.  This means that 
our attempt to perfect ourselves must necessarily have some reference to others, and 
cannot be a purely individualistic activity.  Second, one of the specific ways in which 
human beings are related to others is by their history.  Children are educated into a 
particular way of life.  This way of life, however, is not a fixed and static thing, but itself 
has developed through the self-perfecting activity of the members of the preceding 
generations.  Children inherit a worldview and a set of abilities from their forbears, and 
their early formation is shaped by the history of their people.  The way in which a child 
takes up the lessons learned by their parents is not a simple inculcation of ideas, however, 
because the child develops her capacities in a unique way, herself perfecting and further 
developing what she inherits from her parents.  This is the inevitable outcome of the 
                                            
59 On the interpretation I present here, Herder charts a dialectical relationship between individual 
development and the historical progress in a community in a way similar to that discussed by Robert 
Brandom.  Brandom states: “The self-cultivation of an individual consists in the exercise and expansion of 
expressive freedom by subjecting oneself to the novel discipline of a set of social practices one could not 
previously engage in, in order to acquire the capacity to perform in novel ways, express beliefs, desires, and 
intentions one could not previously even have, whether in arts or in sports.  The cultivation of the 
community consists in the development of new sets of social practiced, at once the result of individual self-
cultivation…and the condition of it.”  Robert Brandom, "Freedom and Constraint by Norms," American 
Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 3 (1979): p. 195. 
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Besonnenheit that characterizes all human activity.  Nothing remains as it was, but is 
creatively appropriated, developed, and applied.  In the letters to Mendelssohn, Herder 
argued that every human perfection can only be a perfection in a specific context.  In 
Ursprung der Sprache, Herder argues that this context is always historical, a theme which 
Herder would elaborate upon in more detail in his 1774 Auch eine Philosophie der 
Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit, which will be discussed in chapter 4.60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
60 The present chapter was written before I had acquired and read Nigel DeSouza, "Language, Reason, 
and Sociability: Herder's Critique of Rousseau," Intellectual History Review 22, no. 2 (2012).  DeSouza’s 
article also discusses some of the issues taken up in the present chapter and my work here would have been 
much improved had I been able to take account of it.  I hope to do so in a future iteration of this chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Herder’s Genealogy of Morals: Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte 
 
 
I 
 
 Friedrich Nietzsche characterizes his Zur Genealogie der Moral as an inquiry into 
“the conditions and circumstances out of which [moral values] have grown, under which 
they developed and shifted,” and he further claims that this is “knowledge of a kind that 
has until now neither existed nor even been desired.”1  Johann Gottfried Herder’s Auch 
eine Philosophie der Geschichte stands as a refutation of Nietzsche’s claim that such 
knowledge was never desired and such an inquiry never attempted prior to 1887.  In 
Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, Herder examines a set of historical civilizations 
and argues that the form of life of each civilization, including the moral values and the 
various institutions expressing and supporting such values, arose in response to the 
particular historical and natural conditions in which each people lived.  A proper reading 
of Herder’s tract thus reveals it to be, in fact, an inquiry into the “conditions and 
circumstances out of which [moral values] have grown.”   
 The present chapter argues that Herder’s 1774 Auch eine Philosophie der 
Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit can be read as a genealogy of 18th century 
European morality.  I will offer an argument about the structure of the text aiming to 
show that Herder sought to offer an account of how the moral values and social practices 
                                                
1 Zur Genealogie der Moral, Vorrede, §6.  Nietzsche’s work was first published in 1887, 113 years after 
Herder’s Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte.  Citations to Nietzsche’s works are to the section numbers 
of the relevant works.  I have used Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 
Bänden, 15 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980). All translations are my own.  
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of each society are historically determined responses to the conditions in which a people 
finds themselves.  In doing this, I will be focusing on Herder’s account of the ethical 
character of the societies he discusses, thus offering a different focus than much other 
Herder scholarship.   
 
II 
 
Herder’s belief that each culture’s moral values arises from the context in which 
that people lived is clearly illustrated by his discussion of the ancient Middle East, a 
society he refers to as the ‘Morgenland.’2  These societies were supposedly organized in a 
hierarchical manner, dominated by either a patriarch or a religious figure whose authority 
was absolute.    In that time, the authority of the patriarchs and priests was regarded as 
divinely sanctioned, closely linking the concepts of political obedience and piety.3  To 
obey the patriarch or priest was to practice obedience and reverence toward God, since 
God had appointed such men to rule and govern.  This rigid form of authority, Herder 
contends, was needed to bring about the kind of community cohesion that was required 
by a pastoral life.   Obedience, piety, and devotion to one’s family were the dominant 
values in that society because these supported the institutions and practices that were 
suited to the historical needs of that age.4 
In standard Enlightenment works of history, the age of ancient patriarchy was 
despised as an inferior and oppressive form of civilization.  Herder notes that many of his 
                                                
2 This term is usually translated as ‘Orient’.  While literally correct, I avoid translating the term in this way, 
as Herder uses it to refer to the ancient Middle East and not other parts of Asia that lie further to the east 
of Europe. 
3 DKV 4: 17. 
4 DKV 4: 11-9. 
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contemporaries depict this time as one in which a few “cheats” and “villains” 
manipulated and controlled the majority for their own benefit.5  Boulanger, for instance, 
in a representative passage describes this age as one in which persons “bless with a 
religious imbecility the savage capriciousness that deprives them of life.” 6  There are 
three kinds of criticisms commonly made in these accounts.  The first is that the 
authority of patriarchs and priests in the ancient Orient was arbitrary and total.  Second, 
this absolute power was inevitably experienced as oppressive by those who were subjects 
of such power.   Third, such forms of rule were especially conducive to abusive exercises 
of that power, such that the violent abuse of the ruled was the normal expression of this 
kind of authority.  Hence, the dominant position of these Enlightenment thinkers was 
that any society in which there is a patriarchal or absolute form of rule undergirded by a 
religious conception of political legitimacy is inimical to both virtue and happiness. The 
specter of Oriental Despotism was the bugbear proffered by such authors to demonstrate 
the superiority of their own enlightened age, an age that had supposedly shed the 
superstitions and prejudices that afflicted mankind throughout most of history. 
Contrary to these accounts of the ancient Middle East, Herder claims that the very 
beliefs and practices condemned by eighteenth-century historians were salubrious for 
those who lived in that age.  He argues that just as a child’s character must be formed 
through obedience and habituation, rather than through reasoning, mankind in its earliest 
stages of development required similar means of education for the formation of its 
                                                
5 DKV 4: 17-8. 
6 Boulanger’s vitriolic account is similar in tone and outlook to the discussions by Voltaire and Helvetius. 
See, e.g. Claude Adrien Helvétius, De L'Esprit, Or, Essays on the Mind, and Its Several Faculties, trans. 
W. Mudford (London: M. Jones, 1807), third discourse. and François-Marie d'Arouet Voltaire, The 
Philosophy of History, trans. unknown (London: I. Allcock, 1766; repr., 1965).  
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character.7   Submission to authority was consequently not harmful for those living in 
that age, nor was it experienced as oppressive.  It was necessary for the formation of 
characters and the development of various intellectual and moral capacities that were 
important for the kind of life such people lived, and this also prepared the way for the 
development of other, very different, forms of life.8  The particular inclinations developed 
by this manner of life, according to Herder, are piety and love of family, and the very 
happiness of the people in this age consisted in acting according to these feelings.9  
Herder thus argues that what an eighteenth-century Aufklärer or lumiere thinks of as an 
impediment to happiness can for a different people in a different age and time be the very 
substance of happiness. 
Herder does not explicitly address the criticism made by Boulanger, Helvetius, 
and Voltaire that the authority of the patriarchs was arbitrary, capricious, and brutal.  
Unless there is a response to their charges that can be deciphered in his account of the 
ancient Middle East, Herder’s re-interpretation of that historical age cannot do all of the 
critical work that he clearly intends it to.  In that case, one might at best be persuaded 
that Herder is correct that people did not experience the rule of the patriarchs as 
oppressive, but it might nonetheless be true that the ancient Middle East was inferior to 
the Enlightenment because the patriarchs were in fact abusive and their power was 
absolute and arbitrary.  
                                                
7 DKV 4: 15-6. 
8 DKV 4: 18ff.  Montesquieu emphasizes something similar with respect to climate in The Spirit of the 
Laws, trans. Basia Carolyn Miller Anne M. Cohler, and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989).   Herder goes much further than Montesquieu in both arguing for extreme care in 
making transcultural comparisons and also in introducing the idea of the historical development of each 
society into his account. 
9 DKV 4: 19. 
  
121 
 
Two lines of response to these charges of Enlightenment critics can be discerned 
in Herder’s text.  On the one hand, Herder suggests that the abuses of ancient priests and 
patriarchs have been exaggerated and, even when veridical, depict events which took 
place only in the later stages of the civilization of the Morgenland.10   At that later stage, 
as authority eroded, rulers were wont to lash out abusively in order to preserve the last 
vestiges of their power.  Hence, the stories of abusive power relished by Boulanger, 
Voltaire, and their epigones are not to be taken at face value for they tend not to be 
supported by the available evidence.  Even when roughly accurate, though, Herder 
counters that the violent abuses of power are not characteristic of this age in its 
flourishing period, but are rather the death throes of its last moments.11   It would be 
mistaken to assess the entire age on the basis of these uncharacteristic final days, as such 
a period marks a deviation from the norm rather than an instance of it.  This line of 
response, insofar as it is based on a more accurate account of the whole of the age in 
question, would be adequate as a riposte to the emphasis on the violence and cruelty of 
ancient patriarchs that were frequently trotted out to denigrate this period of history, but 
it still does not answer the charge that the authority of the patriarchs was arbitrary and 
illegitimate. 
Herder’s second response to such critics goes further and addresses this latter 
issue.  He claims that the kind of character which made possible the virtues of piety, love 
of family, and obedience could not be instilled through mere discourse or reasoning 
because the emotional and habitual dispositions necessary for such reasoning to be 
                                                
10 DKV 4: 12 and 14. 
11 DKV 4: 12. 
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effective were not present. 12  The long education through submission to authority thus 
formed the character of the people of the ancient Middle East, endowing them with their 
own particular virtues and form of happiness, while also preparing the character of 
mankind for its next stage of development.  According to Herder, different kinds of 
authority, less arbitrary and total, and different systems of values, ones which tend to 
elevate the importance of freedom and reason, are apropos for later stages of 
development.13   Yet, these later forms of life could not emerge if not for the existence of 
the earlier stages out of which they developed.14   This line of argument is more powerful 
than the former one in that it suggests that the arbitrariness of a power is not relevant to 
the goods which result from an age spent in obedience to a figure of authority.  The 
positive consequences of such a kind of life are, he suggests, to be found in having a 
character which is capable of reverence and which is disciplined enough to yield to 
something other than its own desires.15   These habits, virtues, and values are instilled 
through obedience to any power, arbitrary or not.  Hence, according to this argument, 
the form of life of the ancient Middle East could have been good for those living in that 
age and also for its cultural inheritors even if the power exercised in that age was 
                                                
12 DKV 4: 15-6. 
A similar argument is also made by Hegel in his discussion of lordship and bondage in both the 
Phänomenologie des Geistes and the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, §433 and §435.  
G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1971), Band X.  Hegel contends that a relationship of this kind is 
necessary for the development of more egalitarian and free forms of society, as well as of the psychological 
character that will flourish in such conditions  Herder’s influence on Hegel is widely acknowledged, and 
this may be one more area to which that influence reaches.  For a discussion of these issues in Hegel, see 
Michael N. Forster, Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998), 247-55..  
There is also an echo of this idea in some passages in Nietzsche.  See, e.g., Jenseits von Gut und 
Böse, §188. 
13 DKV 4: 97ff. 
14 DKV 4: 21 and 84-8. 
15 DKV 4: 18. 
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arbitrary.  Herder’s account of the ancient Middle East thus speaks to both of the kinds 
of criticisms prevalent in Enlightenment histories of that age. 
 
III  
 
In his discussions of succeeding ages, Herder offers a similar account of the way in 
which the characteristic virtues and values of each age are an outgrowth of the needs of 
their form of life, appropriate to their stage of development.  The diligence and discipline 
of the Egyptians, the adventurous and commercial spirit of the Phoenicians, the beauty 
and refinement of the Greeks, and the vigor and martial virtues of the Romans, are all 
treated as developing out of each peoples’ natural and historical conditions.   
Both the order in which Herder discusses these societies and his selection of 
societies is significant.  On the one hand, Herder attempts to show how each later society 
took up and developed the perfections of the societies that preceded it, altering and giving 
such perfections their own character in the process.16  On the other hand, Herder also 
aims to show that the specific societies he treats in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte 
formed and prepared the conditions out of which the European society of the eighteenth-
century had developed.  The work as a whole is meant to serve as a genealogy of Herder’s 
own society. 
Herder argues that those who live in each historical age have different values and 
virtues, and that they correspondingly feel differently about the customs and practices of 
their societies than those whose sensibilities were formed differently.  The patriarchal 
                                                
16 See especially Herder’s characterization of ancient Greece at DKV 4: 29-30.  
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manner of life, and the values which supported such a lifestyle, were not experienced as 
oppressive or miserable by those who lived in that age.17  This is because the values, 
social forms, and practices, contributed to the good and pleasant aspects of those 
societies.  While these forms of life struck many of Herder’s contemporaries as 
contemptible, Herder avers that this is only because they did not abstract away from their 
own peculiar historically determined dispositions and preferences.18  Consequently, they 
only thought of such a life as one of soul-crushing servitude, not as one of pious devotion 
and attachment to one’s family and tribe.  But just as the form of life characteristic of the 
people of the ancient Middle East is not suited for eighteenth-century Europeans, the 
form of life of eighteenth-century Europeans is not suited for all human beings at all 
times in history.  Each of these ages has a distinct set of values which determine what is 
experienced as a good and happy life for those who live in that age.  These standards are 
not trans-historical or timeless, but are individual and particular.  Thus, according to 
Herder, each place and time has its own standard of happiness.19 
The second idea that Herder advances is that each civilization needed the ages 
which preceded it, and out of which it developed, in order for it to have the social life, 
                                                
17 I here differ from Michael Forster’s interpretation of Herder’s genealogy in that Forster claims that 
Herder regards the patriarchal society of the ancient Middle East as marked by social oppression.  See 
Michael N. Forster, "Genealogy," American Dialectic 1, no. 2 (2011): 246..  Herder’s intent is, in fact, to 
undermine accounts of that age which treat is as oppressive by arguing that such a form of life would not 
have been experienced as oppressive by those who lived at that time, not to add his voice to the chorus of 
disapproval.   
18 This is a problem that Herder draws attention to repeatedly in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte 
and in other texts.  See, for example, “Von der Veränderung des Geschmacks”, DKV 1: 159, and Herder’s 
critical review of John Millar’s The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, SWS 4: 455.  
19 DKV 4: 38-9.  For further discussion of Herder’s notion that the good or happy life varies historically, 
see Sonia Sikka, "On the Value of Happiness: Herder contra Kant," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37, 
no. 4 (2007); Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 44-84..  
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virtues, and values that it has.20  Hence, no person or society is entirely self-made or 
independent.  This is just as true of modern European society as it is of any other.  
Eighteenth-century European society became what it was only because it was the 
inheritor of a long series of historical development that began in the ancient Middle East.  
Thus the patriarchal and theocratic societies so despised by philosophes were historically 
necessary for the development of the values and ideals which the philosophes used as 
ammunition in their salvos.  Failure to be aware of this dependence produces a tendency 
to unfairness and hypocrisy in historical judgments, according to Herder. 21   
Taken together, the claims that the standard of happiness of each society is 
historically determined, and that each society depends on the inheritance it receives from 
preceding societies, leads to one of the central conclusions of Herder’s argument: one 
should seek to understand the conditions which made possible the development of 
particular mores and values before attempting to criticize them in the light of the 
dominant values of one’s own age. 22  Exercising this form of caution is likely to lead one 
to see that what at first appears reprehensible and arbitrary, such as particular forms of 
authority and obedience, may in fact be necessary or salutary.  As noted above, Herder 
employs the metaphor of the development and education of a child in order to support 
this principle.  At different periods of life different kinds of motivation and concern are 
                                                
20 In Über den Fleiss in Meherern Gelehrten Sprachen, Herder claims that languages are also subject to 
the same form of development, and even describes the order of influence in a way that mirrors the historical 
narrative of Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte.  See DKV 1: 25.  A helpful discussion of this passage 
can be found in Michael Morton, Herder and the Poetics of Thought (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1990), 58-64. 
21 See, for example, 4:57-9. 
22 DKV 4: 39.  This idea was developed prior to Auch eine Philosophie der Geshichte in some of Herder’s 
early works on aesthetics, such as Über die neuere deutsche Literatur, Erste Sammlung and “Von der 
Ode.”  For discussion of this principle, dubbed by Meinecke the principle of individuality, see Friedrich 
Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1965), 155, 369, 402-3, and 
545.; and Frederick C. Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
4, 106-9. 
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characteristic and appropriate.  In order be a fair judge, one must take account of a 
person’s developmental stage.  An infant who takes toys from another infant is not 
necessarily a moral reprobate, but an adult who steals toys from a child would evince a 
deeply vicious moral character.  Or, bouncing a ball against a wall may be entertaining 
and exciting for a 3-year-old, though the very same activity is more likely to serve as an 
expression of boredom in a 30-year-old.  In making judgments about both the virtues and 
the happiness of an entire age or people, Herder insists that one should remain cognizant 
of the context in which each people lives, and the developmental stage that they have 
reached.23   
 
IV 
 
A great part of Herder’s argument is premised on the assumption that mankind as 
a whole develops in the same manner as an individual organism does.24  The metaphor of 
organic development does serious work for Herder, and he himself insists that though it is 
an analogy, it is not merely “play”. 25  In the narrative Herder constructs, he states that 
the people of the ancient Middle East are representative of the infancy of modern 
European culture, the Egyptians its childhood, and the Greeks its adolescence, and Rome 
                                                
23 For a helpful discussion of these issues, see Sikka, Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference, 32-4. 
24 See Frederick M. Barnard, Herder's Social and Political Thought: From Enlightenment to Natonalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 72-87. 
25 DKV 4: 20.  I think that this undermines Tino Markworth’s claim that Herder’s metaphor of life stages 
has no argumentative significance for Herder.  See Tino Markworth, "Das “Ich“' und die Geschichte. Zum 
Zusammenhang von Selbstthematisierung und Geschichtsphilosophie bei J.G. Herder," in Johann 
Gottfried Herder: Academic Disciplines and the Pursuit of Knowledge, ed. Wulf Köpke (Columbia: 
Camden House, 1996), 159.  The role that this metaphor plays in Herder’s attempt to avoid relativism is 
discussed in Frederick C. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 208-9. 
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its manhood.26   By characterizing the development of modern European culture in this 
way, Herder is able to argue that each preceding stage of development was both necessary 
and important, thus undercutting the efforts of those who sought to depict these ages as 
irredeemably flawed because they lacked a number of the virtues characteristic of the age 
of the European enlightenment.  Seen in another light, though, Herder’s metaphor can 
appear patronizing, condescending, and even guilty of making the kinds of value 
judgments that he criticizes in the works of others.   
Herder criticizes both the historical chauvinism of Enlightenment philosophies of 
history, as well as imperial and colonial domination of non-Europeans by Europeans, in 
Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte as well as in later texts.27  However, the idea that 
human cultures can be in different stages of maturity is problematic because it implies 
that there is a uniform course of development for all of humanity, and that one culture 
can be more advanced along that course of development than another.   
 There are two distinct problems with Herder’s metaphor.  First, it seems to violate 
his principle of evaluating each culture only by its own standards and eschewing the 
imposition of a schema of evaluation expressive of the standards and ideals of another 
culture.28  Herder claims not only that the people of the ancient Middle East stand in a 
relationship to eighteenth-century European civilization analogous to that which 
childhood stands to being elderly, but also that the majority of non-European cultures are 
                                                
26 DKV 4: 15-6, 21, 26, and 29. 
27 DKV 4: 100-1.  See also Book 15 of Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte, and Herder’s discussion in 
Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität, tenth collection, letter 114, of the Native American who stated that 
he did not want to go to a heaven where there are white people.  The latter passage is discussed in detail in 
Robert Bernasconi, "“Ich mag in keinen Himmel, wo Weisse sind“: Herder’s critique of Eurocentrism," 
Acta Institutionis Philosophiae et Aestheticae 13 (1995).  For a thorough discussion of Herder’s attitude 
towards imperialism, see Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), chapter 6. 
28 For more on this point, see also Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition, 136-7. 
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in a state of childhood.29   This implies that there is one form of development that is 
natural or good for all human civilizations and ignores the possibility of not only 
divergent, but deeply incommensurable, courses of development for different peoples.  
Herder encourages charity in the judgment and evaluation of forms of life different from 
one’s own, but the developmental metaphor implies that the differences between the 
cultures evaluated is akin to evaluating different stages of a linear development. 
A second problem is that Herder’s account seems to potentially provide a kind of 
justification of imperialism, despite his intention to condemn it.  Sonia Sikka argues 
persuasively that the developmental metaphor itself is ethnocentric through its depiction 
of modern European society as an adult in contrast with other purportedly less developed 
societies.  Such a conception can serve to justify of the domination of one society by 
another.30   There is nothing objectionable about an adult acting as an authority over a 
child in her care.  If cultures are capable of standing in an analogous relationship to one 
another, then the control of one by another would appear prima facie to be justifiable.31  
Hence, there is both the danger of imposing an inapt schema onto material for which it is 
not suited, and also the danger of reviving the ethnocentrism that Herder aims to critique 
by characterizing those unlike modern Europeans as immature creatures in need of 
guidance.   
Though the leading metaphor employed by Herder is problematic in these ways, 
there is nevertheless an insight contained in Herder’s argument that does not depend on 
                                                
29 DKV 4: 89. 
30 Sikka, Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference, pp. 106-16. 
31 A strategy of justification similar to this was, in fact, employed by ideologists of the British Empire, such 
as Henry Maine.  See Mahmood Mamdani, Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012). and Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the 
Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).. 
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the problematic features of Herder’s metaphor of linear organic development.  This is 
that every culture and age has its own needs and goals, and moreover that the moral 
values and practices found in these ages tend to be ones that serve these.  For example, 
Herder argues that the Egyptians needed to develop formal systems of law and the virtues 
of diligence and civic loyalty in order to build an agricultural as opposed to a nomadic 
civilization.32   The need for these particular virtues and values arose from living in 
conditions which required steady labor in the same location over an extended period of 
time.  Herder argues that this explains the differences between the values of the Egyptians 
and those of the nomadic and shepherding societies of the ancient Middle East who did 
not have the same challenges to meet.  The latter did not need the kinds of diligence and 
loyalty to a city because their form of life did not require it.  For those societies, familial 
loyalty took precedence over loyalty to any other form of community because the family 
was the social center of gravity.  Herder tells the same kind of story about the values and 
virtues of the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and the other societies who contributed to 
the development of modern European culture.    Herder’s account of each of the peoples 
he examines is meant to provide evidence for the general thesis that “all formation 
[Bildung] arose out of the most particular individual needs and returned back to it – 
genuine experience, action, application of life, in the most determinate circle.“33  
Herder’s view, thus, is that it is crucial to see that each civilization has a set of 
aims and needs which it seeks to realize or satisfy.  Any adequate interpretation of the 
virtues and values of a culture must explain how they developed in response to those aims 
                                                
32 DKV 4: 19-24. 
33 DKV 4: 68. 
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and needs.34   This is a dynamic and ongoing process of development, as the capacities 
developed by a civilization also contribute to the development of new needs and 
purposes, which then bring about important new changes within a culture.  Often these 
developments have an impact on other cultures, which make them their own as they 
attempt to satisfy new goals and to realize new purposes.   
The appropriation of elements of one society or age by another is a creative 
process, not merely a mimetic one.  Herder notes, for example, that Phoenicians 
developed advanced nautical skills in order to satisfy their desire for wealth.  The practice 
of trading brought them into contact with many other civilizations.  This led to a desire 
for a broader understanding of the world, which in turn laid the groundwork for the 
development of Greek civilization, which itself valued intellectual understanding and the 
fine arts.35   As the Greeks developed these talents, they came to value very different 
things than the Phoenicians did.  As a result of these different needs and interests, the 
Phoenician virtues and skills appropriated by the Greeks were stamped with a Greek 
character and transformed into distinctly Greek virtues. 
Herder identifies similar transformations and chains of influence throughout his 
text, all with the purpose of establishing the general point that the needs, capacities and 
abilities found in any culture are the result of a process of historical development and 
formation of persons in response to their needs and desires.  Each people develops the 
material prepared for it by prior generations, and this is done in response to the needs 
                                                
34 DKV 4: 19-24. 
35 DKV 4: 24-6 and 29-30. 
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and desires that arise from their own particular circumstances.  This means that each 
culture is both connected to others and is also inimitable, individual, and unique.36 
 
V 
 
The interpretation of Herder developed here brings to light several important 
features of Herder’s genealogical method.  First, Herder does not deal only with the 
surface characteristics of the moral values of the groups he studies.  He asks about the 
role that the ways of living and valuing play with regard to supporting the survival and 
development of each society.  The goodness of a particular form of life and the values 
embedded in it are appraised according to the contribution that those values make to the 
development of the capacities that each people needed to develop in order to live well.  
That is, values are not assessed as true or false, but as favorable or unfavorable to a 
people’s attempts to perfect and improve themselves in their historical context.  It is also 
important, within Herder’s approach to the historical development of the values of 
various cultures, to understand why particular values took root in some times and places, 
and why these same values ceased to be dominant in other times and places.  This means 
that in order to understand the values and virtues of a society, as well as the institutions 
which support them, one must look at the conditions which led each society to develop in 
just the way that it did. It would be both unhelpful and uninformative to assess these 
societies according the values of other, later ages.  Practicing the correct form of moral 
inquiry thus requires paying attention not only to what individuals do and say, but also to 
                                                
36 DKV 4: 35.  Beiser discusses how this idea has its origin in Herder’s early aesthetic works.  See Beiser, 
The German Historicist Tradition, pp. 106-9. 
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the historical background conditions which shapes the characters of individuals, and the 
role that values play in the development of cultures and societies. 
Second, one of the central purposes of Herder’s genealogy is to show that the 
particular values dominant in eighteenth-century Europe are themselves the product of 
historical development.  One of the differences between Auch eine Philosophie der 
Geschichte and the later Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit is that the 
history narrated in the former text deals exclusively with the civilizations that contributed 
to the development of modern European culture, whereas in the latter Herder broadens 
his scope in an attempt to understand the historical development of humanity as a 
whole.37  This can be seen by the material that Herder includes in his historical sketch, as 
well as through what he excludes.  This is why there is a discussion of Greece and Rome, 
but not of China.  Herder’s aim is to provide an account of the origins of Enlightenment 
Europe.  It is a narrative which is supposed to reveal the dependence of that society on 
prior cultural forms.  This leads to the third purpose of this genealogy. 
It is clear throughout Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte that Herder is 
critiquing a particular strand of Enlightenment thought.  His specific target is the kind of 
Enlightenment history which presents all or most past societies as contemptible for failing 
to have the values of modern European.  Herder’s genealogy offers two challenges to 
such positions.  First, he attempts to show that the societies despised by his 
                                                
37 That Herder’s focus in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte is the Europe of the era of enlightenment 
is noted, but its significance is not explained, in Benno von Wiese, Herder: Grundzüge seines Weltbildes 
(Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1939), 81. 
 This is also noted in Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, 394.  Meinecke claims that this 
reveals Herder to be the forerunner of the kind of world history practiced by Leopold von Ranke.  
However, Meinecke seems unaware that there is a tension between claiming that the history one is writing 
is a world history and the history of one’s own culture. 
Beiser is thus mistaken in claiming that in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, “all epochs and 
cultures are linked together in a continuum where earlier stages are the basis for the growth of the later 
ones” Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition, 136.  
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contemporaries possessed many praiseworthy features that eighteenth-century Europe 
lacks.  The Romans possessed the courage and vigor that was necessary for and nurtured 
by their military pursuits, but the age of the Enlightenment is by comparison enervated 
through the excessive development of its intellectual capacities.38  The admirable 
qualities of many past ages are ignored by the typical philosophe to the detriment of his 
grasp of the true character of those historical ages and, consequently, what is most 
distinctive of his own age.  The second critical aspect of Herder’s genealogy is even more 
important.  It involves showing that the forms of life of the past historical periods he 
examines were necessary for the development of modern European morality.  That is, the 
very same cultures treated with vehement derision in standard Enlightenment histories 
were necessary for the development of the ages which are admired by the typical 
Aufklärer, including the age of Enlightenment itself.   The Greeks, praised as the model 
of excellence by thinkers such as Shaftesbury and Winckelmann, could not have become 
what they were if they had not been able to develop upon the accomplishments of their 
predecessors such as the Egyptians.39   And closer to home, the very values which a 
Voltaire or Boulanger thought were evidence of their utter superiority to past ages are 
actually revealed, when one takes up a proper historical outlook, to be a sign of their 
dependence on those past ages. 
 
VI 
 
                                                
38 DKV 4: 30-2 and 64. 
39 DKV 4: 22-4. 
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Herder’s genealogy is a precedent of the kind practiced by Nietzsche insofar as it 
aims to reveal the conditions required for the development of different forms of morality.  
Some of the distinctive features of Herder’s genealogy will be made more apparent, 
however, by noting explicitly some of the similarities and differences between their 
respective methods and aims.40 
A first similarity between Herder and Nietzsche is that they both seek to alter the 
self-image of their own society by calling into question a dominant narrative about their 
own age’s greatness.  Herder challenges the idea that European civilization is a pure and 
unmitigated improvement upon all societies which preceded it by showing both how 
those societies were necessary for the development of modern European society and also 
possessed virtues which modern European society lacks.  Nietzsche challenges the idea 
that the morality of modern European society, especially Christian morality, consists of a 
pure form of lovingness by tracing its origin to forms of hatred and ressentiment that are 
still embodied, in a sublimated form, in its doctrines and precepts.41  The history 
presented in each of these genealogies thus has the intent of changing the self-
understanding of the present. 
Another point of commonality is that both attempt to show that their 
contemporaries’ objects of condemnation were actually essential to the development of 
the values appealed to in condemning the practices or actions in question.  On Herder’s 
account, a hierarchical society of obedience and authority in the ancient Middle East was 
needed for the emergence of the beautiful art of Ancient Greece, as well as for the 
                                                
40 I am here attempting only to make a few general observations about Nietzsche’s methods in Zur 
Genealogie der Moral in particular, not the entirety of his oeuvre.   
For another discussion that makes the case for Herder’s priority to Nietzsche in this sphere, see 
Forster, "Genealogy.". 
41 Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung, §8. 
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development of the intellectual sophistication, the increase in individual freedom, and the 
advancement of the sciences in modern European society.  To admire the latter and 
despise the former without qualification is to be ignorant about the importance of the 
former for the origin of the latter.  Nietzsche’s account of the origin of the Christian ideal 
of the love of one’s enemy as a product of the hatred of enemies that could not be 
realized through action is supposed to reveal a similar ignorance underlying the self-
understanding of modern Christians.42  Both of these accounts are developed in order to 
give reasons for thinking that a particular moral outlook has its origins in the very things 
condemned by that outlook. These histories are part of a project of reevaluation of both 
the present moral outlook and the historical form of morality commonly condemned.  
A third common feature of these genealogies is that they both rest on the notion 
that moral systems are the products of the needs and histories of the societies in which 
they are found.  Understanding morality hence requires both an awareness of this history, 
as well as of the aspects of human nature that make human beings capable of having a 
history.  The discussion above has shown that this idea is of crucial importance for 
Herder.  Nietzsche is more explicit in claiming that the aim of his genealogy is to discover 
the conditions of the origin of various forms of moral thinking, this being the preparatory 
task for a critique and evaluation of the values inherent in them.43  
The similarities enumerated above show that both Herder and Nietzsche are 
interested in understanding and explaining what Nietzsche described as the “conditions 
                                                
42 Though a common theme throughout the Genealogie, the most forceful case is made by Nietzsche’s 
quotation of Tertullian in §15 of the first essay.  See also Jenseits von Gut und Böse, §2.  This idea is 
helpfully discussed by Christopher Janaway in his interpretation of the second essay of Zur Genealogie der 
Moral in Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 124-42. 
43 Zur Genealogie der Moral, Vorrede, §6. 
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and circumstances out of which [moral values] have grown.”44  Yet, that Herder 
preceded Nietzsche in doing so, belies Nietzsche’s claim to be without precedent on this 
score and that this was “knowledge of a kind that has until now neither existed nor even 
been desired.”  Nietzsche stands as the beneficiary of a tradition of historically-inflected 
German philosophical thought inaugurated by Herder.  This is not to say that Nietzsche’s 
genealogy was simply appropriated from Herder.  Nietzsche’s adaptation of genealogy 
was a creative one, even if his claims to originality are overstated.  The differences 
between the genealogies conducted by each of these thinkers are thus instructive for 
understanding the range of possible manifestations that a form of inquiry such as this can 
take.   
To begin with, Herder makes a greater effort to ground his genealogy in historical 
facts.  While the history narrated in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte is admittedly 
sketchy, Herder fills out his account in much more detail in his later work, Ideen zur 
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.  And though there are important differences 
between the Ideen and Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, in both texts Herder is 
committed to explaining the variations between the moral practices and beliefs of various 
cultures on the basis of their historical context.   
Herder makes it clear which ages and cultures he is referring to, whereas some of 
Nietzsche’s historical allusions are far from clear, if they intended to refer to a specific 
historical age at all.  For example, the account of the origin of the concept of guilt out of 
a combination of the concept of debt and of practices of punishment in the second essay 
of the Zur Genealogie der Moral does not seem to be intended to offer a history of 
                                                
44 Zur Genealogie der Moral, Vorrede, §6. 
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specific, documentable events.45  That discussion is especially opaque in that it concerns 
events alleged to take place at an unspecified period of time in an unspecified place.  It 
seems that in such cases Nietzsche is relying solely on the psychological plausibility of his 
account, in a manner similar to the pseudo-history Rousseau offers in the Discourse on 
the Origins of Inequality.  Being attentive to historical detail is thus integral to Herder’s 
project in a way that it is not for Nietzsche.  Herder’s form of genealogy thus has a much 
stronger claim to the attention of those who are genuinely convinced that understanding 
the moral values of an age requires an understanding of its history.  Nietzsche’s claim to 
offer an account of the conditions out of which modern European morality developed 
rings hollow, if this account is supposed to be grounded in an account of the actual 
history of those values. 
A second difference concerns the kind of lesson that each philosopher believes is 
to be drawn from the historical and mutable nature of human values.  For Herder, 
history shows that there is progress of a kind, guided by divine foresight.  While there is 
much that he laments about his own age, Herder takes heart from his examination of 
history, concluding his text with an exhortation to take hope that what comes next will be 
good in its own way, and also that each age has its place and purpose.46  In the 
scholarship, much attention is given to Herder’s critical attitude towards the Whig 
histories of the Enlightenment, but there is also a form of self-criticism and a lesson being 
                                                
45 One additional piece of evidence for this is that the majority of Nietzsche scholars do not even bother to 
consider the actual historicity of Nietzsche’s account.  For example, in the following recent collections, 
there is not a single discussion in any of the essays concerning the historical veracity or plausibility of 
Nietzsche’s second essay of Zur Genealogie der Moral: Simon May, ed. Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of 
Morality: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Richard Schacht, ed. 
Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1994).  
46 DKV 4: 107. 
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taught to critics of the age of enlightenment, such as himself.  About his own age, Herder 
says, “This too is fate.”47  History, according to Herder, shows that values move and 
change, but not that the changes that take place serve no purpose.  The purpose of 
history is not a human, but a divine one, and all events are meaningful when considered 
from the proper vantage point.  Nietzsche, by contrast, sees history as offering a warning 
and a danger, but not a providential promise that all will be well in the end.  Nietzsche 
fears that the age he lives in is threatened by nihilism, a sense that all is meaningless, that 
there is nothing worth affirming, and his own philosophical project is to develop an 
alternative to nihilism that does not require religious faith.48  Herder’s optimism is 
plausible only because of his theology, his reliance on a belief that the world is the 
creation of a God which guarantees that the world is fundamentally good.49  Hence, to 
those who are not persuaded by a Christian account of history as governed by a 
benevolent providence, but are instead inclined to believe that history is a series of 
naturally determined events without a transcendental purpose, Herder’s optimism will 
                                                
47 DKV 4: 90. Tino Markworth discusses how Herder’s writing of the essay was, in part, a response to a 
personal existential crisis undergone in the early 1770s. See  "Das “Ich“' und die Geschichte. Zum 
Zusammenhang von Selbstthematisierung und Geschichtsphilosophie bei J.G. Herder.".  The discovery of 
meaning in history was meant to offer a way for a critic of his age, such as himself, to accept and make 
peace with his own fate.  There is a trace of stoicism in this idea, and Herder’s selection of a quotation from 
Epictetus to serve as the epigraph to Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte is significant. 
48 This issue is central to understanding Nietzsche.  A valuable recent discussion of this issue can be found 
in Bernard Reginster, The Affirmation of Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
49 Ernst Cassirer calls Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte “die tiefste Fassung der 
Theodizeegedankens.” Ernst Cassirer, Freiheit und Form (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1922), 185..  For a 
similar view, see Rudolf Haym, Herder: Nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken, 2 vols. (Berlin: Rudolf 
Gaertner, 1877-85), 1: 540..  Rudolf Stadelmann, Der historische Sinn bei Herder (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 
1928), 21-2. denies that Herder intends to offer a theodicy, but only by claiming that Herder aims to show 
how history could be a Wissenschaft.  Stadelmann does not consider the possibility, however, that these 
may not have been regarded as mutually exclusive by Herder.   
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seem nothing more than wishful thinking, as it is only sustainable by his falling back on 
appeals to a belief that God is at work in the course of nature and history.50   
A final difference between the genealogies offered by Herder and Nietzsche is that 
Nietzsche attends more to the different kinds of values in competition with one another 
within any particular society, and considers these conflicts to be crucial for understanding 
historical change.  This is evident in Nietzsche’s account of the inversion of the values of 
the noble and powerful through the “slave revolt in morality.”51  Such a revolt was the 
product of social division and conflict between different groups within the same society.  
Nietzsche’s genealogy makes the conflict within a particular society central to his 
explanation of the conditions out of which moral values grow.    
Herder, on the other hand, tends to write as if the societies he discusses are 
internally more uniform and possess only common, and not conflicting, interests and 
ways of thinking.52  This is a weakness affecting Herder’s account, for it fails to note the 
way that internal conflicts operate within societies, often being the engines of historical 
change, and also how different classes or groups within a society may themselves have 
very different values and manners of thinking.  Nietzsche thus has a richer account of 
                                                
50 The importance of providence in Auch eine Philosophie der Geshichte is also noted by Beiser, The 
German Historicist Tradition, 137-40.  A helpful general account of the importance of religion for Herder 
can be found in Benjamin D. Crowe, "Herder’s Moral Philosophy: Perfectionism, Sentimentalism, and 
Theism," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, no. 6 (2012): 1155-9.  For a thorough 
discussion of Herder’s changing religious and theological attitudes in the time during which he authored 
Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, see Haym, Herder: Nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken, 1: 
453ff. 
51 Zur Genealogie der Moral, Erste Abhandlung, §10. 
52 Meinecke and Adler both claim that Herder’s history is moved by contradictions in a dialectical manner 
anticipatory of Hegel (and, for Adler, Marx).  See Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, 393; Emil 
Adler, Herder und die deutsche Aufklärung (Vienna: Europa, 1968), 140-3. However, both ignore that the 
only tensions and contradictions discussed by Herder in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte are between 
different ages and societies, not within them.  
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how these dynamics can operate within a society, being as attentive as he is to the 
importance of power differences.53    
 
VII 
 
In fact, this is one of the weakest aspects of Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte.  
To see this more clearly, it is worth returning to Herder’s account of the role played by 
the society of the ancient Middle East in his historical narrative.  Herder avers that the 
disciplinary and autocratic character of that period of time was necessary for bringing 
about the discipline, and ingraining the habits, required for later forms of civilization to 
emerge.  These later stages were not as authoritarian and were able to develop virtues 
other than obedience, loyalty, and piety, but only because the human character had been 
shaped as it had by the early forms of discipline.  The capacity for freedom, which is one 
of the admirable elements of later ages, especially the Enlightenment, could thus only 
emerge because of this earlier disciplinary form of life.   
There are several problems that affect the plausibility of this account.  In a society 
such as Herder describes, it is reasonable to think that there will be stark differences 
between those who command and those who obey.  Supposing that the moral education 
necessary to produce later civilizations occurs in such a society, which class of this society 
is supposed to have the necessary form of character?  Is it those in authority or those 
                                                
53 This is why Herder could not have even possibly been as great of an influence on the kind of genealogy 
practiced by Michel Foucault as Nietzsche was.  Foucault attempted to trace historical shifts by examining 
the nature and effects of power within particular historical epochs, and this required looking at the 
divisions, differences, and inequalities within the epochs being studied.  On Foucault’s debt to Nietzsche, 
see Michel Foucault, "Nietsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Counter-Memory, and Practice: 
Selected Interviews and Essays (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980). 
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subject to it?  Likewise, one could ask which aspect of social life is most significant and 
influential: the tendency to obey or the tendency to rule?  If there is a third option, that 
these come to be synthesized in some way, how is this done and how can it be 
recognized?  Herder’s discussion seems to assume that it is the aspects of human 
character that are cultivated by obedience that are inherited by later ages, but why these 
specific traits and capacities are passed on is not explained.  Such important questions are 
left unanswered, as Herder seems to assume that there is a single set of traits that holds 
for both the patriarchs and their subjects.      
 The weakness in Herder’s account of the patriarchal societies he discusses also 
affects, I believe, his account of later ages.  His account of the Egyptians, Greeks, and 
Romans omit any but the most cursory mentions of slavery or other forms of class 
differences in those societies.  The problems arising from this are twofold.  Herder is 
unable to account for the internal differences within these societies, and it is not unlikely 
that the intellectual and practical horizon of the members of the slave class will be 
different from that of the masters.  Also, Herder’s history in this early phase lacks any 
clear sense of the way in which such internal tensions can serve as dynamics of historical 
change.  
 While Herder’s Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte is significant for the birth of 
the kind of historically-inflected philosophy characteristic of much of the German 
tradition of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, its overlooking of the significance of 
conflict and differences within each society is salient.  Herder’s later Ideen zur 
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit pays more attention to the oppressive 
character of many of the societies examined.  Yet even there, the internal differences and 
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conflicts are not treated as of central importance to historical change.  In this respect, 
Herder is surpassed by the work of thinkers who grappled with the role that intra-societal 
conflict plays in shaping each society and in driving history, such as Hegel, Marx, and 
Nietzsche.  Herder’s influence, both direct and indirect, on those thinkers, was 
substantial.  But the new historical approach pioneered by Herder had to be refined and 
developed by later generations. 
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Chapter 4: Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele 
 
 
Sokrates rief die Weltweisen vom Himmel herunter: ein zweiter Sokrates hob das Erdenkind zur 
Bürgerin des Himmels empor.  Die wahre Wißenschaft wird That wie es die höchste Politik wird 
und nur das ist gesunde Menschheit, glückseliges Erdgeschlecht wo Erkenntnis und Empfindung 
als Seel‘ und Körper, als Himmel und Erde, als Mann und Weib sich küßen und bringen Frucht. 
   
Herder, Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele, SWS 8: 333 
 
 
I 
 
Herder’s Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele is of paramount 
importance for the study of Herder’s ethical thought.1  It contains a synthesis of his moral 
psychology, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.  
The essay challenges moral psychological views that pose a sharp distinction between 
thought and emotion, or intellect and feeling, making it an important precursor of recent 
work that has sought to undermine such a dualism.2  To privilege either feeling or 
                                                 
1 In this chapter, I cite the versions of the text that appear in volume 8 of Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämtliche Werke, 
ed. Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877-1913).  There are three significant drafts of the text, and 
Herder altered the title with each draft.  The first was written in 1774 with the title Uebers Erkennen und Empfinden 
in der Menschlichen Seele.  The second, heavily revised and extended, was completed in 1775 with the title Vom 
Erkennen und Empfinden, den zwo Hauptkräften der Menschlichen Seele.  The final draft, which was submitted to 
the Berlin Academy in 1778 for a competition on the topic of the relationship between Erkennen and Empfinden.  
Herder’s text was not awarded the prize.  The final version was given the title Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der 
menschlichen Seele.  Bemerkungen und Träume.   
 In this chapter, I refer to the text simply as Vom Erkennen und Empfinden.  My interpretation is based 
primarily on the 1775 and 1778 versions.  I do not believe that there is any conflict between the two texts, though I 
will note where there are differences in presentation. 
2 While contemporary readers are likely to think of the views of Hume and Kant as representative of dualistic 
theories, it was Sulzer whose views were of primary importance for Herder.   
For recent work challenging a rigid distinction between emotion and reason, see Ronald De Sousa, The 
Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Jerome Neu, A Tear is an Intellectual 
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abstract thought, Herder argues, is gravely mistaken as it attempts to sunder what is in 
reality one.  The text argues that each human being’s individuality ought to be developed 
into a harmonious whole, making it a precursor of the ethic of individuality that was 
developed by Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich Schiller, and the Frühromantiker.  It 
connects this emphasis on individuality with an account of the historical and social 
character of the human being, the result being a perfectionist ethic of individuality that is 
not atomistic. 
 As with the rest of Herder’s corpus, the existing literature that discusses Vom 
Erkennen und Empfinden, tends to neglect the ethical dimension of the text.3  In what 
follows, I will try to ameliorate this lack.  I begin my interpretation by explicating the 
concept of individuality presented in the text.  In doing so, I will discuss how Herder’s 
metaphysics and philosophy of mind ground the view that he develops.  I will then 
discuss the normative basis of this account of individuality, along with the ideal of 
harmonious development that Herder defends.  After that, I explore Herder’s account of 
human dependence, and his rejection of extreme forms of autonomy in light of his theory 
of individuality.  Finally, I examine the place of the emotion of love in Herder’s account.  
Herder makes love a central part of not only human relationships, but even of our 
cognition of objects.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Thing: The Meanings of Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Anthony Damasio, Descartes' Error: 
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The 
Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Robert Solomon, The Passions: Emotions 
and the Meaning of Life, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996); Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing 
Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
3 The most thorough discussion of Vom Erkennen und Empfinden is Marion Heinz, Sensualistischer Idealismus 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994), chapter 5.  Other valuable discussions are Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 145-9; Rudolf Haym, Herder: Nach seinem Leben und 
seinen Werken, 2 vols. (Berlin: Rudolf Gaertner, 1877-85), pp. 699-708.  
 
 
145 
 
II 
 
 
 Herder’s essay contains one of the fullest early expressions of what has been called 
the ethics of individuality.4  While Herder’s earlier works occasionally hint at this ideal, it 
is explicitly articulated and defended in Vom Erkennen und Empfinden.  The ethic of 
individuality is the notion that the ethical task for each human being is to become a 
unique individual, in which one’s various powers are developed and blended into a 
harmonious whole.  The dangers to be avoided, according to this theory, are uneven or 
imbalanced development of oneself and conformity to a form of life that is not fitted to 
one’s nature.  With respect to the first danger, the recommendation is to make oneself 
like a work of art, where every individual part contributes to the beauty of the whole.  
With respect to the second, the Delphic advice to “know thyself” and live according to 
one’s nature is marshalled against the demands of conformity and utility.5  
Herder’s conception of individuality is premised on a view of nature, which he 
believes offers a reason for believing that every human being is utterly unique: 
...it is, I think, the flattest opinion that has ever entered into a paperhead 
[Papierkopf] that all human souls are alike, that they all come into the world as flat 
empty tablets.  No two grains of sand are like one another, let alone such rich 
                                                 
4 This position is most closely associated with the early German Romantics.  See, e.g., Schleirmacher, Monologen, 
II, in Friedrich Schleiermacher, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Gunter Meckenstock and et. al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1984-), I/3.; and Schlegel,  Ideen and Vorlesungen über die Transzendentalphilosophie, included in Friedrich 
Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe, ed. Ernst Behler, Jean Jacques Anstett, and Hans Eichner 
(München: Schöningh, 1958-), volumes II and XII.   
 The ideal is probably most clearly expressed by Wilhelm von Humboldt: “Der wahre Zweck des 
Menschen…ist die höchste und proportionierlichste Bildung seiner Kräfte zu einem Ganze.”  Ideen zu einem 
Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1967), p. 22. 
 The interpretation I develop here runs counter to the claim of Frank McEachran that Herder undervalued 
individuality.  See Frank McEachran, The Life and Philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1939), p. 65.  
5 The early German Romantics, on these grounds, were thoroughly opposed to the ethics of duty advanced by Kant 
and Fichte because it was an ethics that demanded the same kinds of acts from all persons.  On this, see Frederick C. 
Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), pp. 25-30 and 92-3.  
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germs and abysses of forces [Kräfte] as two human souls – or I have hardly any 
idea of the word ‘human soul’.6   
 
As even the seemingly simplest inorganic entities in nature are unique, we have reason for 
believing that this is even more likely in the case of a human soul.  This entails a rejection 
of the Lockean conception of the mind, according to which all minds are alike at birth 
and only differ with respect to the experiences that are imprinted on them.7  This initial 
claim about the unique character of each individual is further supported by other aspects 
of Herder’s account of the human soul and human physiology. 
The soul, according to Herder, is not an inert receptacle or passive medium.  
Rather, each human soul is composed of a variety of dynamic forces and no two such 
souls have precisely the same forces.8  These forces are the basis of a person’s character, 
as well as of the various human capacities that are expressed in action.  While these forces 
require the right kind of environment and external opportunities to be developed, a 
person’s character is the product of the interplay between their innate powers, their 
environment, and their personal history.  Neither innate powers nor environmental 
stimuli alone are sufficient for the development of a person’s character and talents.  This 
means that the genesis of human character required both the dispositions produced by 
the innate forces in an agent’s soul, and the experiences that one has over the course of 
one’s life.  Hence, one-sided theories which exclude the contributions of either innate 
                                                 
6 SWS 8: 226. 
7 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 104.  Even 
if one were to consider the metaphor of the blank slate employed by Locke, Herder would also contend that no two 
slates are identical for one who attends closely.   
8 SWS 8: 192.  The same claims are made in the 1775 edition as well, see SWS 8: 317.  Some of these ideas are also 
discusses in Herder’s earlier works, as I argue in chapter 2.  
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capacities or environmental influence are rejected by Herder as inadequate accounts of 
human nature and individual character.9   
In addition to this metaphysical conception of the soul, Herder offers an argument 
for uniqueness on the basis of human physiology.10  Herder discusses the physiological 
basis of individuality in the first division of Vom Erkennen and Empfinden.  He argues 
there that each human being has a distinct physiological structure and is placed into a 
unique position in the world.11  The physiological structure, grounded in the soul’s forces 
[Kräfte], enables persons to engage with objects in the world, and is the basis of each 
individual’s character.12   The basis of all sensation is a capacity for irritation or Reiz, a 
tendency to respond to objects by which one is affected.  This capacity for irritation 
grounds the more articulate and conceptually laden capacity for sensation.  The 
sensations are also themselves, when refined by apperceptive reflection, the source of all 
human cognition and reason.  Hence, each individual’s physiology structures how she or 
he experiences and understands the world. 
However, the way in which one’s experiences are understood by each person are 
shaped not only by their physiological constitution, but also by the understanding of the 
world that each person has internalized through their individual history, social position, 
and language (these latter two are shaped by the broader history of society, according to 
Herder).13  Due to the complex interaction between each person’s intricate physiology 
and the environment into which she or he is placed, no two human beings will have the 
                                                 
9 As is discussed below, this means that Leibniz’s conception of windowless monads is subject to criticism along 
with Locke’s blank slate theory of the mind. 
10 The account of the soul and the account of physiology are complementary, according to Herder.   
11 SWS 8: 316. 
12 SWS 8: 317. 
13 SWS 8: 316.  
 
 
148 
 
same character.  There will be greater similarities between those whose bodies are similar, 
as well as those who share a culture and environment.  Nonetheless, differences in body 
and individual experience still set each individual apart from all others.14   
Also underlying Herder’s conception of the uniqueness of each person is his 
adaptation of Leibniz’s conception of individual substances.15  Though Herder 
vehemently rejects the theory of pre-established harmony, he endorses Leibniz’s view that 
each individual mind is unlike any other and was placed into a unique position in the 
world by divine providence.16   According to Leibniz, each individual is distinct from 
every other, and no two are exactly alike with respect to all of their properties.  If any two 
persons were to have every property in common, then they would not be distinguishable 
and would, in fact, not be distinct.17  Each person thus has a ‘notion’, such that if one 
were to grasp the notion fully, one would know everything about that person, including 
all of the actions that the person will perform, the experiences they will undergo, as well 
as their relationship to all other existing things.  Leibniz uses the example of Alexander 
the Great, and holds that one who had a complete grasp of Alexander’s notion would 
have knowledge of every detail of Alexander’s life.  According to Leibniz, such a perfect 
grasp is not possible for finite, human intellects, but it is possible for God.  Each being is 
                                                 
14 In Herder’s later works, such as his Gott einige Gespräche of 1787, Herder continues to hold this view of 
individuality, as he says “Every created thing is defined with a most perfect individuality, and circumscribed by it.”  
SWS 16: 488.  See, also, Herder’s essay of 1795, “Das eigene Schicksal”, DKV 8: 214ff. 
15 For more extensive discussions of Leibniz’s influence on Herder, see Nigel DeSouza, "Leibniz in the Eighteenth 
Century: Herder's Critical Reflections on the Principles of Nature and Grace," British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 20, no. 4 (2012); Catherine Wilson, "Leibniz’s Reputation in the Eighteenth Century: Kant and Herder," 
in Insiders and Outsiders in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. G.A.J. Rogers, Tom Sorell, and Jill Kraye 
(London: Routledge, 2010). 
16 For Leibniz’s account of the uniqueness of each substance, and each intellectual substance, see Discourse on 
Metaphysics, §9 and §13, included in G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989). 
17 See, e.g., Discourse on Metaphysics §9 and  Monadology §9. This is, of course, Leibniz’s principle of the identity 
of indiscernibles.  I discuss the principle here only as it applies to persons, though for Leibniz its application is much 
broader and applies to all substances. 
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so unique that it “is like a complete world and like a mirror of God or the whole 
universe.”18 
Herder does not employ Leibniz’s precise terms in his essay, but the connection to 
Leibniz’s argument is palpable.  In a passage infused with Leibnizian spirit, Herder 
declaims:  
All of God’s works are infinite.  Each is a sum of delectable [köstlicher] thoughts 
and forces [Kräfte], as sands of the sea: and if any would be developed, a universe. 
The human being, the first of his creatures here below, is in dispositions a small 
world…19   
 
In this passage, Herder claims that each individual is an infinitely complex whole, 
composed of a variety of forces which makes each being a world of its own.  This is a riff 
on Leibniz’s account of the identity of substances, and it is apparent that Herder is 
drawing on this, as he also describes the individual as a “small world”.20   
Herder’s account of individuality is thus the product of joining this Leibnizian 
view with his own account of the forces that are constitutive of each being.  This is the 
basis of the physiological account of individuality that is also present in the text.  
Together these form the basis for his view that each human being is a unique individual 
unlike any other.  However, these do not yet reveal the practical or ethical dimension of 
the account of individuality.   
 
III 
                                                 
18 Discourse on Metaphysics §9. 
19 SWS 8: 314. 
20 Haym contends that, in the first edition of the work: “The spirit of the Leibnizian philosophy pervades it from one 
end to the other.  Yes, it is nothing other than a summation of this philosophy in the reflection of the Herderian 
spirit.”  Haym, Herder: Nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken, vol. 1, p. 665. Though I think Haym exaggerates the 
case a bit in saying that the text is “nothing other” than a reflection of Leibniz’s ideas, he is correct that the influence 
of Leibniz runs deep through in this work.   
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In Herder’s text, the central part of his account of individuality appears in the 
midst of a discussion of the concept of genius.  The normative dimension of his 
conception of individuality can be more fully illuminated if we approach it by attending 
to his explication of this idea.  Herder rejects the concept of genius that he believed was 
common among his contemporaries.  On this view, genius is a rare capacity possessed by 
only a small handful of individuals to excel in one talent.  The talents regarded as 
significant, moreover, are those utilized by artists, scientists, and other intellectuals.  
Herder believes that there are two striking problems with this view. 
First, it ignores the natural talents of human beings who are not scientists, artists, 
or poets.  This is a fault because there are numerous talents at which persons can excel 
that are thus not recognized by such accounts.  A farmer who plants and harvests 
exercises a variety of skills in plying his trade, yet the standard eighteenth-century 
account of genius treats such human activity as if it required no thought or sensitivity 
whatsoever.21  This is false, however, as such talents also require the development of 
human powers and can be exercised with varying levels of expertise.  A large range of 
valuable and admirable human activity is thus excluded from consideration by the kind of 
theory rejected by Herder. 
                                                 
21 At SWS 8: 223, Herder specifically criticizes Thomas Gray for denigrating the life of a farmer compared to a poet 
in “Elegy Written in a Country Church-Yard.”  While Herder may be correct that there was a general tendency on 
the part of many intellectuals to despise persons who practice ordinary crafts, he seems to have misread Gray’s 
poem.  While Gray does contrast the accomplishments of artists and the powerful with those who lead simpler lives, 
Gray’s tone is not supercilious.  Gray, in fact, writes against those who look down on the lives of poor farmers: “Let 
not Ambition mock their useful toil,/ Their homely joys, and destiny obscure;/ Nor Grandeur hear with a disdainful 
smile,/ The short and simple annals of the poor.”  Gray and Herder may differ in some ways, but Gray’s poem does 
not have the sense that Herder attributes to it.  The “Elegy Written in a Country Church-Yard” is included in 
Thomas Gray, Poems (London: J. Dodsley, 1768). 
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To speak as if only if intellectuals or statesmen are capable of having genius, 
Herder claims, involves taking for granted the social fragmentation of the modern age in 
which each person is assigned a narrow task.22  The concept of genius has been assumed 
to involve nothing more than an exaggerated ability in only a narrow range of these tasks 
– specifically those practiced by intellectuals.  Instead, one should have a broader 
conception of the range of human possibilities, according to Herder.  Once one achieves 
the correct perspective, he contends that one will see that all persons have genius to some 
degree.  The concept, if properly understood, is simply “the individual way of being 
human [Menschenart], which has been given by God.”23  This does not entail that there 
are no distinctions in excellence between persons.  Human powers or Kräfte differ in 
their extensiveness or intensity.  Each person may have capacities that are naturally more 
extensive or intensive.  The criticism Herder is making is directed towards thinkers who 
privilege one very narrow set of human practices and make them the exclusive paradigm 
of excellence.24   
A second problem Herder finds with the common conception of genius concerns 
its practical effects.  He avers that the emphasis on excellence in one area of human 
activity encourages the development of misshapen and unbalanced persons.  The paragon 
of genius on the standard account is a human being that has one of their capacities 
                                                 
22 Here there is an early criticism of the fragmentation of modern societies of the kind that is also made in Schiller’s 
Über die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen, Friedrich Schiller, Werke, Nationalausgabe, ed. L. Blumenthal and 
Benno von Wiese (Weimar: Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1943-1967), vol. XX. This issue is argued to be a central problem 
of modernity in Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985). 
23 SWS 8: 222. 
24 Herder can be seen here as reprising, in a way, some of the arguments that he made in his letters to Mendelssohn 
and in his comments on Spalding’s Die Bestimmung des Menschen discussed in chapter 2. 
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developed at the expense of the others.25  A person of this kind would be like a physicist 
who is unable to appreciate a poem or bake a loaf of bread.  Herder’s critique here is that 
such a form of character would not be admirable, but rather a “deformity 
[Unförmlichkeit]”.26   
By contrast, the optimal development of a human being is to be a well-balanced 
whole.  A genius, according to this conception would be “a well-formed [wohlgebildeter], 
healthy, forceful [kräftiger] person, living in his place, and intensely effective there.”27  
Being well-formed is explicitly contrasted with one who has one of their powers 
developed in such a way that it stands out over and against the person’s other capacities, 
making the person’s character disharmonious.  In using the term ‘kräftiger’, Herder is 
explicitly drawing on his conception of the soul as constituted by a set of Kräfte.  A 
‘kräftiger’ person would be one who has these powers developed and perfected, but to be 
well-developed as a whole these need to be developed in a balanced way so as to prevent 
the person from being either malformed or unhealthy.  Herder also suggests here that a 
person of this kind is able to “live in one’s place”, to fulfill the duties of one’s station and 
to see what is both appropriate and possible in the conditions in which one lives. 
In addition to criticizing the ideal contained in the notion of genius found among 
his contemporaries, Herder also criticizes the form of education that goes along with such 
a conception.  Herder argues that the better, richer, and more balanced kind of person 
                                                 
25 It is unclear to me that any actual thinker holds the view that Herder criticizes here.  Most significantly, Sulzer 
also argues that genius requires a combination of talents being developed to a high degree, and not one talent or 
capacity exclusively.  See “Entwickelung des Begriffs vom Genie”, Vermischte Philosophische Schriften, vol. 1 
(Leipzig: Weidmann, 1782), pp. 314-5.       
26 SWS 8: 223.  In the 1775 edition, Herder claims that such one-sided development is “Mißbildung”, SWS 8: 325.  
27 SWS 8: 223-4.  I mostly follow Forster’s translation of this passage. 
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tends to develop more slowly.28  In an echo of Rousseau’s Emile, Herder claims that the 
hastened development of young people in the modern world brings out even good 
qualities only in a superficial, and consequently a delible, way.  Becoming a well-
balanced, harmonious personality will take more time and patience than becoming a 
shallower and malformed person with one narrow talent developed to an extreme.   
In describing a person as one-sided or malformed, Herder must rely on a 
conception of natural or complete development.  This conception of the natural cannot 
be merely something that is in accord with the laws of nature as such, for no object of our 
experience is unnatural in this sense.  Rather, Herder must be relying on a normative 
conception of the natural intended to provide some kind of ideal in light of which he 
criticizes imbalanced forms of development and commends those who achieve harmony 
in their character.        
The discussion of genius in the 1775 edition is especially useful for understanding 
the normative character of Herder’s account.  The argument focuses on the relationship 
between the various excellences of mind that a person can develop.  Each of our various 
strengths of mind or character is in need of the others in order to be authentically 
realized: “Wit [Witz] without acumen [Scharfsinn] is half wit, as imagination without 
memory, as abstraction without attention, and overall vice versa.”29  A garrulous fool 
who banters ceaselessly is a pale imitation of genuine wit because such a person fails to be 
attentive to the details of a situation and fails to see what it is appropriate to respond to 
and what kinds of responses are most fitting.  This is the difference between actual 
cleverness and mere persiflage.   
                                                 
28 SWS 8: 227. 
29 SWS 8: 322.   
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Holding these powers to be mutually dependent does not require Herder to say 
that all excellent persons will be identical, or that they will have all talents of mind 
developed and balanced in precisely the same way.  It is to say, however, that each talent 
needs others to be developed and exercised to at least some degree, even if the entire host 
of powers are not all maximally developed.  There can still be excellent persons who tend 
to be more sensual, and others who tend toward abstract thinking, but these should be 
tendencies that predominate in a person’s character rather than qualities that completely 
eclipse or squelch their complements.  Herder can thus without contradiction endorse 
Pascal’s distinction between the two kinds of spirits – the mathematical and the intuitive 
– and regard both as healthy and good in their own way without contradicting himself.30  
There may be these two general kinds of character, each of which would has its own host 
of sub-species, but a person who is an excellent specimen of either type will need some of 
the talents characteristic of the other type in order for their own qualities to be both 
authentically excellent and durable. 
Herder is in part borrowing a line of argument from Sulzer, who also argues that 
in a person with genius each talent is balanced with and supported by the others.31  The 
key difference, however, is that while Sulzer simply argues that for the rare and 
exceptional genius all faculties will be developed, Herder goes further and attempts to 
show that there can be no authentic development of any individual talent in isolation 
from the others.  Herder’s argument is about the capacities as such, not only with respect 
to how the talents are combined in a handful of extraordinary persons.   
                                                 
30 Herder notes Pascal’s distinction in the 1778 edition of the text at SWS 8: 233.  In the 1775 edition, Pascal’s 
distinction is given a more prominent role, serving as an epigraph for the third division of the essay.  See SWS 8: 
314.  The passage from Pascal in question appears at Blaise Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings, trans. Honor Levi 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), XLII, sec. 669, pp. 149-50.  
31 Sulzer, Vermischte Philosophische Schriften, 1, "Entwickelung des Begriffs vom Genie", pp. 314-5. 
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The line of thought developed by Herder here is similar to the ancient doctrine of 
the unity of the virtues.  In the Protagoras, Plato contends that in order to possess any 
individual virtue, an agent must possess them all.32  This is because any virtue requires 
wisdom in order to be applied appropriately, but once one has wisdom one will also have 
all of the virtues concerning appropriate actions.  Aristotle also defends a thesis of this 
kind as well, holding that a virtuous agent is one who acts in the right way, at the right 
time, in the right place, and for the right reasons.  What enables an agent to act in this 
way is practical wisdom.  However, if an agent has practical wisdom, then they have a 
general capacity to act in the appropriate way in a variety of situations.  Because each 
virtue presupposes practical wisdom, and further the possession of practical wisdom 
entails that one possesses all of the other virtues of character, it follows that to have one 
virtue requires one to have all of the others.33  It is not clear if Herder was directly 
influenced by such ancient doctrines here, but at the least there is a structural similarity 
between the views.   
This appears to signal a departure, or perhaps deviation, from a line of thought 
advanced by Herder in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte.  There, Herder contended 
that for each virtue or strength that a person (or society) possesses, there is a 
corresponding weakness that serves as its necessary complement.  The courageous 
Roman was cruel and bloodthirsty, and the source of the cruelty and the courage were 
the same.  “Peak borders on valley,” as Herder expresses the point in that text.34  In Vom 
Erkennen und Empfinden, however, Herder attempts to forge a new ideal in which all 
                                                 
32 Included in Plato, Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
33  Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, ch. 13.  Included in volume 2 of Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
34 DKV 4: 37. 
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human excellences presuppose and reinforce one another.  Each excellence or virtue does 
not seem to require a corresponding weakness or vice, on this account.  The position 
developed in Vom Erkennen und Empfinden thus seems to contradict the one developed 
in the earlier works, and to thus signal a change in Herder’s views.   
In later texts, Herder seems to adhere to the position laid out in Vom Erkennen 
und Empfinden on this matter.  In the Ideen, for example, at one point Herder says that 
each individual’s nature has a maximum point of perfection towards which every one of 
their powers tends to converge.  Bringing one’s various powers to be unified and 
balanced in this way is the good towards which individuals should aim.  While he 
acknowledges that various forms of deficiency may be necessary steps towards reaching a 
balanced state (he compares imbalanced powers in a person to the swinging of a 
pendulum), the good and optimal state involves an agent having their capacities unified 
into a harmonious whole in which no one power dominates the others.35   
There may still be a way in which Herder’s account of the mutual dependence of 
talents and virtues is compatible with the earlier views found in texts such as Auch eine 
Philosophie der Geschichte.  Herder often shifts from discussions of individuals to 
cultures or peoples, and it may seem that what applies in his account of qualities in one 
case applies in the other.  However, the focus of Vom Erkennen und Empfinden is on the 
psychological constitution of individual persons and not on a social whole.  It may be that 
Herder believes that human excellences should be harmonized and balanced in an 
individual, but that in assessing the character of a Volk we should expect the virtues to be 
accompanied by vices at the level of the group. 
                                                 
35 Ideen, Bk, 15, ch. 3, DKV 6: 649-50.   
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An additional premise underlying the normative dimension of Herder’s conception 
of individuality and uniqueness is his conception of nature as divinely well-ordered. 
Because each person has a host of powers and abilities in them, these capacities must be 
present as a result of God’s will.  Genius, or the host of powers each individual is 
endowed with, itself is “’the individual way of being human [Menschenart], which has 
been given by God’, nothing more nor less.”36  The emphasis on the divine gift here is 
significant, and more than simply a rhetorical flourish. 
In the 1775 edition of the text, Herder claims that attending to only one aspect of 
humanity while ignoring the others is akin to a form of idolatry.37  Since God would not 
have given a person any capacity in vain, it follows that each capacity must be significant 
and intended to play a positive role in the economy of the human soul.  Developing all of 
one’s powers into a harmonious whole is thus a kind of piety, a heeding of the divine will 
for each individual.     
While there is a religious basis for this aspect of Herder’s view, the logic at work is 
not that of a divine command theory in which duties are determined by the prescriptions 
and proscriptions of an anthropomorphic deity.  Herder’s theological views are complex 
and can often be difficult to pin down, but such a conception of God is foreign to his 
conception of the divine.38  The evidence that God has intended us to be well-rounded 
                                                 
36 SWS 8: 222. 
37 “Das Hauptgesetz der frühen Erziehung sei also zu nähren Eins in Allem und Alles in Einem, die innere 
Thätigkeit und Elasticität der Seele.  Jede Einschränkung ist Gift und Verbeugung des Baumes, der nicht gerade in 
frischer Luft wachsen darf…Sie ist Abgötterei: mit ihr verblühet jede innere Kraft des Lebens….” SWS 8: 325-6, 
my emphasis.  See also 8: 332-3. 
38 A full discussion of Herder’s views cannot be given here.  Fuller discussions can be found in Martin Kessler, 
“Herder’s Theology”, in Hans Adler and Wulf Köpke, eds., A Companion to the Works of Johann Gottfried Herder 
(Rochester: Camden House, 2009).;  Sonia Sikka, Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 221-34.; Benjamin D. Crowe, "Herder’s Moral Philosophy: Perfectionism, 
Sentimentalism, and Theism," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, no. 6 (2012): pp. 1155-9.; Hans 
Dietrich Irmscher, Johann Gottfried Herder (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2001), pp. 29-33. 
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and holistically developed beings is that nature itself is law-governed and harmonious, 
and that persons are happier in a condition where their various powers are developed and 
brought into a proportionate balance.39  Even when speaking of God, the appeal is to the 
natural and the immanent, not to the supernatural and transcendent.  As Hans Dietrich 
Irmscher expresses this point, “Divine determination and natural development go hand 
in hand for Herder.”40   
Herder claims that “each inner force [Kraft] of life withers” if it is not developed 
in harmony with the other forces of the human being.41  Being as we are naturally 
determined to be is thus its own reward, and failing to be in such a condition its own 
punishment.  Herder endorses the stoic adage to “follow nature”, but this is understood 
to mean that we must guard against a disharmonious and uneven development of our 
powers and capacities.42  Herder even goes so far as to suggest that suicide can be 
explained as a condition wherein which a person has had their forces cut off from 
another, and from the environment that nurtures them.43  Each agent thus has an interest 
in pursuing the ideal of perfecting oneself into a balanced and harmonious whole. 
As was suggested above, Herder’s argument that every individual is a genius in 
some respect, and that each person ought to develop their powers into a harmonious 
                                                 
39 Herder presents his account of God most clearly in Gott, einige Gespräche, especially in the second dialogue.  See 
DKV 4:701-19.  It is very likely that Herder’s conception of how God preserves, and is revealed by, the order of 
nature is very likely influenced by Shaftesbury, especially The Moralists: A Philosophical Rhapsody, 
Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 3 vols. (London: Purser, 1732; repr., Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 2001).  This in turn seems to be influenced by Stoic defenses of providence. See, for example, Seneca, De 
Providentia, included in Dialogues and Essays, trans. John Davie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 My understanding of this dimension of Vom Erkennen und Empfinden is indebted to Crowe, "Herder’s 
Moral Philosophy: Perfectionism, Sentimentalism, and Theism," pp. 1155-9. 
40 Irmscher, Johann Gottfried Herder, p. 129.  The positive references to Spinoza in Vom Erkennen und Empfinden 
are of interest for understanding how Herder combines his appeal to God’s will with a naturalistic account of the 
human being in this essay, and elsewhere.   
41 SWS 8: 326. 
42 SWS 8: 201. 
43 SWS 8: 234. 
 
 
159 
 
whole, is one of the earliest expressions of the ideal of individuality that also appears in 
the works of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich Schiller, and the German Romantics.44  
There are two important ideas that Herder contributes to this ethics. 
 The first is that genius is not a capacity possessed by an elite few, but is instead 
nothing other than the unique individuality of every human being.  Each individual has a 
set of talents at which they can excel if given the proper education and upbringing, and 
becoming a unique individual is intrinsically valuable.  What prevents many people from 
developing as they should are either poor educational institutions that reflect a 
misunderstanding of humanity, or forms of oppression that force persons to live in ways 
that cause the degradation or unbalanced development of their powers.   This idea 
provides the grounds of a form of social criticism according to which a social formation 
fails to be what it should if it hinders the healthy development of human abilities.  While 
Herder specifically targets the 18th century for its excessive attention to rationality, he 
also notes that a human being whose feelings are not harmonized with reason and good 
sense would be a poorly developed being as well.45  This means that there is a norm for 
individuals and what they should strive for, as well as a standard for criticizing societies 
that fail either to have a healthy and well-balanced set of ideals or which are so deeply 
divided in terms of social power that education and development are the preserve of an 
elite few.46 
                                                 
44 There is also an echo of this notion in Nietzsche.  See, for example, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, sec. 290.  
However, Nietzsche is happier to preserve a form of hierarchical elitism than Herder and the other thinkers 
mentioned here. 
45 Herder was always hostile to the eighteenth-century cult of feeling, and an emphasis on blind attention to passions 
devoid of reflection is criticized at SWS 8: 199-201. 
46 This aspect of Herder’s social criticism is part of what endeared him to Marxist readers, such as Emil Adler and 
Wolfgang Harich.  See Wolfgang Harich, "Herder und die bürgerliche Gesellschaft," in Zur Philosophie der 
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 A second idea, closely related to the first, is that each person has a form-giving 
power by which they can not only shape the objects in their world, but also their own 
experience and even their life.47  Herder combines this idea with the notion that each 
individual gives form to their experience in such a unique way that their world is not the 
same as any other.48  Each individual human mind gives structure to its world in the 
same way that an artist gives structure to her work.49  Hence, the perspective of each 
person is unique and, because it is the result of a divinely ordered nature, intrinsically 
valuable.  The development of oneself into a unique individual involves attending to the 
kind of person one is and working to become as fully realized as one can in the situation 
in which one finds oneself.  On these grounds, there is a an aim towards which every 
individual ought to strive and, as will be developed in greater detail below, this is also a 
reason for each individual to respect and encourage others in the achievement of this aim.   
  The conception of a well-developed and balanced personality presented in Vom 
Erkennen und Empfinden offers a clearer basis for the critical comments about the 
modern age that Herder makes in earlier texts, such as Auch eine Philosophie der 
                                                                                                                                                             
Geschichte: eine Auswahl in zwei Bänden, ed. Wolfgang Harich and Johann Gottfried Herder (1952); Emil Adler, 
Herder und die deutsche Aufklärung (Vienna: Europa, 1968). 
 A similar ideal is also part of what led William Morris from a general romantic outlook to political 
radicalism.  See, e.g., E.P. Thompson, William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1976). 
47 “He [i.e. the human being] is a stringplay, though from another perspective only a string, a tone of a string: but at 
the same time he is the free player of his own stringplay.”  SWS 8: 316.  See also the description of cognition as 
giving unity to the confused mass of impressions at SWS 8: 292-3. 
 This idea can also be found in Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit:  “[Die Seele] ruft aus 
dem Chaos der Dinge, die sie umgeben, eine Gestalt hervor, an die sie sich mit Aufmerksamkeit heftet und so 
schafft sie durch innere Macht aus dem Viele ein Eins, das ihr allein gehöret.”  DKV 6: 181. 
 Nisbet compares Herder’s view to Gestalt psychology in Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science 
(Cambridge: Modern Humanities Research Association, 1970), p. 63. 
48 “The human being, the first among [God’s] creatures here on earth, is in its structure [Anlagen] a small world…”  
SWS 8: 314.   This passage is from the 1775 edition.  For similar passages in the 1778 version of the text, see SWS 
8: 170, 188-9 and 208.   
49 Herder makes a comparison along these lines in the 1774 draft of the work, SWS 8: 251.  See also Heinz, 
Sensualistischer Idealismus, pp. 135-7.  
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Geschichte and the travel journal.  In the earlier texts, Herder lambastes the present age 
with for being one-sided and excessively rational.  In those places, he does not develop an 
account of what the alternative to being one-sided and missgebildet would be.  In Vom 
Erkennen und Empfinden, however, he goes beyond mere suggestion and attempts to lay 
out the basis of a better ideal.  We see here, then, a further working out of the aspirations 
that were put forth in the texts written in his formative years.   
 
 
 
IV 
 
  
Up to this point, I have focused on the Herder’s conception of individuality 
focusing on issues on the way this is to be understood with respect only to each individual 
agent.  It is important to emphasize, however, that Herder does not think that each 
individual is a completely autonomous being, capable of perfecting themselves without 
relying on the natural world or other persons.  Herder’s conception of human cognition 
and sensation involves the notion that human beings are dependent on the world outside 
of them for their knowledge, and for their general development.  Each person needs both 
an environment in which they can have experiences and other human beings to share a 
form of life with in order to develop their capacities.  To draw out the basic elements of 
his view, it will be helpful to begin by noting how he distinguishes his account of the 
mind from the views of Locke and Leibniz. 
Though emphasizing the importance of experience for the development of human 
powers and the increase of human knowledge, Herder rejects the Lockean notion that 
human beings are blank slates devoid of innate tendencies or propensities.  Herder argues 
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that differences in experience alone cannot account for the unique and distinct nature of 
each individual.50  Hence, each individual must be regarded as having a distinctive 
constitution which gives their soul a tendency to develop in particular ways.51   
And though Herder agrees in many respects with Leibniz, he contends that the 
latter’s theory of each soul as a windowless monad is undermotivated and implausible.52  
Herder finds two faults in Leibniz’s account of human selves as self-contained entities 
that only apparently interact with other beings.  First, Leibniz’s metaphor of the veined 
statue, intended to flesh out how his theory differs from Locke’s blank slate, treats human 
beings as inert, dead, organisms that are acted upon, rather than beings that are the 
sources of their own activity.53  This may only be so much quibbling over metaphors, 
however, as Leibniz can hardly be faulted for conceiving of living things in general, or 
human minds in particular, as passive entities that only undergo change when acted upon 
by external things.  If anything, Leibniz’s tendency is toward a panpsychism that 
attributes mental activity to beings that are ordinarily regarded as inorganic and passive.54  
Further, Leibniz is clear that in human souls there is an active and living element, and 
that every idea that a person has is uncovered only through the soul’s own spontaneous 
                                                 
50 SWS 8: 226. 
51 SWS 8: 207-9. 
52 SWS 8: 226. 
53 SWS 8: 226-7.  Leibniz,  Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas, in Philosophical Essays, p. 27. See also, 
New Essays on the Human Understanding, trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p. 52. 
54 See, for example, Leibniz, Principles of Nature and Grace, §1: “Composites or bodies are multitudes; and 
substances – lives, souls, and minds – are unities.  There must be simple substances everywhere, because, without 
simples, there would be no composites.  As a result, all of nature is full of life.”  Another statement of this idea 
occurs in The Principles of Philosophy §66: “From this we see that there is a world of creatures, of living beings, of 
animals, of entelechies, of souls in the least part of matter.”  Both texts are included in Leibniz, Philosophical 
Essays. 
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activity.55  Consequently, it doesn’t seem as if this aspect of Herder’s criticism offers a 
genuine rejection of any of Leibniz’s views. 
Herder’s second criticism of Leibniz, however, is not beside the point.  It targets 
the claim that human beings are completely independent and self-contained, and have no 
real interaction with one another or the entities that they encounter in their world.  
Herder claims that Leibniz’s theory of monads is insightful insofar it presents an account 
of the mind as unified and active, but is mistaken in denying that each soul is completely 
independent and windowless.  Rather, each human soul can only be developed through 
contact with the world, and through communication with other persons.    
Like Kant, Herder believes that the human mind is both spontaneous and 
receptive.56  Unlike Kant, however, Herder believes that the character of a person’s 
reason is shaped by experience and instruction.  There is no noumenal self capable of 
acting independently of the laws of nature.57  For Herder, the idea that a human being 
could be completely autonomous (either metaphysically or practically) is a gross error, as 
honest and searching self-examination will reveal: 
The more deeply someone has climbed down into himself, into the structure and 
origin of his noblest thoughts, then the more he will cover his eyes and feet and 
say: ‘What I am, I have become.  I have grown like a tree; the seed was there, but 
air, earth, and all the elements, which I did not deposit about myself, had to 
contribute in order to form the seed, the fruit, the tree.58  
 
                                                 
55 “…we must say that God originally created the soul (and any other real unity) in such a way that everything must 
arise for it from its own depths, through a perfect spontaneity relative to itself…”  Leibniz, A New System of Nature, 
ibid., p. 143.   
56 I do not intend to suggest that this idea is derived from Kant.    
57 Kant’s account defense of the idea that free agents should be conceived of as noumenal selves capable of acting 
independently of the laws of nature or experience is presented in the third part of Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten. Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Wilhelm Dilthey et al., 29 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter), Band 4. 
58 SWS 8: 198.  I here use Forster’s translation of the passage.   
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A human being may thus have the ability to act and effect changes in the world, but the 
means by which this is done are in great part acquired from one’s teachers, parents, 
environment and historical age.  This does not involve Herder in a denial that human 
beings have freedom.   Rather, the kind of freedom that each person has is dependent 
upon the sources of their development.  These sources are both the individual’s physic-
psychological constitution and the socio-historical conditions in which one lives.  One 
may thus be free to develop one’s powers and to act in various kinds of ways, but within 
the social and environmental conditions that make possible and also limit the 
opportunities for development and action.59   Herder’s view is thus similar to that 
expressed by Marx’s adage that men are free to make their own history, though not in 
conditions of their choosing.60   
 Herder’s account of our dependence on the world has four components.  We are 
dependent, first, on our senses and the objects of experience.  Second, we require a 
language in which to develop our thoughts and understanding.  Third, we are dependent 
on other human beings for both our early education and also as being with whom we can 
interact in ways that contribute to our development throughout our mature lives.  
Fourth, we are dependent on God for creating the world and placing us in a particular 
situation in it. 
 First, Herder contends that every individual’s character is shaped by their 
particular physiology, and that no two human beings are identical in terms of their 
                                                 
59 Herder’s view bears some resemblance to Heidegger’s account of the Geworfenheit of Dasein in  Sein und Zeit, 
19th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006), sec. 29.  This similarity is also noted in Heinz, Sensualistischer 
Idealismus, p. 123. 
60 Karl Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte.  Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe (Berlin: 
Dietz), Volume 1/12, p. 96. 
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physiological structure.61  The body can only develop, and have an effect on the 
development of a person’s character, by means of interacting with objects in the world.  
In the crudest sense, this involves taking in nutrients from the physical world and 
allowing the body to increase its powers.  In a subtler manner, though, the soul is only 
able to obtain knowledge or develop its own powers through interaction with material 
objects.  The soul’s own activity affects how an agent’s experiences form and develop 
their character, even though it does not do this independently of those objects.  As 
Marion Heinz puts the point, Herder rejects any attempt to privilege either the subjective 
or the objective side of human knowledge, instead arguing that both are mutually 
dependent on one another.62  Heinz’s account of Herder’s epistemology bears on his 
account of our character as well.63  The development of human powers can only occur 
through a subject’s active engagement with a world of objects outside of, and 
independent of, herself.  The development of our character thus depends on our having 
the opportunity to encounter and engage with objects in our world outside of us, but the 
way that we engage with them is in part the product of our soul’s own activity. 
 Second, human thought can only occur in a language.  This entails that human 
beings can only increase their understanding of the world and themselves if they have 
learned a language.64  While Herder defends the centrality of language for human 
thought and action in Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, here he alters his 
view in an important manner.  In the earlier treatise he considered it possible for 
                                                 
61 SWS 8: 317. 
62 “Das Originelle an Herders Ansatz besteht darin, Subjektvorstellung und Objektvorstellung als durcheinainder 
vermittelt zu denken.”  Heinz, Sensualistischer Idealismus, p. 121.   
63 Heinz herself notes that Herder conceives of the increase of knowledge of the world involves at the same time an 
increase of the powers of the subject.  Ibid., p. 155. 
64 SWS 8: 196-7. 
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individual human beings to invent their own language in a situation of isolation.  
However, in Vom Erkennen und Empfinden he claims that without language shining a 
light on the inner world of the human being that no one would be able to begin to sense 
the world in an organized manner.65  Hence, a person could not engage in even the 
relatively simple linguistic act of naming an object without a set of concepts that are 
provided by a language in order to pick out one object in their experience.  The account 
of the relationship between thought and language offered in this is thus more akin to the 
expressivist interpretation of Herder defended by Charles Taylor.66  
 This account of language leads to the third dimension of human dependence 
discussed by Herder – our dependence on other persons.  If we need a language to 
develop our thoughts about the world, and also to act effectively in it, then we must learn 
that language from others.  No language is self-taught.  To become a speaker of a 
language requires instruction by others.  Further, each language expresses the life of the 
community in which it is used, and as a result of being brought up in a particular form of 
life each individual’s thought is shaped by their community.  Every individual is thus only 
able to become who he or she is in a particular historical and social context.  All of one’s 
capacities cannot thus be developed in social isolation.67  
 We could imagine a possible condition in which human beings needed all of the 
above – a body that is capable of interacting with objects in the environment, an 
environment that is reasonably hospitable to human beings, a language, and a community 
                                                 
65 Herder himself acknowledges that he does not think the earlier account of the relationship between language and 
thought is adequate at SWS 8: 197. 
66 Charles Taylor, "The Importance of Herder," in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995); "Language and Human Nature," in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  See also chapter 6 of Michael N. Forster, German Philosophy of 
Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
67 SWS 8: 210-3 and 316.  See also the discussion of these issues in chapter 3. 
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– but were deprived of some of them.  However, such deprivation is not the norm for 
human beings in our world.  We are placed into a world that is, at least, good enough.  It 
is a world in which human beings are capable of not only surviving, but of developing 
their powers and even enjoying their lives.  This reveals the fourth dimension of human 
dependence – our dependence on God.  Without divine providence, Herder contends, we 
could not expect to be so fortunate.68  The creator shows his care for us by placing us in 
a climate in which we are able to survive, and also provides us with a medium in which 
we can develop our thoughts. 
 The extent of each individual’s dependence reveals that human beings are not 
completely autonomous.  In order to develop our powers, to make ourselves into the 
kinds of harmoniously developed beings that Herder argues we should strive to become, 
we require much that is outside of our own power.69    Herder’s view is this far removed 
from an individualistic or atomistic version of perfectionism.  No one can become what it 
is their vocation to become if they do not live in the right kind of world.  The ethic of 
individuality that he develops reveals, rather than occludes, our finitude and our need for 
others. 
 
V 
 
 In addition to its avowal of a form of perfectionism and an ethic of individuality, 
Vom Erkennen und Empfinden places love at the center of human life.  Herder claims, in 
this text, that love is an integral part of our cognitive activity.  This has two very 
                                                 
68 SWS 8: 288. 
69 SWS 8: 197-8.  
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important consequences.  First, it means that all human cognitive activity involves an 
agent in relationships with others.  Second, it means that the project of self-perfection 
cannot be pursued without the involvement of, and consideration for, others.  
Herder claims that there are two feelings which are central to human cognition 
and willing: a feeling for oneself and a feeling for others: 
Humanity is the noble measure according to which we cognize and act: self- and 
other-feeling (once again expansion and contraction) are the two expressions of 
the elasticity of our will; love is the noblest cognition, as it is the noblest sensation.  
To love the great Creator [Urheber] in oneself, to love oneself into others [sich in 
andre hinein zu lieben], and then to follow this sure pull – that is moral feeling, 
that is conscience.  It stands opposed only to empty speculation, but not to 
cognition, for true cognition is loving, is feeling in a human way.70  
 
This passage is central to Herder’s moral vision, though it is rather opaque.  One 
difficulty for understanding it concerns the precise manner in which love is supposed to 
be, or involve, cognition.  The term implies that something is apprehended in such a way 
that knowledge is increased or gained, but what is it that is known when an agent loves 
someone or something?  Another difficulty concerns the claim that “true cognition is 
loving.”  This suggests that cognition is not only involved in love, but that all genuine 
cognition is indispensably or intrinsically bound up with a loving attitude towards the 
object cognized.  At first glance it is difficult to see what each of these claims means, as 
well as Herder’s grounds for asserting them.  I believe, however that it is possible to 
understand them if they are placed within Herder’s moral psychology. 
Herder’s view here is best understood as a development of a set of ideas that he 
initially sketches in some of his earliest essays, such as Versuch über das Sein and Zum 
                                                 
70 SWS 8: 199-200.  In translating this passage, I have consulted Forster’s translation for assistance. 
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Sinn des Gefühls.71  In these texts, Herder contends that each human being is 
constituted by a set of natural forces, and further that all of the natural forces that bring 
human beings into contact with external objects are either forces of attraction or of 
repulsion. Additionally, each human being is internally constituted by a force that enables 
them to form representations [Vorstellungen], or to have a conscious mental life.72  Due 
to the forces of attraction and repulsion that play a role in the economy of each 
individual’s mental life, we are each always connected with other objects in the world.   
This underlies Herder’s claim that all human cognition is emotionally inflected, as 
it is only by being drawn towards an object that one cognizes it.  All objects in the world 
are constituted by a set of forces, according to Herder.  Cognitive awareness involves the 
subject encountering the forces in an object of cognition, and taking them into oneself to 
form a representation of that object.  In doing this, the subject becomes united with the 
object in a manner that Herder considers to be more than metaphorical.73  This process 
of merging with the object of cognition is possible because both the subject and the object 
are both constituted by dynamic forces (Kräfte) which are capable of acting on and with 
one another.74 
                                                 
71 Versuch über das Sein, DKV 1: 9-21 and Zum Sinn des Gefühls, DKV 4: 235-41.  A similar idea is sketched more 
briefly in a short piece from 1769, “Gesetze der Welt: Gesetze der Körper”, DKV 9/2: 222. 
72 For a fuller account of this distinction, see Heinz, Sensualistischer Idealismus, pp, 102-8. 
73 “Sie wird in diesem Betracht mit dem Gegenstande würklich Eins, der Gegenstand Eins mit ihr.”  SWS 8: 293. 
74 Heinz, Sensualistischer Idealismus, pp. 164 ff.  Heinz’s account focuses on the issues at stake for Herder’s 
epistemology and philosophy of mind, and marginalizes the ethical dimension of the text.  Though she notes that 
love is central for Herder, she tends to reduce what he has in mind to any uniting of subject and object in the act of 
cognition.  I believe that this is too attenuated of an account of the emotional bond that Herder has in mind.   
Further, it makes it difficult to see how hate and love can be distinguished if this is all that is involved in Herder’s 
account of love, for to have an intense hatred of an object that leads one to attempt to destroy it will involve 
cognizing it to some degree.  But if all cognition involves a subject being imprinted with the forces of an object, and 
this uniting of forces is what love is, then in attempting to destroy an object one would also simultaneously be loving 
the object.  I do not believe that Herder’s account of love in Vom Erkennen und Empfinden is complete, but I think 
that it is most likely compatible with an account that distinguishes love from hatred, so one should be wary of 
attributing to Herder a theory incapable of admitting such a distinction. 
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In Vom Erkennen und Empfinden, Herder suggests that the feeling of attraction is 
connected with the positive emotional valence of love.  Our awareness of other persons 
involves cognitive activity, but this is always a kind of activity that is emotional and 
affective.  Herder offers three different grounds for this idea, and emphasizes a different 
one in each of the major drafts of the text, completed in 1775 and 1778.75  In the 1775 
edition, Herder argues that cognition is emotional because, first of all, cognition only 
occurs when an agent is interested in an object, and that this cognition involves an 
increase in the agent’s own powers.76  In that same text, Herder also argues that the more 
complete one’s cognition is, the more one is aware of the connection between all finite 
beings as dependent on God, before whom “we are all children and brothers.”77   
The 1778 version of the texts also draws on Herder’s theology, but the 
formulation is strikingly different.  Instead of presenting an anthropocentric God as a 
cosmic patriarch, Herder claims that in cognizing the world truly, one cognizes just as 
God does.78  This means that the subject merges with God, and in doing so one comes to 
love the world and the beings in it as God does.  In achieving this form of loving 
cognition, we become transformed from slaves of nature into its kings.79  Herder notes 
that this is the same as Spinoza’s account of the intellectual love of God.80  This 
                                                 
75 In calling these two drafts ‘major’ I mean that they are much more developed and comprehensive than the first 
draft of 1774. 
76 SWS 8: 293. 
77 SWS 8: 296. 
78 Marion Heinz claims that the 1778 version of the text differs from the 1775 version in that the latter has removed 
the theological basis of Herder’s arguments and removed the theological emphasis.  See Heinz, Sensualistischer 
Idealismus, pp. 170-1.  Heinz’s claim is hard to square with the numerous places in the 1778 version where Herder 
uses identical or very similar arguments about the role that divinity plays in making human cognition possible, some 
of which are discussed above in the present chapter.  However, it seems true that the 1778 text is more obviously 
compatible with Herder’s growing enthusiasm for Spinoza, and the heterodox theology that it seems to involve.   
79 SWS 8: 202. 
80 SWS 8: 202.  Herder goes so far in his praise of Spinoza that he describes him as even more divine than St. John.  
Spinoza’s account of the love of God and its connection to human freedom appears in Part 5 of his Ethics.  Included 
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Spinozistic love involves an awareness of the need of each finite being for other beings, 
and also an increased sense of the knowing subject’s power and pleasure.81  Hence, true 
cognition on Herder’s view increases the individual’s own perfection, while 
simultaneously increasing their affection for the other beings they share the world with.  
This increase in perfection and awareness of one’s union with others brings about a 
positive emotional state of love.82 
 There are two important features of Herder’s view that can now be made 
apparent.  First, the sense in which cognition is identified with love is connected with an 
awareness of “the creator in oneself”, which is the formative power discussed above.  
Becoming self-consciously aware of this capacity in oneself should also involve 
recognizing that other human beings are similarly constituted by the very same powers or 
forces.  Hence, the perfections one finds in oneself are also in others and are likewise 
worthy of love.   
Second, Herder claims that moral feelings are grounded in the ability to “sich in 
andre hinein zu lieben.”83  This means that the capacity to love others requires one to 
love oneself.  It is the “necessary condition” of caring for others, as “it is and remains true 
that we love our neighbor only as we love ourselves.”84  In addition to incorporating the 
injunction of Christ to love one’s neighbor as oneself,85 this idea is also connected with 
Herder’s concept of Einfühlung, as presented in Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte.  
Herder believes that the ability to understand other human beings is bound up with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Benedict de Spinoza, The Collected Works of Spinoza, trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton Unicersity 
Press, 1985). 
81 For the source of these ideas in Spinoza, see Ethics, 5P32 and 5P36. 
82 Again, for the connection to Spinoza, see Ethics, 5P36C and Scholium. 
83 SWS 8: 200. 
84 SWS 8: 200. 
85 Matthew 22: 39 and Mark 12: 31. 
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person’s being able to have loving feelings towards them. Thus, Herder’s attempt to 
develop and encourage the study of other peoples and cultures is part of the moral project 
of cultivating love and sympathy, and when done correctly contributes to our moral 
growth. 
This bolsters one of the other arguments that Herder makes in his criticism of 
modern culture in other texts, such as Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte.  Those who 
develop what they conceive to be intellectual capacities, while ignoring or stifling the 
emotional side of human nature, are not only harming their prospects of happiness.  They 
are also engaged in a form of bad faith.  By treating the pursuit of truth or knowledge as if 
that were possible without any emotional or volitional involvement, such persons are 
deluded about who they are, and how they have acquired the perfections they possess. 
Up until this point, we have been looking at the sense of Herder’s claim that 
genuine cognition is a form of love, but he also makes the converse claim – that love is 
cognition, the noblest cognition.  Love must not be understood as a brute feeling that 
lacks cognitive content.  In claiming that love has a cognitive component, Herder is 
committed to an anti-Humean account of love.  Herder’s account requires that love 
involves both a discrimination of the properties of the loved object, which must be 
apprehended to be regarded as both good and capable of increasing the perfection of the 
knowing subject.86   It also includes an understanding of the object’s place in the natural 
order.  Together, this means that the knower must be aware of the intrinsic perfections 
and powers of the object, as well as its extrinsic relations to other beings in the world.  
                                                 
86 SWS 8: 293. 
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Any conception of conscience or moral feeling as a brute reaction lacking any cognition 
must thus be rejected as hopelessly confused.87   
 By drawing love into the heart of human cognitive activity, Herder makes it clear 
that his perfectionism is thoroughly social.  No human being can live as they should, 
developing and perfecting their capacities, without others.  Because of this, we must 
strive to develop our individual perfection in harmony with that of others.  As he writes:  
“I can only attain my own perfection through the perfection of others.”88  The need for 
community with other persons is thorough and total.  The true love of self, and the 
pursuit of one’s own perfection that this involves, does not thus bring human beings into 
conflict with one another when we live wisely.  Rather, it offers us a reason for taking up 
a concern for our communities and the individuals who are a part of it. 
 
VI 
 
 Vom Erkennen und Empfinden is a text that draws together many of Herder’s 
characteristic concerns.  In it, we see Herder striving to find a middle path between 
several dualisms that have divided philosophers: individuality and social connection, 
freedom and situatedness, cognition and feeling.  All of these apparent dualisms, 
according to Herder, are only the products of a more fundamental unity.  To take a side 
on these issues, to emphasize the importance of one of these poles of human life at the 
expense of the other, is both an intellectual and a moral failure – it is to separate what 
                                                 
87 SWS 8: 199.  Herder does not state explicitly which thinkers he has in mind.  It may be that Hutcheson is more his 
target than Hume. 
88 SWS 8: 200-1.   
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God has joined.89  The proper form of perfectionism and the truest ethic of individuality, 
accordingly, will emphasize a life in which human feeling and thought are perfected in a 
community of individuals who take an interest in one another’s well-being.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 SWS 8: 293. 
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Chapter 6: Bonds of Love and the Chain of History: Ideen zur Philosophie der 
Geschichte der Menshheit 
 
 
 
Hier also liegt das Principium zur Geschichte der Menschheit, ohne welches keine solche 
Geschichte gäbe.  Empfinge der Mensch alles aus sich und entwickelte es abgetrennt von äußern 
Gegenständen: so wäre zwar eine Geschichte des Menschen, aber nicht der Menschen, nicht 
ihres ganzen Geschlechts möglich.  Da nun aber unser spezifische Charakter eben darin liegt, daß 
wir, beinah ohne Instinkt geboren, nur durch eine Lebenslange Übung zur Menschheit gebildet 
werden, und sowohl die Perfektibilität als die Korruptibilität unsres Geschlechts hierauf beruhet: 
so wird eben damit auch die Geschichte der Menschheit notwendig ein Ganzes, d.i. eine Kette 
der Geselligkeit und bildenden Tradition vom Ersten bis zum letzten Gliede.   
     Herder, Ideen, DKV 6: 337 
 
I 
 
One of the guiding threads of Herder’s philosophical thought, running through 
both his early and later works, is his conception of human beings as inherently social and 
historical creatures.  This means that on the one hand human beings are not capable of 
living distinctively human lives in isolation from other human beings and, on the other, 
that human societies develop and change their ways of living over time as no other kind 
of animal does.   Herder’s philosophical anthropology is opposed to currents of thought 
that approach human beings in an ahistorical and individualistic manner.  Herder is also 
committed to a form of naturalism.  Though this is also commonly acknowledged by 
scholars, the specific ways in which Herder’s naturalism informs or supports his 
commitment to the essentially historical and social character of man has not been 
adequately explained.  Herder has one argument in particular that is especially 
informative about the way in which his naturalism is related to his theory of history and 
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his philosophical anthropology, though this argument has been largely ignored by most 
scholars. 
The argument to which I refer is found in the first part of Herder’s Ideen zur 
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.1  The argument is that the natural 
dependence and weakness of human children leads to the cultivation of a social 
disposition.  The argument has been eclipsed in great part due to the presence of another 
argument that Herder presents in the same text – that the distinctness of human beings 
can be derived from their upright posture - which has received more scholarly discussion, 
even though it is both less interesting and less compelling.   
In this chapter, my central aim is to present a neglected argument in Herder’s text 
that may point the way towards a better understanding of the relationship between 
Herder’s naturalism, historicism and social theory.  I also hope to show how Herder’s 
social thought, which is the basis of his political philosophy, is distinct from other 
important views in social and political philosophy.  Additionally, I will argue that a failure 
to grasp the place of this argument in Herder’s philosophical thought, especially his 
thought of the 1780s, can lead to inadequate interpretations of Herder’s philosophy, as 
well as to outright misinterpretations.   
 
 
II  
 
 
 
                                                            
1 In the rest of the text, I will refer to Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit 
simply as Ideen.    
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Herder’s Ideen was published in four parts between 1784 and 1791.2  In the work, 
Herder attempts to explain the fundamental characteristics of human nature and to argue 
for the importance of historical development and change in the study of man.  Herder 
also defends a particular view of history that includes a conception of historical progress, 
and yet eschews the ethnocentrism of other Enlightenment theories of history, which 
tended to regard the society of eighteenth century Europe as the model according to 
which all other societies were to be judged.3   
The subject of the Ideen is the philosophy of the history of mankind.  It famously 
begins with the phrase, “our earth is a star among stars,” and then proceeds to consider 
how the earth’s location in the solar system has shaped the kind of life that human beings 
have.4  Herder then moves on to consider the variety of organisms that inhabit the earth, 
and the similarity and dissimilarity of the various organisms to human beings.5  The first 
part of the Ideen is concerned with the natural conditions in which human beings live – 
the kind of environment that the earth is, the kinds of organisms that we share the earth 
with, and also the structure of the human organism.  The second, third and fourth parts 
of the Ideen examine the characters of various human societies throughout the earth, and 
                                                            
2 The first part was published in 1784, the second in 1785, the third in 1787 and the fourth in 1791. 
3 The prime example of such a text is François-Marie d'Arouet Voltaire, The Philosophy of History, trans. 
unknown (London: I. Allcock, 1766; repr., 1965).  Other noteworthy examples are Nicolas Antoine 
Boulanger, The Origin and Progress of Despotism in the Oriental, and Other Empires, of Africa, Europe, 
and America, trans. J. Wilkes (Amsterdam: Unknown Publisher, 1764); Claude Adrien Helvétius, De 
L'Esprit, Or, Essays on the Mind, and Its Several Faculties, trans. W. Mudford (London: M. Jones, 1807). 
4 DKV 6: 21. 
5 This led some nineteenth-century commentators to read Herder as a precursor of Darwin’s.  The most 
influential statement of this position is Friedrich von Bährenbach, Herder als Vorgänger Darwins und der 
modernen Naturphilosophie (Berlin: Theobald Grieben, 1877).  Bährenbach exaggerates his case for such 
a comparison by attributing to Herder a belief in the mutability of species, which Herder explicitly denies.  
For a helpful corrective to this view, see Arthur Lovejoy, "Some Eighteenth-Century Evolutionists," The 
Scientific Monthly 71, no. 3 (1950).  
 Bährenbach’s mistake is somewhat understandable, though, as some readers in Herder’s day were 
led to attribute this view to him.  See, for example, the letter of Charlotte von Stein stating this, discussed 
in Robert Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 369-70. 
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how these societies have developed through history.  The Ideen is a remarkably ambitious 
work containing a wealth of astronomical, ethnographic, historical, and biological 
material.  Because of the expansive character of the work, it can be difficult at times for 
modern readers to see the specifically philosophical import of much of the text.   
 One of the important philosophical features of Herder’s Ideen, apparent from the 
very beginning of the tome, is that Herder adheres to a naturalistic approach to the study 
of human beings.  For example, Herder argues that the physical structure of human 
beings determines their intellectual and moral character.  Specifically, he emphasizes the 
importance of man’s upright posture.  This alone, at one point he states, is what 
distinguishes human beings from other kinds of primates, such as Orangutans.6  This 
claim drew much criticism upon the publication of Herder’s work, and most scholarship 
discussing the first part of the Ideen focuses almost exclusively on this claim.7  The 
                                                            
6 DKV 6: 118-20. 
7 The most influential comment on this part of the work is that of Kant, in his “Rezensionen von Johann 
Gottfried Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit”, in Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte 
Schriften, ed. Wilhelm Dilthey et al., 29 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-), 8, pp. 43-66.  Another of 
Herder’s contemporaries to criticize Herder’s arguments about the significance of upright posture was 
Georg Forster, in his letter to Sömmering of May 19, 1785, in Hermann Hettner, ed. Georg Forster's 
Briefwechsel mit S.T. Sömmering (Braunschweig: F. Vieweg, 1877), pp. 222-3.  This letter came to my 
attention because it is discussed in Hugh Barr Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science 
(Cambridge: Modern Humanities Research Association, 1970), pp. 250-1. Other scholars to emphasize 
this are Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 
pp. 390-1; Rudolf Haym, Herder: Nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken, 2 vols. (Berlin: Rudolf 
Gaertner, 1877-85), II, pp. 209-10.    
 While at first glance, Herder’s discussion of the upright posture of man might appear ridiculous, 
especially when one takes account of Herder’s crude poeticizing about the matter, there is some reason to 
take it seriously.  First, Herder’s emphasis on mankind’s upright posture is connected with a discussion of 
the unique structure of the human brain.  Herder argues that it is only an upright posture that could permit 
the human brain to be organized as it is.  There is some recent empirical evidence suggesting that Herder’s 
conjecture is broadly correct.  Nonetheless, the best that can be said on those grounds is that Herder has a 
correct conclusion, though he lacks the premises that would justify his assertion of that conclusion (i.e. the 
theory of evolution and more adequate knowledge of the human brain). 
Second, there is a historical reason for taking account of the details of Herder’s argument.  Herder 
was not the first to argue that the upright posture of man is in some way connected to his unique rational 
and moral character.  The Italian doctor Pietro Moscati wrote a treatise in 1770, translated into German in 
1771 in which he argued that mankind’s upright posture was a punishment for original sin, but at the same 
time gave man his specific moral character.  See Pietro Moscati, Von dem körperlichen wesentlichen 
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details of the argument from man’s upright posture will not be dwelt upon here because I 
believe that Herder has another argument that is more interesting and compelling, yet 
just as naturalistic.   The argument is that the prolonged period of weakness and 
dependence of human children determines the social, rational and historical character of 
human beings.     
The argument for the importance of human dependence in the Ideen arises in the 
context of the discussion of an issue that was of significant interest to philosophers in the 
eighteenth century - the difference between human beings and animals with regard to the 
possession of instinct.  A number of thinkers argued that whereas animals had instincts, 
human beings possess reason in the place of instinct, and hence are distinct from animals 
on the basis of their possession of reason.8  Herder asserts that, on the contrary, human 
beings have the same natural instincts other animals enjoy, and that these instinctual 
ways of acting can be observed in infants who know how to eat food without being 
taught, as well as in societies which due to extreme need and danger are capable of living 
in the natural world as animals do.9   The real difference between human beings and 
animals concerns the way in which their instincts are organized.  Herder claims that the 
distinctive character of human beings is the consequence of their ability to suppress 
certain instincts in favor of others: “the drives of man are not so much robbed from him 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Unterscheide zwischen der Structur der Thiere und der Menschen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1771).  Kant 
presented a favorable review of Moscati’s work in 1771.  Herder was familiar with both Moscati’s work and 
Kant’s review, and Moscati’s text is cited in the Ideen, DKV 6: 151.  For an excellent and balanced 
discussion of these issues, see Nisbet, Herder and the Philosophy and History of Science, pp. 249-51. 
8 For a discussion of the debates over instinct in animals and humans, see Gary Hatfield, "Mechanizing the 
Sensitive Soul," in Matter and Form in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Gideon Manning (Leiden: Brill, 
2012). 
9 DKV 6: 142. 
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as they are suppressed by him, and ordered under the control [Herrschaft] of the nerves 
and the finer senses.”10  
The finer senses, according to Herder, are those of hearing and vision and the 
cruder senses are those of smell and touch.11  Herder regards the senses of sight and 
smell as finer because he believes that they involve a distance from their object that touch 
and smell do not, and they permit one to think of their objects in a reflective way.12  
Herder argues that the subordination of the cruder senses to the finer ones is the basis of 
mankind’s rational character.   
The different cognitive character of each sense was an interest of Herder’s from 
early on, and his characterization of vision in his fourth Kritische Wälder offers the best 
concise statement of why Herder considers vision to be a finer sense, and what this means 
about the importance of sight for the rational and intellectual capacities of human beings.  
Herder states: 
Objects of sight are the clearest [am klärsten], the most distinct [am deutlichsten]: 
they are before us; they are outside of and next to one another: they remain objects 
for as long as we wish.  Because they are thus the easiest, the clearest, and however 
one might wish to express it [und wie man will], to cognize; because their parts are 
more capable of analysis [Auseinandersetzung] than any other impression; for that 
reason their unity and plurality, which give us pleasure, are the most visible…13 
 
Vision, as opposed to the senses of touch and smell, is believed to allow for more distinct 
perceptions.  Herder avers that we are capable of dividing what we see up into parts more 
easily than what we smell or feel.  Vision permits the clear recognition of an object and its 
                                                            
10 DKV 6: 142-3. 
11 DKV 6: 144. 
12 DKV 6: 136-7.  Herder discusses the characteristics of each sensory modality in many other works.  See, 
for example Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, DKV 1: 734-7 and 743-51. 
13 DKV 2: 289. 
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distinct elements, whereas it is more difficult to distinguish parts when feeling an object.  
Additionally, Herder claims that the objects of vision are sensed as being distinct from 
and outside of us, and consequently they have a “weak effect upon us.”14  Herder claims 
that this is of practical importance in our lives because it means that we are not so 
immediately determined to act by the objects of our senses, as creatures with other kinds 
of sensory organization are.15  Herder’s conclusion is that the centrality of vision and 
hearing in human cognition enables human beings to act deliberately and to think clearly 
– to be rational creatures. Vision is, as Herder expresses the point, “the most 
philosophical sense.”16  
The central place given to the senses of sight and hearing in human cognition are 
thus connected to the ability of human beings to “suppress” their instincts as beasts with 
senses organized in a different manner cannot.  According to Herder, how does this 
happen?  Herder bases his explanation on a description of human development, as he 
believes that this explains the way in which the various capacities that human beings 
possess at birth are given the specific form that they take in a mature human being.  
                                                            
14 DKV 2: 290. 
15 This is stated in the Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, DKV 1: 712-3.  In an omitted draft of 
the third book of the Ideen, Herder also defends an account of the similarity between human beings and 
some animals on this same basis.  Animals with “feinere Sinne”, he claims, can also be said to have the 
kinds of ideas and feelings which are related to those modes of sensation, and in this way have a manner of 
thinking that is more similar to that of human beings.  SWS 13: 446.   
Michael Forster offers an interesting discussion of the development of Herder’s views on this issue, 
specifically focusing on the issue of language and animals, in Michael N. Forster, "Gods, Animals, and 
Artists: Some Problem Cases in Herder's Philosophy of Language," Inquiry 45, no. 1 (2003): pp. 69-76. 
16 DKV 2: 290.  This conception of the character of these senses was not unique to Herder, but was 
common in Herder’s time.  See, for example, Kames’ comment in that “the eye and the ear, being thus 
elevated above those of the other external senses” should be counted as closer to the intellect than the other 
senses in Henry Home Lord Kames, Elements of Criticism (London: G. Cowie and Co., 1824), p. 10.  
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Herder notes that “the human child comes into the world weaker than any of the 
animals” and human beings develop more slowly than any other animal.17   
This would seem to be disadvantageous to human beings, but it is in fact what 
enables them to develop reason and to have the kind of mastery over themselves and their 
environment that they do.  The length and intensity of this period of human dependence 
contributes to the development of reason because it forces human beings to develop their 
finer senses before the others.  Human beings learn to see objects, pay attention to 
sounds and grasp objects with their fingers before they are capable of walking.18  
Consequently, they develop the capacity to attend to the details of what they sense, and 
to compare the objects of their senses with one another very early on, even before they 
are capable of independent action in the world.   
Herder argues that this shows that human beings come into the world without 
their reason complete, “in order to learn reason.”19  For a human infant:  
Its finest senses, eye and ear, awaken first and become guided by shapes and 
sounds…It was first an apprentice [Lehrling] of the two finest senses: for the 
instinct for artificial creation [künstliche Instinkt], which should become formed in 
him, is reason, humanity, a human form of life [menschliche Lebensweise], which 
no animal has or learns.20 
 
Herder is making two claims here.  First, the long period of human dependence means 
that the senses of hearing and vision, the “finest senses” are the first to be put into 
practice.  Second, the priority of sight and vision is somehow the ground of reason, the 
                                                            
17 DKV 6: 143. 
18 “Ehe das Kind gehen lernt, lernt es sehen, hören, greifen und die feinste Mechanik und Messkunst 
dieser Sinne üben.”  DKV 6: 143.   
19 DKV 6: 143. 
20 DKV 6: 144.  I have translated “künstliche Instinkt” as “instinct for artificial creation” rather than the 
more literal “artificial instinct” because it is clear that Herder is emphasizing the human capacity for 
creative activity and production, even though he is also implying that reason and humanity are the products 
of human creative activity. 
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capacity for creative activity, and all other distinctively human qualities.  This entails that 
reason is learned, and not innate.21  It is clear that Herder believes that the protracted 
length of human dependence means that the finer senses of human beings are more 
central than in other creatures, and that human reason itself is somehow the product of 
this long period of dependence and the acute development of the finer senses.   
 Human young are not capable of developing on their own, due to their weakness.  
The long period of weakness in human infants is also a long period of dependence, and 
the character of this dependence has great consequences for the psychological, moral and 
intellectual character of human beings.  The period during which children are practicing 
the use of the finer senses and developing their inchoate reason is a period of time during 
which they are cared for by their parents.  Herder claims that during this time the child 
receives “motherly love” through an “organic cause”, and the child’s “tender drives are 
formed.”22  As they learn to make use of their vision and hearing, infants and children 
begin to learn how to distinguish between the things in their environment, and this is 
done through the “aid [Beihülfe] of another”, who instructs a child in language.  
Learning a language also enables the child to share its thoughts with others.23  This also 
brings the child into a human community and constitutes it as a social being.  The care 
provided for a human infant by those who raise him or her is a “tender bond” which 
holds human societies together.  The human need for others during the formative period 
of infancy, Herder argues, is the foundation of more than the intellectual capacity of man.  
                                                            
21 See Herder’s comment that reason is not “Automat”, but is rather “das fortgehende Werk der Bildung 
des menschlichen Lebens.”  DKV 6: 144. 
22 DKV 6: 158. 
23 DKV 6: 141-2.  The sense of hearing is especially important for development of human reason, 
according to Herder, as it is the sense that has the most influence on the capacity for human language. 
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It is “the ground of a necessary human society, without which no man would be able to 
grow to maturity.”24   
This deep need for others, Herder argues, shows that human beings are naturally 
and essentially social: 
In the paternal house arose the first society, bound with bonds of blood, trust and 
love.  Thus to break the savagery of men and habituate them to domestic 
intercourse [häuslichen Umgange] the childhood of our species needs to last for 
many years.  Nature compels men to come together, and holds them together, 
through tender bonds, so that they will not scatter and forget one another, as do 
creatures which soon arrive at maturity.  The father became the educator of his 
son, as the mother was of the infant; and thus a new link of humanity is knit.  
Here lies the ground of a necessary human society, without which no man would 
be able to grow to maturity, and the majority of men would not exist.  Man is thus 
born for society: this the affection [Mitgefühl] of his parents and the years of his 
long childhood tell him.25  
 
Herder’s account of infancy and its effects is the basis of his conception of the social 
nature of human beings, which he develops and extends more thoroughly in his account 
of human history.  Men are “born for society”, and they learn this because they are 
forced to perceive their own dependence on their parents.  The bonds of human society 
are deeper than any contract that free-standing agents might enter into.  Rather, the 
bonds are “tender” or “affectionate” ones because they are bonds formed by parental 
care and love.  As a consequence of their natural development, human beings are 
determined to be social beings who live with others, not individuals who could ever 
possibly deliberate about whether or not they will live in society. 
 
III  
                                                            
24 DKV 6: 158. 
25 DKV 6: 158.  I have consulted Churchill’s translation of the Ideen for assistance with the translation of 
this passage.   
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Herder’s argument that the dependence of human infants and the care given to 
them by their parents is “the ground of a necessary human society“ is important for 
Herder’s social and political thought.26  In order to understand how, it will be helpful to 
consider Herder’s argument as a contribution to the philosophical discourse about the 
state of nature.  As is well known, many of the most significant moral and political 
theories of the early modern era involve an appeal to, or alleged examination of, 
mankind’s state of nature.  To highlight the distinctive character of Herder’s use of the 
state of nature in his social thought, I will compare Herder to two of the most well-known 
philosophers who offer a theory of mankind in the state of nature - Hobbes and 
Rousseau.   
Though Hobbes and Rousseau are in many respects contrasting figures, both 
consider the state of nature to be a pre-social state in which human beings lead solitary 
lives.  Hobbes states that in the state of nature “men have no pleasure, but on the 
contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to over-
awe them all.”27  The natural state of mankind, he argues, is a state of war, characterized 
by fear and hostility.  It is only because of the fear of other men that social bonds are 
formed.28  Rousseau dissents from Hobbes’ pessimistic characterization of human beings 
in the state of nature as competitive, hostile and vicious.  He argues that Hobbes’s 
account of the state of nature involves the projection of qualities characteristic of the 
most refined societies – forms of pride and self love, and a competitive disposition that 
                                                            
26 DKV 6: 158. 
27 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Inadianapolis: Hackett, 1994), I.xiii, p. 75. 
28 Ibid., I.xii, p. 78; and I.xiv. 
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are the product of unnatural desires that are only developed in society.29  Rousseau 
insists, contrary to Hobbes, that men are naturally endowed with a form of natural pity 
and lack the desire to subject others to their will.  They would not intentionally attempt 
to dispossess or harm others, but Rousseau nonetheless holds that human beings in the 
state of nature “had no dealings with each other” and that each human being lived in 
such a state “without any need of others of his kind” and was “self-sufficient”.30  
Philosophers such as Hobbes and Rousseau sought to understand what mankind’s 
life in the state of nature was like because they believed that understanding men in the 
state of nature would help them grasp the fundamental characteristics of human nature – 
the kinds of motivations, needs, desires and dispositions that are characteristic of human 
beings.  The reason for exploring mankind’s life in the state of nature was to understand 
what led men to form societies and states.  It was also supposed to reveal something 
about the nature of moral and political obligation, and the standards by which social and 
political arrangements might be evaluated.  The state of nature, whether historical or 
hypothetical,31 was believed by these two thinkers to reveal that mankind is naturally 
either anti-social or asocial, and how societies could best manage the anti-social or asocial 
characteristics of human beings.32  
                                                            
29 Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, included in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other 
Early Political writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 151-
60. This is also the argument of Rousseau’s Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, and was largely inspired 
by Montaigne, especially his Apology for Raymond Sebond.   
30 The Discourses and Other Early Political writings, pp. 154 and 57. 
31 Rousseau, for example, states that the state of nature he discusses “no longer exists, which perhaps never 
did exist, which probably never will exist.”  Ibid., p. 125.  At moments, however, he doesn’t seems to be 
undecided on this issue.  He sometimes seems to treat his speculations as likely to be borne out by the 
facts.  See, for example, his discussion of Orangutans as possible men in the state of nature in ibid., pp. 
205-11. 
32 The philosophical discussion of the state of nature was not limited to Hobbes and Rousseau, but was a 
central issue in the work of many of the most important moral and political thinkers in the early modern 
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Herder opposes his account of human nature in the Ideen to accounts held by 
philosophers such as Hobbes and Rousseau in order to show that the political and moral 
conclusions of these other thinkers were unjustified because their fundamental premises 
are false.  Rousseau was an explicit target in Herder’s discussion of the origin and nature 
of language in the Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache.  Herder also directs his 
criticism toward the similar attempt by Hobbes to establish conclusions about the nature 
of human beings on the hypothesis of a state of nature prior to the formation of social 
bonds.33  Both of these philosophers argue that human beings are naturally solitary or 
antisocial.  In such a state, men are required to reflect on the possibility of forming a 
social pact, if they are to come to live together and become social.  The postulation of a 
state of nature, by such philosophers, is done in accordance with their individualistic 
conception of human beings that regards them as deciding to live together either out of 
fear (Hobbes) or in order to satisfy more of their desires than can be satisfied in isolation 
(Rousseau).  According to both of these views, the formation of society occurs as the 
result of a rational decision, and thus is itself dependent on man’s possession of reason. It 
is supposed to be reason which enables men to contract to live in society, which involves 
changing the way in which they were determined to live by nature. 
Herder offers a deep and powerful challenge to the basic assumption of the views 
of Hobbes and Rousseau.  Herder regards man’s possession of reason as a natural 
development of his natural powers that is only possible because of his being a social 
being.  Herder contends that reason is a natural capacity that is unique to mankind only 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
era.  Other contributors to the discussion include Grotius, Locke, Hume, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac and 
Leibniz. 
33 Hobbes is clearly referred to by Herder in the Ideen.  See the reference to philosophers who have 
claimed that mankind’s natural circumstance is a “Stande des Kriegs” at DKV 6: 313-4.   
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because man develops his powers in a particular way, and this development requires the 
social affections that are involved in the care of children.  Human beings are constituted 
in such a way that the “finer senses” of hearing and vision are the most central to their 
way of living.34  By contrast, other organisms are guided in their lives primarily by touch 
or smell, and have less distance from the objects they encounter, and are consequently 
unable to reflect on them.35  Human beings are capable of reflective thought because of 
the way in which their sensory capacities are organized during their development.  Due to 
the specific character of human sensibility, human beings are also capable of language.  
All of this is only possible, however, because they receive care, education and an 
upbringing from their parents.  The result of this process of education is the acquisition 
and development of reason, which is not immediately possessed at birth by any human 
being.36  Without a community and society in which one was brought up, no human 
being would be able to develop their rational capacities, and would lack the faculty of 
reason.  Hence, Herder reverses the order of priority that the aforementioned thinkers are 
committed to.  For Herder, men are not social because they are capable of forming 
contracts on the basis of rational decision, but rather human reason can only be 
developed by any individual human being because human beings are naturally social. 
Reason is thus, on Herder’s view, learned and developed.  It is not a talent or 
quality that they possess apart from being instructed by their caretakers and having 
experiences in an environment.  It is not a supernatural quality or property that was 
                                                            
34 DKV 6: 136-42. 
35 Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, DKV 1: 771-4. 
36 “Hieraus erhellet, was menschliche Vernunft sei: ein Name, der in den neuern Schriften so oft als 
angebornes Automat gebraucht wird und als solches nichts als Missdeutung giebet.  Theoretisch und 
praktisch ist Vernunft nichts als etwas Vernommenes, eine gelernte Proportion und Richtung der Ideen 
und Kräfte, zu welcher der Mensch nach seiner Organisation und Lebensweise gebildet worden.”  DKV 6: 
144. 
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placed in man by a divine source, as the builder of a machine places the motor into the 
product of his labor.  Nor can it be exercised immediately at birth, as one can digest food 
without needing to learn how to do so.  Reason is something that man is born with the 
capacity for that he develops through his own activity, but the circumstances that make 
that activity possible are the right kinds of interactions with other human beings and his 
environment – circumstances which can only obtain if human infants are cared for during 
their long and intense period of dependence. 
Fortunately, according to Herder, human beings are naturally disposed to love and 
care for their young.37  Herder suggests that being loved and cared for in this way endows 
one with the propensity to love and care for one’s own offspring later in life.  These 
family ties produce threads that unite even larger communities of human beings.  Herder, 
contrary to the thinkers he is challenging, argues that human beings are only capable of 
becoming rational creatures because they are naturally disposed to be caring towards 
their children.38  Herder describes the nature of this development as follows: 
The suckling at the mother’s breast reposes on her heart: the fruit of her womb is 
the pupil of her embrace.  His finest senses, the eye and ear, first awake, and are 
led forward by sound and figure: happy for him, if they be fortunately led! His 
sense of feeling gradually unfolds itself, and attentively watches the eyes of those 
around, as his ear is attentive to their language, and by their help he learns to 
distinguish his first ideas.  In the same manner his hand gradually learns to feel: 
and then his limbs first strive after their proper exercise.  He is first a pupil of the 
two finest senses: for the instinct for artificial creation to be formed in him is 
reason, humanity, a human form of life, which no animal possesses or learns.39 
 
                                                            
37 DKV 1: 789, quoted below. 
38 This is also expressed in the Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache: “Allerdings hatte die Mutter 
mehr das Kind zu lehren als das Kind die Mutter – weil jene es mehr lehren konnte, und der mütterliche 
Instinkt, Liebe und Mitleiden, den Rousseau aus Barmherzigkeit den Tieren zugibt und aus Grossmut 
seinem Geschlecht versagt, sie zu diesem Unterricht, wie der Überfluss der Milch zum Saugen zwang.”  
DKV 1: 789.  
39 DKV 6:144. I have used, though modified, Churchill’s translation of this passage, Outlines of a 
Philosophy of the History of Man, p. 91. 
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Though they are entirely dependent and needy, human infants are cared for and 
protected in such a way that enables them to safely develop their ability to see and hear.  
These two “finest senses” are the senses that are most closely connected to the 
development of reason and language, as Herder argues in both the Ideen and in the 
Treatise on the Origin of Language.  Because these senses, and hence a nascent or 
inchoate faculty of reason, develops prior to man’s cruder senses, they retain a position of 
priority over the other senses in the course of a human life.  Human beings are thus 
organically constituted for the formation of reason, and the specific character of their 
organic development is what allows reason to have the form that it has in the life of a 
human being.  This organic development, however, is only possible because of the care 
that is given to dependent young by those whom they are dependent upon. 
In short, the formation of reason in human beings is accomplished through the 
development of the fine before the crude senses and the physical weakness of human 
infants.  Human infants can only develop appropriately and naturally, according to 
Herder, because of the affectionate upbringing that they receive from one’s parents.  
Herder believes that this shows both that human beings need to live in social relations 
with others, and also that they are positively inclined to do so through forms of emotional 
attachment that are formed through the natural development which human beings have 
all benefitted from.40 
 Herder emphasized the priority of the nation, or Volk, to the state in his political 
thought.  Scholars often note that this is a consequence of Herder’s belief that there were 
                                                            
40 Other thinkers have also more recently argued that human rational capacities are both shaped and 
informed by a kind of affective engagement that is the result of the kind of upbringing natural to human 
beings.  One example is Axel Honneth’s recent work on reification and recognition.  See especially his 
Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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forms of social organization that are organic and natural, whereas the state is mechanistic 
and artificial.41  What sometimes is omitted in these discussions is that Herder’s 
conception of society as a natural, organically formed entity was not only a matter of faith 
or a provocative and inspirational metaphor.  Herder’s organic conception of society is, 
rather, the outgrowth of his naturalistic approach to his study of the human being.42   
 
IV 
  
Herder challenges the individualistic conception of human nature that was 
defended by a number of thinkers in the early modern era, but he was not the only one to 
do so.  One of the most important criticisms of an individualistic conception of the state 
of nature was presented by the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson in his 1767 An 
Essay on the History of Civil Society.  Ferguson also sought to challenge the conception 
                                                            
41 E.g. Frederick M. Barnard, Herder's Social and Political Thought: From Enlightenment to Natonalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 72-87. 
42 While the overwhelming consensus among Herder scholars is that Herder was committed to some form 
of naturalism, it is still common to run across comments asserting the contrary.  Allen Wood, for example, 
suggests that Herder appeals to some kind of direct divine dispensation of reason to human beings, whereas 
by contrast Kant’s view is that human beings develop their capacity for reason by themselves.  See Kant's 
Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 234.  It seems to me that the 
attribution of such a view to Herder involves a rather careless misreading of a single section of a single text 
of Herder’s philosophical works, and is shown to be utterly implausible in the light of the arguments under 
discussion in the present paper. 
 Terry Pinkard takes issue with reading Herder as a naturalist, in part, because doing so would 
somehow not account for the kind of influence that Herder had on the Romantics and Hegel.  See German 
Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 133.  
Pinkard’s argument is not based on any specific texts, so far as I can see.  However, if the naturalistic 
element of Herder’s thought goes missing in the next generation influenced by Herder, this is hardly a 
reason to deny that Herder himself was committed to a form of naturalism.  In fact, it is more likely that 
Herder’s conception of nature was influential on Hegel and the Romantics, as it is a conception of nature 
as purposive and living, a conception that Herder inherited from Leibniz and Shaftesbury, though he 
molded it in his own fashion.  There is a strong case to be made for the influence of Romantic thought on 
the direction of scientific research, as is shown in Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life. 
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of human nature advanced by Rousseau and Hobbes, but he additionally sought to 
undermine the individualism that worried him in his fellow countrymen, and friends, 
David Hume and Adam Smith.  Ferguson argues that one should not think of man’s 
natural state in individualistic terms because we have no evidence that human beings 
have ever lived apart from society.  Thus, in any important sense of the word ‘natural’, 
mankind’s natural state is a social one.  In Ferguson’s words: 
If both the earliest and the latest accounts collected from every quarter of the 
earth, represent mankind as assembled in troops and companies; and the 
individual always joined by affection to one party, while he is possibly opposed to 
another; employed in the exercise of recollection and foresight; inclined to 
communicate his own sentiments and to be made acquainted with those of others; 
these facts must be admitted as the foundation of all our reasoning relative to man.  
His mixed disposition to friendship and enmity, his reason, his use of language 
and articulate sounds, like the shape and the erect position of his body, are to be 
considered as so many attributes of his nature: they are to be retained in his 
description, as the wing and the paw are in that of the eagle and the lion, and as 
different degrees of fierceness, vigilance, timidity, or speed, are made to occupy a 
place in the natural history of different animals.43   
 
Herder was familiar with Ferguson’s Essay, as Ferguson was a widely read thinker in 
Germany at the time.  It is possible that Ferguson’s criticism may have exerted an 
influence on Herder, though the extent of Ferguson’s influence is difficult to establish.44  
Ferguson’s argument, at the least, was an influential one.  Many critics of the social 
contract theories of society rejected Rousseauian and Hobbesian arguments about the 
                                                            
43 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), p. 9.  Part I, Section 1 of Ferguson’s text is an extended argument for this position, most specifically 
directed against Rousseau. 
44 Herder’s mentions Ferguson in his review of Millar’s The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, SWS 5: 
452-6. Ferguson’s works were well-known in Germany in the eighteenth-century. The general reception of 
Ferguson in Germany is discussed in Fania Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment: Scottish Civic 
Discourse in Eighteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 130-7.  While Herder was 
certainly acquainted with Ferguson’s work, the alleged influence of Ferguson on Herder has at times been 
overstated.  For example, Roy Pascal, "Herder and the Scottish Historical School," Publications of the 
English Goethe Society 14 (1938-9). 
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state of nature on the grounds that the observation of nature shows us that human beings 
are naturally social and communal creatures.   These arguments involve, in a sense, an 
updated restatement of Aristotle’s claim in the Politics that man is a social or political 
animal.45 
Herder, however, takes the matter a step further than thinkers who made an 
argument such as Ferguson’s.  It is one thing to note that man exists in society 
everywhere that we can observe mankind to live.  It is another matter to ask why this is 
so, and to venture an explanation of this fact through an examination of the biological 
nature human beings.  Herder inquires into what it is about man’s natural condition that 
makes him the necessarily social being that he is.  Herder worked, especially in the Ideen, 
to answer the question: “what it is about human nature – specifically the biological 
character of human beings - that has constituted human beings as the essentially social 
beings that they are?” 
Herder’s interest in these questions led him to the study of both history and 
natural history.  Natural history (much of which today falls under the discipline of 
biology) is, according to Herder, the subject that reveals to us the basis of the history of 
mankind’s Geist, our spiritual and intellectual nature.  Herder was not content to offer 
anecdotal observations about man’s nature, and he looked for the material for his theory 
of man in the natural sciences of his day.  Herder drew on scientific works, such as 
Buffon’s Natural History, which contains a rich and detailed account of the structural 
                                                            
45 Aristotle, Politics, Book I.  Included in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
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and developmental character of many organisms, including human beings.46  Though 
Herder learned his facts from Buffon and other natural scientists, he argued for distinct 
conclusions about human nature on the basis those facts – conclusions concerning the 
social, political and moral character of humanity.  This empirically informed procedure 
yielded the unique blend of naturalism and historicism that Herder developed in his 
Weimar years.   
Herder’s naturalistic account of the foundations of society and human nature are 
interesting and have much to recommend them, but there is a challenge for his view, 
indicated by the passage of Ferguson’s quotes above.  Herder’s view, as I have presented 
it thus far seems open to the charge of excessive optimism.  If human beings are naturally 
social creatures, and they are so because of the affectionate bonds between children and 
their parents, and if it is the extension of these bonds that form the basis of society, how 
are we to account for the violence, hostility and aggression that human beings often 
display toward one another?  As Ferguson stated, mankind’s “mixed disposition to 
friendship and enmity” is a fact that “must be admitted as the foundation of all our 
reasoning relative to man.”47 
Herder was not unaware of need to account for the hostility and aggression in 
human beings, and he attempted to do so in the Ideen in a way that he did not in Auch 
eine Philosophie der Geschichte.  Herder claims that violent and aggressive dispositions 
                                                            
46 Volume 1, chapter 5 of Buffon’s Natural History, for example, contains a discussion of human infancy, 
maturation, the senses, and life expectancy.  See Georges Louis Leclerc Buffon, Natural History of Man, 
the Globe, and of Quadrupeds, With Additions From Cuvier, Lacepede, and Other Eminent Naturalists, 
trans. unknown (New York: World Publishing House, 1875).  While Herder was heavily influenced by 
Buffon, Buffon was not Herder’s sole scientific source, as Herder was familiar with many of the scientific 
works being produced at that time.  Herder also argued against the conception of human races, which 
Buffon defends in Natural History volume 1, chapter 6, pp. 138-42.  
47 Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, p. 9. 
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are rarer than gentle and peaceful ones.   Violent and tyrannical persons, Herder argues, 
only come to exist through a limited set of possible causes - “inordinate passions”, “faulty 
natural dispositions”, “peculiar circumstances of education”, or “demands of political 
necessity.”48  The natural world, especially the organic world, shows us certain deviations 
from the norm as part of the natural world itself.  The exceptional instances of extremely 
violent and aggressive persons, Herder contends, do not show that human nature as such 
is marked by dominant inclinations to violence and aggression.  Rather, it shows that 
human beings are naturally subject to the same kinds of variations as other organisms and 
natural phenomena.49   
Herder’s response, however, doesn’t seem adequate.  It neglects the fact that many 
kinds of hostility and aggression may infuse the ordinary lives of human beings in nearly 
all societies.  It also doesn’t seem to show how to account for the origin of hostility 
between various social groups, and how such hostility might endure for long periods of 
history.50  In order to account for these phenomena, though, Herder need not abandon 
his argument as a whole, or any of its fundamental ideas.  Accounting for the grimmer 
aspects of human nature does not require one to abandon either the claim that human 
                                                            
48 DKV 6: 638. 
49 One Hobbesian rejoinder to Herder could be that even if the mankind’s state of nature must be 
conceived of socially rather than individualistically, it could nonetheless appear to be a state of war.  
Hobbes’ own argument in Leviathan I.xii seems to support such an argument.  Herder, however, has two 
arguments against such an account.  First, the empirical record does not confirm Hobbes’ claim.  Second, 
Hobbes assumes that mankind’s desires are more uniform than they, in fact, are.  Hobbes, bases his 
contention that the state of nature is a state of war on the following principle: “if any two men desire the 
same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies” (p. 75).  Herder denies a 
state of war, rather than peace, is natural to men because the objects desired by human beings are both (1) 
variable, as the ways of thinking and hence the objects of men’s desires are not often the same and (2) even 
when men do desire the same objects, the objects desired are rarely scarce.  Herder’s arguments are given 
in Ideen, Book VIII, ch. 4. 
50 Herder’s discussion of the diversity of languages in the Treatise on the Origin of Language might offer a 
way of accounting for this. 
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beings are essentially social, or even that they tend for the most part to have a positive 
affective disposition towards those in their immediate society.  An adequate response to 
the charges of undue optimism would be to admit that tendencies toward hatred may 
tend to coexist alongside tendencies toward love, but that the natural forms of hatred are 
somehow tempered enough by natural forms of love and affection such that our natural 
disposition is still neither solitary nor anti-social.51   
 
V  
 
 Herder’s account of the dependence of human beings provides a naturalistic basis 
for his conception of human beings as essentially social.  It also provides a naturalistic 
basis for his philosophy of history and for the possibility of history as such.   
 In the ninth book of the Ideen, Herder takes up the problem of the possibility of 
history.  History, according to Herder, requires not just that there be events that unfold 
in a chronological sequence over time.  In order for there to be a history worthy of the 
name, Herder argues that there must be change and development across time.  A history 
of human beings and societies involves an account of the changes and developments that 
                                                            
51 I think that Herder could have approached the issue in this manner, as is apparent if we examine one of 
his early texts, his Zum Sinn des Gefühls of 1769.  In that text, Herder argues that the two basic powers of 
the world are attraction and repulsion, that human psychology is governed by these forces like everything 
else in nature, and also that war and peace in any part of nature can be explained according to these two 
forces.  DKV 4: 235-41. For a discussion of this text, see Marion Heinz, Sensualistischer Idealismus 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994), pp. 102-8.   
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take place in their forms of life and ways of thinking.  Herder states the condition which 
makes such changes, and hence history itself, possible:  
Here lies the principle of the history of mankind, without which no such history 
could be given.  If man received everything from himself and developed it 
independently of external objects, then a history of a single man would be 
possible, but not of men, not of the species.  Because our specific character as a 
species lies in the fact that we, born almost without instinct, only become formed 
into humanity [Menschheit] through lifelong practice, and the perfectibility just as 
much as the corruptibility of our species rests on this lifelong practice: so the 
history of mankind is for this reason necessarily a whole – that is, a chain of 
sociability [Geselligkeit] and a forming tradition [bildenden Tradition] from the 
first to the last link.52   
 
According to Herder, changes are observable over the course of history because human 
beings are educated into the societies in which they are born, and thus learn the 
distinctive ways of thinking and acting characteristic of those societies.  Societies, nations 
or Volk are not static entities because with each generation the societies themselves are 
further formed and developed by their members.  The reason that societies are not static, 
but are rather dynamic, developing, and hence historical is that the individual persons 
who compose them are “born almost without instinct” and are hence forced to work 
towards becoming the beings that they are disposed to become – beings capable of 
reasoning, speaking, and living characteristically human forms of life. 
 What enables human beings to become the rationally self-directed, linguistically 
competent, and moral beings that they are is their natural way of growing and 
developing.  And as we have seen, Herder holds that this both requires and involves the 
dependence of a child on the care of its parents.  Herder is fond of speaking of history as 
                                                            
52 DKV 6: 337. 
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a chain, in which each link is either an individual person or an individual generation.  
Herder’s account of what it is that makes history possible reveals that the bonds that hold 
these links together are bonds of love. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 Herder’s work in the Ideen draws together many of the ideas that we have seen developed 
in the texts from the 1760s and 1770s.  An important new concept that appears in the Ideen and 
is developed in later texts is the ideal of humanity, or the Humanitätsideal.  This, according to 
Herder is the progressive development of the qualities essential to human beings.  Humanität is, 
one the one hand, descriptive.  It involves an account of the characteristic qualities of human 
beings.  On this the other hand, the concept is prescriptive or normative.  On the basis of the 
description of human beings developed through the study of history, Herder seeks to provide an 
account of the ends or aims of human development, for both the individual and the species.  It is 
thus, in a sense, Herder’s own spin on the Bestimmung des Menschen, discussed in chapter two. 
 Herder’s account of the Humanitätsideal is one of the crucial areas of his work that is in 
great need of further exploration.  The ideal is fundamental to the Ideen, and especially to the 
Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität, which was authored from 1793-7.  While it is not possible 
to explore this idea now, I believe that the best way to understand it is as a continuation of the 
central concepts laid out in the present work.   
 In the years after the Ideen there are, no doubt, some changes in Herder’s views.  He also 
attempted to fill in some of his accounts of human nature and ethical life with greater detail.  
Some of these developments were responses to intellectual challenges, such as Herder’s 
engagement with Kant’s critical philosophy.  Others were the product of historic events, such as 
the French Revolution.  Along with these, there are also the natural changes that occur as an 
individual grows older and sees the world from a different vantage point. 
 Through all this, I believe, Herder maintains his belief in a form of perfectionism, the 
centrality of history for understanding human phenomena, a version of naturalism, and the 
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principle of harmonious individuality.  To conclude, I wish to gesture towards how these ideas 
appear together in Herder’s later work, with a passage from the Briefe: 
 
Ihr [i.e. Menschheit] Hauptgut, der Gebrauch ihrer Kräfte, die Ausbildung ihrer 
Fähigkeiten ist ein gemeines, bleibendes Gut; und muß natürlicher Weise im 
fortgehenden Gebrauch fortwachsen… 
 Denn die Natur des Menschen ist Kunst.  Alles, wozu eine Anlage in seinem 
Daseyn ist, kann und muß mit der Zeit Kunst werden.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Briefe zu Beförrderung der Humanität, Briefe 25, SWS 17: 117. 
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Note on Translations 
 
 
All translations from the German are my own, except where otherwise indicated.  
Translations from other languages are those of the editions cited in the bibliography. 
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